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This dissertation is composed of three essays in empirical market microstructure.  
My first two essays study market quality issues related to High-frequency Trading (HFT) 
using a dataset provided by NASDAQ that identifies the activity of high-frequency 
traders (HFTs).  My first essay studies the systematic effects of HFT on market quality.  I 
find only small effects of HFT participation on spreads and adverse selection costs, and I 
find evidence that HFT trades improve price efficiency.  I also examine HFT trading 
strategies, and show that HFTs engage in successful intraday market timing.  My second 
essay studies HFT in extreme market conditions, focusing on whether it has a stabilizing 
or destabilizing effect.  I find that HFTs buy during mini-flash crashes, sell during price 
spikes, and provide more liquidity than they consume during both types of events.  These 
results suggest HFTs play a stabilizing role during extreme return events, but their net 
trading volumes are low so these effects are probably small.  I also examine returns 
around large HFT order imbalances, and find only economically small evidence of the 
price momentum that these imbalances have been hypothesized to cause.  Finally, I study 
HFT activity around sustained market order flow imbalances, termed “toxic order flow” 
by Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2011), and find that HFT participation levels 
decrease as order flow toxicity increases.  Overall, in my first two essays, I find evidence 
of beneficial and neutral roles played by HFTs, both in normal and extreme market 
conditions, but no significant evidence for any of the detrimental impacts they are
 iv 
 
thought to have.  My third essay compares corporate bond trading costs in a market that 
provides pretrade transparency (the NYSE) with those in a market that is opaque (the 
OTC market).  I find that trading costs are dramatically lower in the market with pretrade 
transparency, and that pretrade transparency is the most likely explanation for the 
difference.  I also advance a likely explanation for the puzzle of why bond trading costs 
are lower for larger trades, and introduce a new statistical procedure for assessing trade 
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This dissertation is composed of three essays in empirical market microstructure.  
Market microstructure is defined by Hasbrouck as “the study of the trading mechanisms 
used for financial securities.”1  This field deals with issues such as liquidity, pricing 
efficiency, trading under information asymmetry, trading strategies, and market design.  
Empirical market microstructure utilizes highly granular market data to reveal insights on 
these topics, and often involves processing large volumes of individual trades and quotes.   
My first two essays study issues related to High-frequency Trading (HFT).  HFT 
is a recent development where a small group of market participants has developed a 
dramatic speed advantage over other traders and participates in a large share of the 
trading volume.  Their effects on the functioning of the markets are controversial and not 
well understood.  I provide new evidence on this issue using a proprietary dataset 
provided by the NASDAQ that identifies the trades and quotes of high-frequency traders 
(HFTs).  My first essay studies the systematic unconditional effects of HFT on market 
quality.  I find that spreads are slightly wider in trades where HFTs provide liquidity and 
tighter in trades where they demand liquidity, but the differences are small and liquidity 
is plentiful in this sample regardless of HFT participation.  I find that, contrary to
                                                 





 theoretical predictions, HFTs do not impose high adverse selection costs on other traders 
when demanding liquidity, and they seem to improve price efficiency when they trade.  I 
also provide evidence regarding HFT trading strategies, showing that HFTs engage in 
successful intraday market timing but do not seem to trade on cross-sectional return 
predictability.  My second essay studies HFT in extreme market conditions, with a focus 
on whether it has a stabilizing or destabilizing effect.  I find that HFTs buy during mini-
flash crashes, sell during price spikes, and provide more liquidity than they consume 
during both types of events.  These results suggest HFTs play a stabilizing role during 
extreme return events, but their net trading volumes are low so these effects are probably 
small.  I also examine returns around large HFT order imbalances, and find only 
economically small evidence of the price momentum that these imbalances have been 
hypothesized to cause.  Finally, I study HFT activity around sustained market order flow 
imbalances, termed “toxic order flow” by Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2011), 
and find that HFT participation levels decrease as order flow toxicity increases.  This 
finding holds for both liquidity-supplying and liquidity-demanding participation, which is 
inconsistent with predictions that HFTs increase their liquidity demand at high toxicity 
levels.  Overall, in my first two essays, I find evidence of beneficial and neutral roles 
played by HFTs, both in normal and extreme market conditions, but no significant 
evidence for any of the detrimental impacts they are thought to have.  My only results 
that could arguably be considered consistent with negative impacts are findings of 
decreased participation around some extreme events, but these effects are not dramatic.   
My third essay compares corporate bond trading costs in a market that provides 





market).  I find that trading costs are dramatically lower in the market with pretrade 
transparency, and that pretrade transparency is the most likely explanation for the 
difference.  I also advance a likely explanation for the puzzle of why bond trading costs 
are lower for larger trades. 
An important theme, in both this dissertation and the field of empirical market 
microstructure in general, is how specific trading arrangements affect market quality 
from an investor’s perspective.  This topic is relevant for investors deciding where to 
trade, for markets designers interested in how best to organize their trading mechanisms 
to attract traders, and for regulators formulating market rules.  In the first two essays, the 
trading arrangements of interest are the market structure, technology, and regulations that 
have allowed high-frequency trading to exist and flourish.   In the third essay, the trading 
arrangement of interest is pretrade transparency.  Other contributions I make in this 
dissertation include tests of a variety of academic theories and informal hypotheses 
advanced by market participants and the financial press, new empirical facts that can 
guide future theoretical research, and a new statistical procedure for assessing trade 




2. VERY FAST MONEY: HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 
ON THE NASDAQ 
2.1 Abstract 
I provide large-sample evidence regarding High-frequency Trading (HFT) 
strategies and market quality, using a proprietary sample of NASDAQ trades and quotes 
that identifies HFT participation.  Spreads are slightly wider for trades where HFTs 
provide liquidity and slightly tighter when HFTs take liquidity, suggesting that HFTs 
provide liquidity when it is scarce and consume liquidity when plentiful.  Prices 
incorporate information from order flow and market-wide returns more efficiently on 
days when HFT participation is high.  This effect is driven by HFT demand-side 
participation, implying that HFTs improve price efficiency when demanding liquidity.  I 
also provide evidence regarding HFT trading strategies, showing that HFTs engage in 
successful intraday market timing, but do not seem to trade on cross-sectional return 
predictability at the horizons I study.  The new evidence in this paper is relevant to the 
ongoing HFT-related policy debates and can potentially provide guidance to theoretical 





High-frequency trading has become a pervasive feature of the equity markets in a 
relatively short period of time.  Estimates of high-frequency trading activity levels vary, 
but are large.  For example, a 2009 article in Advanced Trading estimates that high 
frequency trading is responsible for 73% of the of U.S. equity trading volume.  The 
developments in market structure (such as decimalization, REG NMS, and automated 
electronic limit order books) that have created the circumstances for HFT to flourish are 
relatively recent.  Our understanding of the impact of high-frequency trading on market 
quality is in its infancy, partly due to its sudden emergence and also the scarcity of high 
quality data.  There are diverse views among market participants and regulators on 
whether HFT is beneficial, neutral, or detrimental.  Reflecting this uncertainty, proposals 
to both restrict and encourage high-frequency trading are simultaneously being debated.  
In a letter to the SEC, Senator Charles Schumer writes: 
I have come to believe that HFT provides less of the benefits to our 
markets than its adherents claim, and does so at a greater cost to long-term 
investors ... The SEC should identify market participants who frequently 
engage in these practices, and require exchanges and other trading venues 
to slow down those market participants [in times of stress] … the 
Commission should consider imposing a minimum quote duration, so that 
orders could not be sent and cancelled within a fraction of a second.2  
Conversely, the Joint SEC-CFTC Advisory Committee recommends:  
the Commission should consider encouraging, through incentives or 
regulation, persons who regularly implement market maker strategies to 
maintain best buy and sell quotations which are ‘reasonably related to the 
market’ … We recognize that many High Frequency Traders are not even 
                                                 





broker-dealers and therefore their compliance with quoting requirements 
would have to be addressed primarily through pricing incentives.3 
  The differing views regarding the impact of HFT on market quality partly stem 
from the lack of consensus on the nature of their trading practices.  A common view is 
that they have taken over the market-making function.  Under this scenario, they 
generally benefit the market by increasing competition to provide liquidity, but there are 
still concerns that they lack the affirmative obligations that bound traditional market 
makers and could cause disruptions by exiting the market at their discretion.  They are 
also thought to engage in high-frequency arbitrage, which may have the beneficial effect 
of making prices more efficient.  The alternate perspective is that the liquidity they 
provide is unreliable, and is outweighed by disruptive practices they are alleged to 
employ such as order spoofing, predatory trading, herding, or overloading market 
infrastructure with excessive messages. 
Aside from the views of market participants and regulators, there are theoretical 
reasons to suspect that HFT may affect market quality.  In the classic market 
microstructure models, the major sources of trading frictions are information asymmetry, 
inventory risk, and order processing costs.  HFTs are likely to differ from the 
intermediaries they have replaced in all of these dimensions.  As pointed out in Jovanovic 
and Menkveld (2011) and Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2011), the speed advantage of 
HFTs could allow them to react more quickly to public news than other traders, which 
would reduce the adverse selection costs they face when providing liquidity while 
making limit orders riskier for slower traders.  Similarly, Stoll (2000) argues that speed 
                                                 






differentials play a role in informational frictions, and that increasing the speed parity 
among traders could reduce spreads under certain conditions.  Inventory costs may also 
play a greater role than in the past.  High-frequency traders generally seek to end the day 
flat.  In models such as Garman (1976) and Ho and Stoll (1981), inventory adjustment 
motives affect liquidity,4 and recent evidence is supportive (see Naik and Yadav 2003, 
Panayides 2007, Comerton et al. 2010).  Several studies have shown evidence of market 
maker inventory adjustment taking place relatively slowly,5 and if HFTs manage 
inventory more aggressively, we might expect the effects on liquidity to increase.  Order 
processing costs should be reduced for HFTs because of their large trading volumes.  
Rebates for adding liquidity are tiered by volume, and their fixed costs will be spread 
over more transactions.  While the classic microstructure literature has implications for 
HFT, there has also been a recent growth in HFT-specific theoretical literature.  
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) develop a model where the information asymmetry 
effects can generate either beneficial or negative impacts, and derive the conditions 
where each outcome is in effect.  Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2011), Cvitanic and 
Kirilenko (2010), and Jarrow and Protter (2011) present theoretical models where HFTs 
can play disruptive roles.  The mechanisms are overinvestment, adverse selection, and the 
crowding out of slower traders in Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2011), order sniping in 
Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010), and a type of herding behavior in Jarrow and Protter 
(2011).  
                                                 
4 To be more precise, inventory affects midquotes, effectively reducing liquidity for trades that increase 
inventory imbalances while improving liquidity for inventory rebalancing trades. 
5 Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) find cases where inventory takes long periods to revert to apparent target 






Despite the emerging theoretical literature and ongoing policy debates concerning 
HFT, there is little empirical evidence on the market quality impacts and trading 
behaviors of HFT.  The empirical studies include Brogaard (2011, 2012a, 2012b), 
Menkveld (2012), Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), Hasbrouck and Saar (2011), and 
Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2011) (KKST (2011) hereafter).  Of these, KKST 
(2011) focus on an extreme event (the 2010 Flash Crash6), and Jovanovic and Menkveld 
(2011) and Menkveld (2012) study a single high-frequency trader, and Brogaard (2012b) 
focuses on trading strategies instead of market quality effects, leaving only three papers 
that address the collective effects of HFT in normal market conditions. 7  Brogaard (2011, 
2012a) studies a sample of NASDAQ trades and quotes with HFT participation identified 
by the exchange, and finds that HFT is generally beneficial or benign.  Brogaard (2011, 
2012a) finds that they provide a large share of the liquidity in the market and play an 
important role in the price discovery process.  Brogaard (2012) finds HFT activity 
dampens volatility.  Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) also study recent NASDAQ data and use 
the intensity of order placements and cancellations, which they call strategic runs, to 
identify periods when HFTs are active in a stock.  They find that high-frequency trading 
“lowers short-term volatility, reduces quoted spreads and total price impact of trades, and 
increases depth in the limit order book” (p. 3). 
There is a related thread of empirical studies on algorithmic trading (AT).  HFT is 
generally considered a subset of AT, but HFTs and non-HFT AT are very different.  
                                                 
6 The Flash Crash is the popular name for an event that occurred on May 6, 2010, where within a half hour 
period, the major U.S. equity indexes dropped more than 5% and quickly reversed most of the losses.  
Volatility in some ETFs and individual stocks was even greater.  See KKST (2011). 
7 Arguably, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) could fall into this category as well.  In part of their analysis, 
they study the introduction of an HFT-friendly trading venue on market quality, but they do not clearly 





Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) explain the distinction clearly.  They divide algorithmic 
traders into agency algorithms and proprietary algorithms.  Agency algorithms are 
“employed to minimize trading costs of buy-side managers” (p. 2). These can be thought 
of as engaging in activities such as splitting large orders or alternating between providing 
and taking liquidity with the goal of meeting a longer term trading need while minimizing 
its price impact.  Proprietary algorithmic traders encompass the subset of AT that I am 
referring to as HFT.  They trade their own capital, turn over positions rapidly, have 
technology and infrastructure to trade at very high speeds (2-3 milliseconds, according to 
Hasbrouck and Saar 2011), and are reluctant to hold inventory overnight.  The AT 
literature does not study HFT directly, but often touches on related issues or includes 
HFT in AT samples.  The empirical AT studies that address market quality issues include 
Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2009), Hendershott and Riordan (2009), 
and Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011).8  Chaboud et al. (2009) study algorithmic 
trading in foreign exchange markets and find that AT trades contribute less to price 
discovery than human trades in two of the three currencies in their sample, AT limit 
orders seem to be strategically placed (face less adverse selection costs), AT reduces 
liquidity provision before the NFP report and increases afterwards, and there is some 
evidence that AT lowers volatility.  Hendershott and Riordan (2009) examine AT in the 
DAX stocks on the Deutsche Boerse’s Xetra platform.  They find that ATs are more 
likely to demand liquidity when it is cheap and supply when it is expensive, and that ATs 
contribute more to price discovery than human traders.  Hendershott, Jones, and 
Menkveld (2011) examine market quality measures on the NYSE and find that AT 
                                                 
8 There is also a somewhat large AT literature that studies algorithmic trading strategies and trading costs 





improves liquidity for large capitalization stocks, makes quotes more informative, and 
reduces the adverse selection costs of trades.  Chaboud et al. (2009) and Hendershott and 
Riordan (2009) study data that explicitly identify algorithmic trader participation, while 
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) uses message traffic as a proxy for AT activity 
and utilize an infrastructure improvement to establish causality.   
I contribute to this literature by examining the market quality impacts of HFT and 
testing several hypotheses regarding HFT behavior in a proprietary sample of NASDAQ 
trades and quotes that identifies HFT participation.  This is the same dataset used in 
Brogaard (2011, 2012a), but I focus on a different set of questions and market quality 
dimensions.  The market quality tests I conduct suggest that HFTs play a neutral or 
beneficial role.  Trading costs are unconditionally very low, but spreads are slightly wider 
for trades where HFTs provide liquidity and slightly tighter when HFTs take liquidity, 
suggesting that HFTs provide liquidity when it is scarce and consume liquidity when 
plentiful.  These results hold whether HFT participation is defined as being on the 
aggressive side, the passive side, or either, and are robust to controls for stock and trade 
characteristics and market conditions.  To the best of my knowledge, this is the first large 
sample trading cost analysis performed in data that explicitly identify HFT trades.9  
Prices are more efficient on days when HFTs are more active in a given stock, in the 
sense that it takes less time for stock prices to incorporate information from order flow 
and market index returns.  This result is driven by HFT liquidity-demanding trades.   I 
also provide new evidence on the trading behavior of HFTs.  Their trading performance 
                                                 
9 Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) are not able to identify HFT participation in specific trades.  Jovanovic and 






as measured in a VWAP analysis is consistent with successful intraday market timing, 
but I find no evidence that their trades predict the cross section of short-term expected 
returns. 
These results should be interpreted with some caution.  As discussed in more 
detail below, the sample does not identify the activity of all high-frequency traders, and 
contains only NASDAQ continuous trading activity in the sample stocks.  The sample 
stocks are traded in multiple venues, and are presumably traded by the sample HFTs in 
other venues.  Also, the NASDAQ exchange is organized as a virtual electronic limit 
order book with price and time priority, pretrade and posttrade transparency, anonymity, 
and a maker-taker fee model.  It is not clear that any conclusions drawn in this sample 
will necessarily generalize to markets that are organized differently.  These concerns are 
somewhat mitigated by the facts that the sample contains an economically large amount 
of trading activity, both in absolute terms and as a share of volume in the sample firms, 
and the identified HFT firms account for a large share of the observed volume.  In 
addition, although I find only benign or beneficial effects of HFT in this paper, my 
analysis focuses on their systematic effects and does not rule out the possibility that there 
are certain circumstances where HFT can have negative impacts.  In particular, the data 
do not distinguish between individual HFTs, so I can only observe their aggregated 
activity.  Therefore, while this is useful in studying their behavior on balance and their 
overall impact on the market, it is possible that individual HFTs follow disruptive 
strategies that are hidden by the level of aggregation in the data.  Nevertheless, I believe 
the evidence provided in this paper should advance our understanding of HFT market 





The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.3 describes the data.  
Section 2.4 examines the level of HFT participation in the sample.  Section 2.5 studies 
trading costs and how they vary with HFT participation.  Section 2.6 presents price 




The primary data source employed is a proprietary dataset provided by NASDAQ 
consisting of trades and quotes for a sample of 120 stocks.  The stock sample was chosen 
by Terrence Hendershott and Ryan Riordan.  See Table 2.1 for a list of sample stocks.  It 
is stratified by market capitalization,10 and is evenly split by NASDAQ and NYSE 
listing.  The sample period covers all of 2008 and 2009 and one week in 2010.11  The 
trade sample consists of all trades executed on the exchange in continuous trading, 
excluding crosses and NASDAQ TRF-reported trades.  Trades are time stamped to the 
millisecond and signed to indicate whether they were initiated by a buyer or seller.  The 
trade signs are high quality, and are based on records of rebate payments.12   NASDAQ 
Inside Quotes (BBOs) are provided for subsamples of the data.  These subsamples cover 
the first full trading week in each quarter, the week of Oct 6-10, 2008 (the week of the 
Lehman collapse), and the week of Feb 22-26, 2010.  The BBO data are time stamped to 
the millisecond and does not have the problems with timestamp discrepancies that are 
                                                 
10 With 40 large, 40 medium, and 40 small stocks. 
11 There is one day, October 10, 2008, missing from the dataset which may become available in the future.   
12 Rebate payments are payments made to the liquidity supplier in a maker-taker market.  These are partial 





present in alternate sources.  The only filter applied to the full trade sample was the 
removal of trades before 9:30 am and after 4:00 pm.  A subsample used for trading cost 
analysis also required a usable quote before and after each trade.  For some analyses, 
additional filters were applied, and specifics are provided in the relevant sections. 
A unique feature of this dataset is that high-frequency participation is identified in 
the data.  NASDAQ has manually identified 26 high-frequency trading firms and flagged 
their activity.  Specifically, trades contain a field with the following codes: HH, HN, NH, 
or NN.  H identifies a high-frequency trader and N identifies a non-HFT.  The first term 
in a pair classifies the liquidity taker, and the second term classifies the liquidity provider.  
For example, a trade marked HN would mean a high-frequency trader took liquidity from 
a non-HFT on that trade.  Similarly, HFT quotes are flagged in the limit order book 
snapshots and a subsample of quotes. 
The identities of the HFT firms are not provided.  The selection process was 
manual and apparently somewhat subjective.  The principles are described in Brogaard 
(2012a) as follows: 
The characteristics of firms identified as being HFTs are the following: 
They engage in proprietary trading… They use sponsored access providers 
whereby they have access to the co-location services and can obtain large-
volume discounts and reduce latency. They tend to switch between long 
and short net positions several times throughout the day…. Orders by HFT 
firms are of a shorter time duration than those placed by non-HFT firms. 
Also, HFT firms normally have a lower ratio of trades per orders placed 
than non-HFT firms. (p. 7) 
Brogaard (2012a) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) note that the selection process 
excludes certain types of firms that engage in HFT, such as firms whose primary business 
is not HFT but sometimes engage in HFT or HFT firms that route trades through a non-





trading volume that the sample firms participate in, which is described in further detail in 
Section 2.4.  It is also worth repeating that the level of aggregation in the data does not 
allow individual HFTs to be studied in isolation. 
I also obtain supplemental data from CRSP and TAQ.  I use CRSP data for the 
sample stock descriptive statistics only.  For several tests, I employ midpoint returns, and 
in some cases, I consider it preferable to use an NBBO midpoint constructed from the 
TAQ CQ tape instead of the NASDAQ midpoint.  The NBBO includes price data from 
other market centers, and is available on dates when NASDAQ Inside Quotes are not 
provided.  In addition to the larger sample size available with NBBO quotes, my main 
considerations in choosing a quote source for a particular application are that TAQ quotes 
are only time stamped to the second, while NASDAQ quotes are timestamped to the 
millisecond, and whether I am primarily interested in liquidity and prices across all 
markets or on the exchange where the sample trades occur.  I also use TAQ to obtain 
SPY midpoints to construct a proxy for the market return, and I use trade data from the 
CT to assess NASDAQ’s volume shares in sample stocks.13 
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2 presents trade summary statistics. The second column reports values for 
the full sample.  The full sample covers 509 days and contains 550,118,372 trades for 
approximately 106 billion shares and a total dollar volume of $3.9 trillion.  The daily 
average share volume in the sample is 208 million shares and the dollar volume is $7.7 
billion.  There is substantial variation in the daily trading activity.  On the 10th percentile 
                                                 





day, there is $4.4 billion traded, while on the 90th percentile day, $11.9 billion is traded.  
The trade size is of particular interest because there is a common perception that trade 
sizes are much smaller than in the past.  They are in fact small in this sample: the average 
size is 192.3 shares, the median is 100 shares, and the 90th percentile is 400 shares.  The 
third column reports values for the subsample where matching NASDAQ pretrade and 
posttrade quotes are available.  This subsample contains 61,272,712 trades for 11.6 
billion shares and $444 billion dollars.  By comparing the two columns, we can 
informally assess whether the quote subsample is reasonably representative.  The days 
with quotes have somewhat more trading activity, but in general appear similar.  The 
subsample covers roughly 10% of the trading days in the full sample, and the aggregate 
trades, share volume, and dollar volume are around 11% of the full sample values.  The 
daily mean share volume and dollar volume in the subsample are 14% and 18% higher 
than the full sample means. The trade size distributions are very close.    
2.4 HFT Activity Levels 
In this section, I examine the extent of HFT activity as a share of total dollar 
trading volume.  I construct three measures of the HFT participation share that differ in 
how each trade is classified as an HFT or non-HFT trade.  The first counts trades where 
an HFT participates on either side of a trade (All), the second only uses trades where an 
HFT is the liquidity demander (Demand), and the third only uses trades where an HFT is 
the liquidity supplier (Supply).  Trades where HFT are on both sides are counted in all 





which is consistent because the numerator does not include HFT from other trading 
venues.  
Brogaard (2012b) performs a similar analysis.  This section complements the 
material in that paper by reporting additional pooling/weighting schemes designed to 
show time-series and cross-sectional variation, and by introducing a measure of stock-
specific time variation in HFT participation that I use as an explanatory variable in 
several analyses that follow in this paper.  Table 2.3 summarizes the main findings.  
Across the full sample, HFTs participate in 68.3% of all dollar trading volume, demand 
liquidity in 42.2%, and supply liquidity in 41.2%.  From the daily results with trades 
pooled across all stocks, the mean participation shares are similar and little time variation 
is evident, with standard deviations ranging from 2.4% to 3.6%.  These levels are 
strikingly high and are of a similar order of magnitude to those reported by Brogaard.  
The third section of Table 2.3 calculates participation shares by stock-day and reports 
sample statistics equally weighting across stock-days.  This removes the extra weight 
implicitly given to stock-days with more trades in the previous sections.  Here we see 
much lower mean participation levels (48.3%, 32.5%, and 23.2% for All, Demand, and 
Supply, respectively), suggesting HFTs are participating more heavily in stock-days with 
more trading activity.  We also see more variability, with standard deviations from 15.4% 
to 20.5%.  A natural question is whether the variability in HFT participation across stock-
days is determined by temporary market conditions and or by persistent stock 
characteristics.  To gain some insight into this question, the fourth section of Table 2.3 
first takes the means of the daily participation shares for each stock, and then reports 





long-run mean HFT participation across stocks.  For example, the 90th percentile stock 
has a mean daily HFT (All) share of 72.6%, while the 10th percentile stock has a share of 
25.1%.  This is consistent with an analysis of HFT participation by stock-day in Brogaard 
(2012b), which finds that some persistent stock characteristics such as market 
capitalization and market-to-book are determinants of HFT activity.   
For some of the tests I wish to conduct later, I will need to identify days with high 
HFT intensity.  In light of the observations above, a stock-specific measure that controls 
for the normal level of HFT activity in that stock is desirable.  For each of the three types 
of HFT participation, I construct indicator variables that take a value of 1 for each stock-
day where the dollar volume participation share is in the highest tercile for that stock 
across all sample days and 0 otherwise.  The choice of terciles is somewhat arbitrary, but 
seems to be a reasonable tradeoff between sample size and extremity.   
Before using the HFT participation indicator variables, I address three potential 
concerns regarding their suitability.  First, they must capture sufficient time variation in 
HFT activity within a given stock.  Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) show that stock-specific 
HFT quoting intensity varies greatly over short intervals, but it is necessary to verify that 
this time variation is also present in trading activity and is not dampened at the daily 
horizon.  The last section of Table 2.3 reports summary statistics on the differences 
between the dollar volume HFT participation levels on days when the indicator variable 
is 1 (high participation days) and other days (normal participation days).  The mean 
differences are 16.6%, 16.1%, and 12.5% for All, Demand, and Supply, respectively, and 
their 10th percentile values are 9.4%, 10.9%, and 8.2%.   Second, given the growth in 





effects they capture could be attributable to time trends in market quality unrelated to 
HFT.  To investigate this, on each day in the sample, I count the number of stocks where 
each of these variables show high HFT participation levels.  These counts are plotted 
over time in Figure 2.1.  Given that the indicator variables take the value of 1 in each 
stock’s high-participation tercile, if these variables only captured a trend, we would 
expect to see no stocks experiencing high-HFT days in the first two-thirds of the sample 
and all 120 stocks with high-HFT days in the last one-third of the sample (with some 
noise).  This is not the case.  Figure 2.1 does show some signs of a trend but with strong 
time variability from day to day.  A third concern is that HFT liquidity demand and 
supply may be highly correlated, and using all three variables would be redundant.  
Visually, there appears to be some correlation, but also periods with significant 
divergences.  The correlation coefficients confirm that there is high correlation but also 
independent information.  The correlation between the daily demand and supply indicator 
variable counts is .203, and the mean stock-specific correlation between the daily raw 
dollar volume shares is .147, with a 10th percentile value of -.068 of and a 90th percentile 
value of .385.  Overall, it seems reasonable to use these indicators in further analyses. 
2.5 Trading Costs 
2.5.1 Methodology 
In this section, I compare the trading costs between trades with HFT participation 
to those without.  The primary metrics I use are effective spreads, price impacts, and 
realized spreads.  I also report quoted spreads but, because they are conditional on a trade 





an actual measure of trading costs.  All spreads are measured as percentages of the 
midpoint price prior to the trade, and I follow the convention of reporting half spreads to 
reflect one-way rather than round trip costs.  For this analysis, I use the subsample of 
trades where both pre- and posttrade quotes are available.  I also convert spreads to total 
dollar costs for selected cases.   
Effective spreads measure the difference between a trade’s execution price and 
the pretrade midpoint.  Effective spreads compensate liquidity providers for adverse 
selection costs when trading with informed traders (as in Glosten and Milgrom 1985) and 
are expected to contain a residual component that covers inventory risk, order processing 
costs, and market maker rents.  An established empirical decomposition method separates 
the effective spreads into the price impact (adverse selection component) and realized 
spread (residual component).  See Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder and 
Kaufman (1997a, 1997b) for a discussion of this methodology and examples of its 
implementation.  The following formulas are used on every trade where quotes are 
available: 
(2.1) Effective Spread = 100Q(P – M0)/ M0 
(2.2) Price Impact      = 100Q(MT – M0)/ M0 
(2.3) Realized Spread = 100Q(P – MT)/ M0 = Effective Spread - Price Impact 
where Q is a trade sign indicator variable equal to 1 for buys and -1 for sells, P is the 
trade price, M0 is the pretrade quote midpoint, and MT is midpoint T minutes after the 





robustness tests use 5-minutes and 30-minutes.  The last midpoint of the regular trading 
hours is used when trades are within T minutes of the close.  Aside from the traditional 
interpretations of this decomposition, there are additional reasons why it is of particular 
interest when combined with the HFT identification.  If HFTs systematically profit from 
naïve market-making, we should observe high realized spreads on their liquidity-
providing trades.  Otherwise, if HFTs profit from these trades, it must be through some 
other mechanism, such as rebates or superior exit timing (i.e., beating the 1-minute 
benchmark used in the decomposition).  If the realized spreads on these trades are much 
higher than on those where others provide liquidity, this suggests that HFTs have skill in 
choosing when to offer liquidity to the market.  When taking liquidity, if HFTs are 
trading on information, we should observe high price impacts, while if they are simply re-
balancing, we should not. 
To compare trading costs in trades with HFT participation to those without, I 
regress these measures of trading costs on indicator variables that capture whether a HFT 
participated in a trade and control for stock and trade characteristics and market 
conditions.  The regressions are variations on two models.  In the first set of regressions, 
the effect of HFT participation is constrained to be constant across all trade types.  The 
following specification is used: 
(2.4) SPREADitn = αit + β1 HFT + β2j SIZEj + β3 BUY + β4 SELL + ε   
where i indexes stocks, t indexes day-half hour intervals, n indexes trades, and j indexes 





indicator variable equal to 1 if a trade had HFT participation and 0 otherwise.  Different 
versions of the model define HFT participation by trade side (liquidity-demanding or 
supplying).  I include fixed-effects intercepts for every stock-day-half hour to control for 
stock characteristics and market conditions.  Trade size groups are defined as SMALL (< 
500 shares), MEDIUM (>=500 shares, < 1000 shares), and LARGE (> 1000 shares).  
BUY and SELL indicate which side of the trade took liquidity.  SMALL and SELL are 
dropped from the estimation, so in these cases, the fixed-effects intercepts capture the 
trading costs for small sells, and the coefficients on the other indicator variables must be 
interpreted as spread differences from small sells. 
The second set of models allows the effects of HFT participation to vary with 
trade characteristics: 
(2.5) SPREADitn = αit + β1j (HFT x SIZEj) + β2 (HFT x BUY) + β3 (HFT x SELL) + ε   
where the variable definitions are identical to the constrained version.  Again, SMALL 
and SELL are dropped from the estimation. 
I also estimate variations of the constrained model one day at a time and one stock 
at a time to examine how these relationships vary over time and across stocks. 
2.5.2 Results 
Means and medians of the spread and price impacts are reported in Table 2.4.  
These are tabulated for the full sample and for all counterparty type combinations in the 





bps, and realized spreads are -0.9 bps.  These trading cost measures are strikingly low 
compared to historical estimates.  For example, Bessembinder (2003) finds mean 
effective spreads of 28.9 bps and realized spreads of 17.2 bps in his postdecimalization 
NASDAQ sample.14  Many other studies have noted reductions in trading costs over time 
(see Angel, Harris, and Spatt 2010, and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 2008, 2011), 
so the low costs in this sample are not entirely unexpected.  It is surprising, however, that 
mean realized spreads are negative for the full sample and all counterparty combinations, 
and medians are negative in the full sample and negative or zero for all counterparty 
categories.  This observation holds in robustness tests using both 5-minute and 30-minute 
realized spreads.  This means that effective spreads do not fully compensate the liquidity 
provider for adverse selection costs.  It does not necessarily mean that liquidity providers 
lose money to informed traders on average, because the absolute values are small and at 
least partially offset by liquidity rebates.  It is also possible that some liquidity providers 
are able to beat the 1-minute posttrade benchmarks built into these measures, which I 
explore in Section 2.7.1.  Nevertheless, it does mean the compensation for liquidity 
provision is very low based on these widely-used measures.  I am not aware of any prior 
study showing negative realized spreads in any market.  I offer two possible explanations.  
First, it is possible that increased competition between liquidity providers has driven 
compensation for liquidity provision down to a level close to the liquidity rebate.  
Second, it is possible that disintermediation has increased to a degree where a large 
proportion of the trades we observe are now between traders seeking liquidity with 
varying degrees of patience, as opposed to trades between an impatient liquidity 
                                                 






demander and a professional liquidity provider.  This does not rule out the low or 
negative realized spreads we observe in the NH and HH categories, because if HFTs 
expect some small profit from a trade, they may be willing to quote aggressively to 
compete with patient liquidity demanders.  However, these are only conjectures that I am 
not able to test in these data. 
In all of the trading costs measures in Table 2.4, we do see some variation across 
the HFT participation categories, but it is generally small.  Across all measures and 
categories, the largest difference is 1.6 bps when comparing median realized spreads 
between HH trades and NH or NN trades.  Differences in means and medians may mask 
important differences that would emerge when controlling for other factors that influence 
trading costs, however, so I consider the regression results below to be more informative. 
Table 2.5 reports the results from the regressions constraining the effect of HFT 
participation to be constant.  In Panel A, the dependent variable is the effective spread.  
Models 1 and 2 define the HFT participation indicator based on the liquidity demander, 
and Models 3 and 4 use the liquidity provider.  Models 1 and 3 include only the HFT 
participation indicator and stock and day-half hour fixed effects, while Models 2 and 4 
include the trade size and sign controls.  The controls add very little explanatory power 
beyond the fixed effects.  The coefficient estimates show that effective spreads are 0.7 
bps lower on trades where an HFT demands liquidity and 0.3 bps higher on trades where 
an HFT supplies liquidity.  This suggests that HFTs provide liquidity when it is scarce 
and consume liquidity when plentiful.  In Panel B, the dependent variable is 1-minute 
price impact, and the regression models are otherwise identical to those in Panel A.  The 





trades where an HFT demands liquidity, and 0.1 bps  lower on trades where an HFT 
supplies liquidity.  All estimates on the HFT indicator variables are significant at the 1% 
level. 
Table 2.6 reports regressions that interact the HFT participation indicators with 
trade characteristics to determine if the impact of HFT participation varies across trade 
types.  In Panel A, the dependent variables are effective spreads.  In Model 1, the impact 
of HFT demand participation is statistically smaller (less negative) for medium and large 
trades than for small trades, but the differences are only 0.1 bps.  In Model 3, the impact 
of HFT supply is also smaller for medium trades and is roughly cancelled out for large 
trades.  In Models 2 and 4, the differences in impact across buys and sells are statistically 
significant but are only 0.1 bps or less.  In Panel B, the dependent variables are 1-minute 
price impacts.  Here we observe more variation with characteristics, but magnitudes of 
the differences are still small.  From Model 1, the price impacts of liquidity-demanding 
HFT trades of all sizes are 0.1 bps higher than similar non-HFT trades.  From Model 2, 
the price impact of HFT liquidity-demanding sell trades is 0.1 bps higher than similar 
trades, and for buy trades, there is almost no effect.  From Model 3, the price impacts of 
small trades where HFTs provide liquidity are almost indistinguishable from similar 
trades, while they are 0.4 bps lower for medium trades and 0.8 bps lower for large trades.  
From Model 4, for sell trades where HFTs provide liquidity, the price impacts are 0.2 bps 
lower than those of similar trades, while for buy trades, the price impacts are about the 
same as for similar trades.  Overall, the estimated impacts of their trades on effective 
spread and price impacts statistically vary with characteristics, but are unconditionally 





The strongest stylized fact from this analysis is that HFTs avoid more informed larger 
trades. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show how the effects of HFT on effective spreads and 1-
minute price impacts vary over time and across stocks.  These are plots of the coefficients 
on the HFT indicator variable in Equation (2.4) with all controls, estimated one day at a 
time or one stock at a time.  From the effective spread coefficient plots in Figure 2.2 
Panel A and C, we see the coefficients do vary over time, but within an economically 
small range.  For example, in Panel A, we see the lowest value for HFT_demand is -1.5 
bps, and the highest is -0.2 bps.  Panels B and D show how the coefficients vary by stock, 
with stocks sorted by their coefficient values.  These show little variation except in the 
tails, and by inspection, the tails tend to hold small stocks.  The graphs for price impact 
shown in Figure 2.3 are similar, with economically small time variation in price impacts 
over time, and little variation across stocks except for the tails. 
It is also of interest to compare the price impact regression estimates with the 
price discovery analysis in Brogaard (2011).  Brogaard finds that when demanding 
liquidity, HFT trades bring information into the market, and when supplying liquidity 
they avoid trading with informed traders.  The regression models employed in this paper 
provide an alternate perspective on these questions.  These models test whether the price 
impacts of trades with HFT participation are significantly different from price impacts of 
other trades, after controlling for other factors described previously.  The results in Table 
2.5 Panel B Models 1 and 2 show that trades where HFTs demand liquidity do have very 
slightly higher price impacts than trades where they do not.  The results in Models 3 and 





results in Table 2.6 Panel B suggest that these conclusions are somewhat trade-
characteristic dependent, however.  For example, from Panel B Model 3, we see that 
when HFTs supply liquidity in medium and large trades, the price impact is 0.4 - 0.8 bps 
lower than predicted by fixed effects and trade characteristics, but for small trades, the 
model predicts no difference between HFT and non-HFT trades.  It is worth noting that 
these differences are all small, and small trades are more prevalent so the small trade 
differences probably deserve the most weight.  I interpret these results as weakly 
supportive of the conclusion that HFT liquidity-demanding trades are more informed, but 
they suggest that the conclusion HFTs avoid providing liquidity to informed traders is not 
robust across methodologies. 
It is also useful to convert some of the spread measures presented above to total 
dollar costs to estimate how much HFTs earned or paid in spreads on their NASDAQ 
trades.  I report values for the 49-day subsample where sufficient data are available for 
this analysis.  In this sample, the total dollar volume traded is $443,996 million.  The total 
dollar effective spread paid to complete these trades amounted to $98 million.15  The total 
dollar effective spread earned by HFTs is $42 million, and the total dollar effective 
spread paid by HFTs is $34 million, for a net dollar effective spread earned by HFTs of 
$8 million.16  The total effective spreads paid by non-HFT liquidity demanders is $64 
million, and the total earned by non-HFT liquidity suppliers is $56 million, for a net 
dollar effective spread paid by non-HFTs of $8 million.  In addition to dollar effective 
                                                 
15 Total dollar effective spreads are calculated as Q(P-M0) x share volume for each trade, and summed over 
all trades in the category of interest. Total dollar price impacts are calculated analogously. 
16 The total paid in effective spreads by HFTs is the sum over trade categories HH and HN.  The total 
earned is the sum over trade categories HH and NH.  The other total dollar spread calculations in this 





spreads, it is of particular interest to examine dollar price impacts because one of the 
detrimental impacts of HFTs predicted by the theoretical literature is high adverse 
selection costs imposed by HFTs on non-HFTs when demanding liquidity.  The total 
dollar price impact imposed on liquidity providers over all trades is $135 million, of 
which $53 million is borne by HFTs, and $82 million is borne by non-HFTs.  Of the $82 
million borne by non-HFTs, $48 million is imposed by other non-HFTs and $34 million 
is imposed by HFTs.  HFTs impose a total dollar price impact of $54 million on other 
traders when demanding liquidity (the $34 million on non-HFTs and another $20 million 
on HFT counterparties), only slightly more than what they bear when providing liquidity.  
Using Model 4 in Panel B of Table 2.4 to estimate the effect of HFT on price impacts, 
without HFT demand participation, non-HFT liquidity suppliers would be projected to 
face only $1 million less in price impact, for a total of $81 million.  Taken together, these 
calculations suggest that HFTs earn about $9 million in realized spreads in this sample, or 
$47.5 million annualized across the 120 sample stocks.    It is noteworthy that this is 
much less than the total HFT profits estimated in Brogaard (2012b), suggesting that HFTs 
derive a significant part of their income from sources other than the spread.17  I interpret 
the total dollar price impact estimates as confirming the initial observations that the price 
impact effects of HFT are economically small, and as suggesting that concerns regarding 
excessive adverse selection costs imposed by HFTs on non-HFTs are probably 
overblown. 
                                                 
17 Brogaard (2012b) estimates total daily HFT profits of $298,000 in this dataset, which would annualize to 
$75 million.  Brogaard does not require quote data for the total HFT profit calculations, so this estimate is 





Overall, the results from the regressions confirm the initial observations from the 
summary statistics.  HFT participation explains statistically significant differences in 
trading cost measures, but these differences are economically small.  These results must 
be interpreted with some caution, however.  We cannot assign causality to HFT for the 
small differences in trading costs I report.  First, it is possible that causality runs in the 
opposite direction.  It is likely that HFTs condition their trading behavior on expected 
trading costs.  Second, even if HFTs do not participate in a given trade, their presence in 
the market could still affect the cost of that trade through competition or adverse 
selection.  In the model of Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), the “presence in the wings” 
(p. 28) of an HFT can change the behavior of other market participants.  Despite this 
qualification, it is still informative to observe that the market does not deteriorate or 
improve drastically on average for trades with any combination of counterparties.  In 
particular, the adverse selection costs imposed by HFT on slower traders in the models of 
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) and Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2011) are empirically 
not much higher than those imposed by other slow traders.  These results also suggest 
that the trading cost reductions during bursts of HFT activity found by Hasbrouck and 
Saar (2011) may not be simply explained by more trades being executed with HFT 
counterparties during these bursts. 
The results of this analysis may help inform the debate about affirmative 
obligations for HFT liquidity provision.  It appears that there is little compensation for 
unsophisticated liquidity provision in this market, and it may not be sufficient to induce 
HFTs to provide liquidity without being selective in which trades they take and in which 





2.6 Market Efficiency 
Pricing efficiency is widely considered to be an important dimension of market 
quality.   Fama (1970) describes an efficient market as one where “security prices at any 
time ‘fully reflect’ all available information” (p. 383).  Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2008) (CRS (2008) hereafter) note that the empirical literature has shown that intraday 
inefficiencies can exist in markets that are efficient at longer horizons, because it takes 
investors time to process and react to information.  They further state that “the 
determinants of this short horizon predictability deserve a thorough investigation by 
finance scholars” (p. 249). 
It is an open question whether high-frequency trading makes prices more 
efficient.  Theory provides little direct guidance.  There is no consensus on how to 
describe HFT behavior, so it is not clear whether they should be modeled as discretionary 
market makers, arbitrageurs, predators, or some combination.  The HFT-specific models 
such as Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) and Jarrow and Protter (2011) describe a variety 
of mechanisms that could make prices more or less efficient.  Empirically, Brogaard 
(2011) finds that HFTs are an important part of the price discovery process, but this is not 
equivalent to showing that their activity makes prices more efficient and no direct 
efficiency tests on the time series of prices were performed.  Also, Brogaard (2012a) and 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) find evidence that HFT reduces volatility, which is often 
informally considered an inverse measure of efficiency.  However, total volatility is 
composed of fundamental volatility and excess volatility.  While reducing excess 





Finally, Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) find that HFT increases liquidity and CRS (2008) 
find that liquidity improves market efficiency. 
In this section, I will further investigate this question by comparing the results of 
direct tests of price efficiency during days with high HFT activity to normal days.  A 
common type of efficiency test measures whether prices are efficient with respect to a 
specific information set, and I use lagged order imbalances and market returns in this 
role.   
2.6.1 Methodology 
First, I apply tests loosely inspired by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) 
(CRS (2005) hereafter) and CRS (2008) to examine the incorporation of information 
from lagged order flows.18  These tests exploit the concept that efficient prices will 
follow a random walk, and ex-ante conditioning information will not have explanatory 
power for future returns.  CRS (2005) show that order flow imbalances in individual 
stocks from one period can predict returns in the next period over some short horizons.  
CRS (2008) show that the predictive value of lagged order flow imbalance increases on 
days when liquidity is low, and presents a test specification that I adapt to test the effects 
of HFT on efficiency.  The basic form of the model I use is: 
 (2.6) Rt = α + β1OIBt-1 + β2(OIBt-1 x HFT) + β3MKTt + ε 
                                                 





where Rt is the midpoint return calculated from TAQ midpoints, OIBt-1 is the lagged 
order imbalance,  HFT is an indicator variable that identifies high-HFT participation 
days, and MKT is the SPY S&P 500 ETF midpoint return calculated from TAQ.  I use 
midpoint returns instead of trade returns because predictability in transaction prices due 
to bid-ask bounce is not generally considered evidence of informational inefficiency.  
The HFT indicator in my model replaces the illiquid day indicator variable in CRS 
(2008), and is defined and discussed in Section 2.4.  In different versions of this test, HFT 
participation is alternately calculated using all HFT trades, liquidity-demanding trades 
only, or liquidity supplying trades only.  Following CRS (2008), I use 5-minute intervals 
to measure returns and order imbalances.  I also use 1-minute intervals because CRS 
(2008) show that the 5-minute horizon predictability has diminished over time, and 
because HFT effects may be more pronounced at shorter horizons.  OIB is defined as 
(Buyer Initiated Dollar Volume – Seller Initiated Dollar Volume) / Total Dollar Volume.  
OIB is measured over the same interval length as returns.  MKTt is included to reduce the 
correlation in the residuals across stocks.  The regression is estimated one stock at a time, 
and the time series coefficients are averaged across stocks in a reverse of the Fama-
MacBeth procedure.  T-statistics are corrected for correlation in the regression residuals 
across stocks using the method in CRS (2008).  This method adjusts the measured 
standard errors upwards by [1+ (N - 1)ρ]1/2, where N is the number of individual 
regressions and is the mean pair-wise correlation across the residuals.  If the relationship 
found in CRS (2005, 2008) holds in this sample, β1 will be positive.  If the market is 
more efficient when HFT activity is high, then the sum of β1 and β2 will be lower in 





  I employ a second set of efficiency tests using the price delay measures from Hou 
and Moskowitz (2005).  While the CRS tests measure the incorporation of information in 
past order flow, price delay measures the incorporation of information from market index 
returns.  There are at least two reasons to suspect HFT may affect the incorporation of 
index return information into individual stock prices.  First, index returns are a plausible 
input variable to HFT strategies and index arbitrage is frequently mentioned in informal 
descriptions of suspected HFT behavior.  Second, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) find 
that HFT activity is positively correlated to the explanatory power of the market index for 
a stock’s returns.  They attribute this effect to increased HFT activity when hard 
information has more value, but causality could run the other way as well.   
Hou and Moskowitz (2005) refine procedures used earlier by Brennan, Jegadeesh, 
and Swaminathan (1993) and Mech (1993).  While Hou and Moskowitz (2005) use price 
delay based on weekly data as a stock characteristic in asset pricing tests, I calculate price 
delay with 1-minute and 5-minute midpoint returns and employ it as an efficiency 
measure.  To measure price delay, I first estimate the regressions: 
(2.7) Rt = α + β1MKTt + δ1MKTt-1 + δ 2MKTt-2 … + δ 6MKTt-6 + ε  
(2.8) Rt = α + β1MKTt + ε 
where returns are defined as in Equation (2.6), and six lags of MKT are used.  As in the 
order flow imbalance tests, I use both 5-minute and 1-minute intervals.  These 
regressions are estimated one stock at a time, separately for high-HFT participation days 





the restricted model.  Then for each stock, I calculate the following price delay measures, 
separately on high-HFT participation days and normal days: 
(2.9) D1 = 1 – (R2rest/R
2
unrest) 
(2.10) D2 = (δ1 + 2 δ2 + 3 δ3 …  + 6 δ6)/ (β1 + δ1 + 2 δ2 + 3 δ3 …  + 6 δ6) 
(2.11) D3 = ( T(δ1) + 2 T(δ2 )+  …  +  6T(δ6))/ (T(β1) + T(δ1) + 2 T(δ2) …  +  6T(δ6)) 
where R2rest is the R
2 from Equation (2.8), R2unrest is R
2 the from Equation (2.7), T(.) is the 
t-statistic on the coefficient in Equation (2.7), and other terms are as defined in Equation 
(2.7).  D1 is based on the procedure in Mech (1993) and can be interpreted as the 
additional explanatory power from the lagged returns as proportion of the total 
explanatory power of the unrestricted regression.  Coefficient ratios similar to D2 and D3 
were used in Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993), but the weightings were 
introduced by Hou and Moskowitz (2005).  D2 gives more weight to coefficients on more 
distant lags of the market return.  D3 is similar to D2 but gives more weight to 
coefficients that are estimated more precisely.  Higher values of price delay reflect slower 
adjustment.  For each stock, I calculate each price delay measure separately for high HFT 
days and normal days, defined as in the order imbalance tests above.  Then within each 
stock, I subtract price delay measures on high HFT days from normal days, and average 
these differences across stocks.   
If stock prices incorporate market-wide information more efficiently on days 
when HFT activity is high, then price delay should be lower on these days and the mean 





different from zero, it is not clear that the differences can be considered independent 
observations.  The inputs to the price delay measures are coefficients estimated from 
regressions on returns in the same sample period.  For each stock, two regressions are run 
in separate subsamples, with different days entering the subsamples for each stock based 
on stock-specific HFT activity.  If there are market-wide mechanisms that cause 
simultaneous price delays across multiple stocks, there will be some cross-sectional 
dependence in the differences because there is correlation between high-HFT days across 
stocks.  To correct for this, I use the same standard error adjustment as in the order 
imbalance tests calculated from residuals on the unrestricted regression estimated over 
the full sample (not divided by HFT participation category).  I believe this is a 
conservative approach because the sample splitting procedure should reduce the 
dependence relative to that in the order imbalance tests.  I am not aware of any prior 
studies that address this issue. 
2.6.2 Results 
The results from the order flow imbalance tests are shown in Table 2.7.  The 
mean coefficients on lagged order imbalance are positive and significant in all models 
except for the specification using 5-minute returns and liquidity-supplying HFT 
participation, where it is still positive and marginally significant.  The number of stocks 
with positive and significant coefficients on lagged order imbalance in the individual 
regressions is higher than the number of stocks with negative significant coefficients, and 
often much higher.  This is consistent with the findings in CRS (2008) for most of their 





of lagged order imbalance is reduced on high-HFT days when HFT activity is defined 
using all HFT participation or liquidity-demanding HFT participation.  As an illustration, 
consider the 5-minute returns with all HFT participation.  The mean coefficient on lagged 
order imbalance is 0.0960.  The mean coefficient on lagged order imbalance interacted 
with the HFT indicator is -0.0704.  This means on high-HFT days, the predicted effect of 
lagged order imbalance is .0255 (0.0960 - .0704) compared to 0.0960 on normal HFT 
days, and the t-statistic of -2.69 on the coefficient on the interaction term is the test 
against the null that the difference in lagged OIB effect between the high and normal 
days is 0.  There are 37 (out of 120) individual stock interaction coefficients that are 
significantly negative, while only are 2 significantly positive.  The results for all 
specifications using all HFT participation or HFT liquidity-demanding participation are 
qualitatively similar, but are stronger for liquidity-demanding participation and with 5-
minute returns.  For example, the predictive power of order flow is reduced by roughly 
20% on high-HFT demand days for 1-minute intervals, but it is almost completely 
removed for 5-minute intervals.  In both specifications using HFT liquidity-supplying 
participation, the mean interaction terms are not significantly different from 0 and there is 
no strong pattern in individual coefficients. 
The results from the price delay tests are shown in Table 2.8.  Price delay is lower 
on high-all HFT participation days and high-HFT demand participation days in all 
specifications, and the effects using HFT supply participation days are weaker.  This 
pattern is similar to the lagged order flow test results.  For all participation and demand 
participation, the price delay difference point estimates are all negative and significant 





5-minute differences all become insignificant.   1-minute differences are significant at the 
10% level for D1 with HFT participation defined using all trades and are insignificant 
using HFT demand trades. For D2, the differences remain statistically significant at the 
5% level in both specifications.  For D3, the difference is significant at the 10% level 
using all HFT participation and significant at the 5% level using HFT demand 
participation.  With participation defined using HFT liquidity supply, D2 and D3 
differences are significantly negative at 5-minute horizons before the adjustment, and 
none are significant after.  Differences are insignificant in other specifications before the 
adjustment and the point estimates are of mixed signs.   
Overall, these results suggest prices are more efficient when HFT activity is high.  
Prices tend to reflect more of the information in past order flows and past market returns 
on high-HFT activity days, and the effect is stronger when they are demanding liquidity.  
Based on the evidence presented here alone, we cannot conclude that HFT activity causes 
market efficiency increases, only that there is a positive correlation.  However, if HFTs 
possess comparative advantages in profitably exploiting pricing inefficiencies, it seems 
unlikely that HFTs choose to trade more and demand liquidity more when the market is 
more efficient.  Also, the fact that the improvements in measured efficiency are observed 
primarily when HFT demand is high is relevant to a claim made in CRS (2008).  They 
conjecture that the short-term predictive power of order imbalances is due to the limited 
ability of market makers to absorb the imbalances without causing price pressure.  They 
argue that liquidity improves efficiency in this setting because arbitrage traders are more 
likely to trade on this predictability when liquidity is high, and they do so by submitting 





story where HFTs play the role of arbitrageur, and inconsistent with a version where 
HFTs are enhancing efficiency by improving liquidity.  It is also informative to interpret 
these results in the context of the finding in Brogaard (2012b) that HFTs tend to trade in 
the same direction as past order flow.  The predictive relationship, when present, is that 
buying pressure in one interval predicts positive returns in the next and vice-versa.  If 
HFT trading weakens this relationship, this would suggest that HFTs either trade with the 
contemporaneous order flow, against the lagged order flow, or both.  Brogaard’s results 
are inconsistent with the second mechanism and do not address the first.  However, 
Brogaard studies order flow at shorter intervals so this result is not directly comparable.   
Price delay reductions on high-HFT days are generally larger at 1-minute 
horizons than at 5-minute horizons, and this is different from what we observed in the 
lagged order flow tests.  This could be interpreted as supporting the conjecture in 
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) that HFTs trade more aggressively on hard information, 
as it is easier to envision updating a stock’s fair value after observing an index return than 
after an order flow imbalance.   
2.7 Trading Behavior 
2.7.1 Timing 
The trading costs reported in Section 2.5 can, with some assumptions, be 
interpreted as trading profits earned by HFT.  This is somewhat intuitive, and a related 
analysis is performed in Menkveld (2012).  From Table 2.4, using the 5-minute 
decomposition, we could estimate that HFTs on average lose 0.3 bps per trade when 





from non-HFTs (before rebates and fees).19  Two of the required assumptions for this 
calculation may be incorrect in this application, however.  First, we only observe a subset 
of HFT trades in the sample stocks.  We miss trades that occur in crosses or in other 
trading venues.  While the working assumption is that HFTs end the day flat or close to 
it, inspection of the data shows that the trades in the sample often add up to substantial 
apparent positions at the end of the day.  It is not possible to tell if these positions were 
offset out of view or are actual overnight positions.  And if they were offset, it is difficult 
to estimate at what price.  The offsetting trades could have been done at the opening 
cross, the closing cross, or any price traded in sufficient size on any other trading venue.  
The second assumption is that positions are exited at the 5-minute (or 30-minute in the 
alternate decomposition) posttrade benchmark on average.  These are useful benchmarks 
from a market quality perspective, but we do not expect that HFTs typically offset their 
positions mechanically after a fixed interval.  If HFTs have trading skills that allow them 
to strategically time the reversal of their positions, then realized spreads would understate 
their profits. 
I attempt to determine whether HFTs have trade timing skills for two main 
reasons.  First, the estimates from the realized spreads are very small and suggest that 
HFTs are willing to trade for miniscule profits.  If they are in fact doing this, they are 
providing liquidity for little compensation beyond the rebate and bringing very granular 
information into prices when they take liquidity.  If they are instead trading based on 
superior price forecasts, these interpretations would be an overly optimistic description of 
their trading behavior and the apparent liquidity they provide could be overstated.  Under 
                                                 





that scenario, the liquidity provided by HFT in the sample trades was only available to 
counterparties trading against their price forecasts, and was not offered because they 
perceived the measured spreads to be an adequate incentive to provide liquidity.  This 
distinction has implications for the affirmative obligation proposals.  If their profits did 
not really come from very small per-trade amounts scaled over very large volumes, 
would HFTs be economically viable if they were forced to trade less selectively?  
Second, little is known about the intraday predictability of stock prices.  Analogous to the 
search for signs of longer horizon predictability in the asset manager performance 
literature, HFT trading performance and behavior is a natural setting to search for signs 
of short-term predictability. 
In this section, I attempt to shed light on this question by measuring their trading 
performance using VWAP (Volume-Weighted Average Price) analysis. 20  By comparing 
the VWAPs of their buys and sells against the day’s VWAP and each other, I can 
measure the performance of the trades in this sample against a useful benchmark without 
making any assumptions about the prices or times of the unobserved trades.  When 
subtracting the VWAP of HFT buys from HFT sales, this provides an intuitive measure 
of their trading performance over a day and is unaffected by their impact on the market 
VWAP.  I also calculate these separately for liquidity-demanding and liquidity-providing 
trades.  This approach is related to the floor trader performance measure from Manaster 
and Mann (1996) and the traded spread from Stoll (2000). 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.9.  All VWAP differences are 
signed so a positive number indicates positive trading performance (i.e., market VWAP - 
                                                 





HFT buy VWAP will be positive if HFTs buy below the market VWAP).  The basic 
VWAP calculations and each difference calculation are performed daily for each stock 
and summarized across stock-days, sample days, and stocks.  Panel A reports summary 
statistics averaged across all stock-days.  The mean of the difference between HFT sell 
VWAP and HFT buy VWAP is 6.5 bps.  Positive skewness is evident, as the median 
difference is only 2.3 bps.   Buys and sells contribute about equally (3.3 bps below 
market VWAP and 3.2 bps above market VWAP, respectively).  This performance is 
driven by liquidity-providing trades.  For liquidity-providing HFT trades, the mean sell 
VWAP - buy VWAP difference is 12.8 bps, while it is only 2.3 bps for liquidity-
demanding trades.  The VWAP differences relate to performance on round trips, while 
the performance implied by realized (half) spreads mentioned above is for a one-way 
transaction.  A comparison with the realized spreads doubled suggests that realized 
spreads understate HFT trading performance for liquidity-demanding trades somewhat 
and understate their performance when providing liquidity dramatically.21  Note that this 
comparison is not entirely clean because it is based on different samples, as I compute 
realized spreads only on days where quotes are available and VWAP measures for all 
sample days, and there are also weighting differences.22   
In Panel B, the VWAP differences for each stock are averaged over each sample 
day, and the resulting daily values are then averaged to produce a time series of daily 
measures.  The standard deviation and skewness observed in Panel A decrease, which is 
                                                 
21 The difference is more dramatic when correcting for 1-way price impacts.  Assuming no-timing ability, 
using effective spreads from Table 4 and considering price impacts on entries but not on exits, implied Sell 
VWAP - VWAP Buy differences are 2.5 bps for liquidity-providing round trip trades and -1.1 bps for 
liquidity-demanding round trip trades. 
22 A possible next step is to analyze a subsample of VWAP differences on days where there are quotes 
available, and use benchmarks based on volume-weighted mean spreads calculated by stock day to correct 





not surprising because I am essentially creating an equal-weighted portfolio of all the 
sample stocks every day.  The consistency of the HFT liquidity-providing trade 
performance over time becomes apparent.  On the 10th percentile day, the mean sell 
VWAP - buy VWAP difference across all stocks is positive 2.7 bps.    In Panel C, the 
differences are averaged over all sample days for each stock, and then summarized across 
stocks.  These results highlight another dimension of HFT liquidity-provision 
performance consistency.  In the 10th percentile stock, the sell VWAP - buy VWAP 
difference is positive 1.9 bps.  The information in Panel B and C is shown graphically in 
Figure 2.4.  In Panel A, we see that there are some very high-performance days, and high-
performance days outnumber low-performance days.  From Panel C, we observe that 
overall performance is distributed relatively evenly across stocks, and liquidity-
demanding performance is negatively correlated with liquidity-supplying performance.  
One final note on Table 2.9: all of the mean differences in the table indicate positive 
performance and all are significantly different from 0 at the 5% level or higher, with the 
exception of sell VWAP - market VWAP in Panel C. 
At what horizon do HFTs have market timing ability?  We might expect this 
ability to be concentrated at the shortest horizons based on their investments in very low-
latency technology and various assertions in the press.  This relates to questions about the 
nature of intraday return predictability, whether HFTs are willing to risk their capital on 
expected price changes that take longer to play out, and also on HFTs potential effects on 
price formation.  I investigate this issue in two ways.  First, I decompose the sell VWAP - 
buy VWAP differences reported in Table 2.9 into shorter term and longer term 





minute interval in which the trade occurred, and recalculate daily HFT buy and sell 
VWAPS for each stock using these transformed prices.  I call these HFT positioning 
VWAPS, and refer to the sell HFT positioning VWAP - HFT buy positioning VWAP 
difference as HFT positioning performance.  This procedure removes the effects of HFT 
market timing within 5-minute intervals, and leaves only the effect of HFTs’ choices of 
how much to buy or sell in a given 5-minute interval.  If HFT market timing performance 
is only due to their short-term timing ability, then their positioning performance should 
be close to zero.  I also measure the difference between the actual sell HFT VWAP – 
HFT buy VWAP and the HFT positioning performance on each stock-day, and call this 
the HFT short-term timing performance.  Given the similar results across weighting 
schemes in Table 2.9, I only conduct this analysis with stock-day weighting.  For my 
second test, for every stock-day, I rank each 5-minute interval by market VWAP and 
observe the variation in HFT activity across groups of intervals.  This is designed to 
reveal how their trading activity differs across lower and higher price periods, and the use 
of 5-minute VWAPs as the measure of price focuses the test on positioning performance 
and away from fleeting prices.  There are 78 5-minute intervals in the trading day, so I 
rank the intervals into 13 groups, giving each group six 5-minute intervals.  The HFT 
activity measures I consider are net normalized HFT dollar volume and HFT order 
imbalance.  I define net normalized HFT dollar volume as HFT buy dollar volume less 
HFT sell dollar volume divided by total HFT dollar volume traded.  HFT order imbalance 
is calculated with the same formula but uses only trades where HFTs demand liquidity, 
and is identical to the order imbalance used in Section 2.6 with only HFT trades.  If HFT 





no difference in their activity between low-price and high-price 5-minute intervals.  This 
approach also reveals whether the HFT positioning performance observed above comes 
from trades at the extreme prices of the day or is shown more continuously across the 
distribution of prices, and whether this differs across liquidity-demanding and supplying 
trades. 
The results of the decomposition analysis are presented in Table 2.10.  The 
overall stock-day-weighted HFT sell-buy VWAP differences from Table 2.9 are repeated 
in Panel A for convenience.  Panel B reports summary statistics on HFT positioning 
performance.  For all trades, 5.0 bps of the 6.5 bps overall mean sell-buy VWAP 
difference is attributable to positioning performance.  For liquidity-demanding trades, 
their positioning performance of 2.8 bps is actually higher than their 2.3 bps sell - buy 
VWAP difference.  For liquidity-demanding trades, 8.1 bps of their 12.8 bps mean sell - 
buy VWAP difference is attributable to positioning performance.  All of the positioning 
performance estimates are highly statistically significant.  HFT positioning performance 
also seems to inherit much of the positive skewness in their overall sell-buy VWAP 
differences.  Panel C reports summary statistics on HFT short-term timing performance.  
These are the component of HFT sell - buy VWAP difference that is not explained by 
their positioning performance, and can be interpreted as a measure of HFT’s ability to 
time the market within 5-minute intervals.  HFT short-term timing performance for all 
trades and liquidity-demanding trades is positive, while it is negative for liquidity-
demanding trades.  All of the short-term timing performance estimates are highly 
statistically significant.  HFT short-term timing performance is also positively skewed, 





performance on liquidity-demanding trades is negative.  This suggests that without HFT’s 
positioning skill, their short-term timing ability in these trades is not sufficient to 
overcome the bid-ask spread.  Overall, these results are striking.  HFTs would retain most 
of their market timing ability if they transacted at the market VWAPs for the 5-minute 
intervals in which their trades occur.  HFT positioning performance is greater than short-
term timing performance for all trade categories.  This even holds for their liquidity-
providing trades, where we might expect most of their performance to come from earning 
the spread when it is wide.  Despite the attention paid to HFT investments in the arms 
race to achieve the lowest possible latencies, it seems that their pricing models could be 
more important than their speed. 
The results of the HFT activity analysis across intervals ranked by VWAP within 
each stock day are presented in Table 2.11.  Based on the positioning performance results 
in Table 2.10, we can expect HFTs to buy more than they sell in 5-minute intervals when 
prices are low, and vice-versa.  This is in fact what we observe, both for their overall 
trading (HFT Net Dollar Volume Ratio) and liquidity-demanding trades (HFT Order 
Imbalance).  In addition to confirming the results in Table 2.10, this analysis also sheds 
light on whether this is solely driven by trading behavior at the extreme prices or is more 
continuous.  The difference in HFT Net Dollar Volume Ratio between Group 13 (high 
prices) and Group 1 (low prices) is -.074 and is highly significant.  Similarly, the 
difference in HFT Order Imbalance between Group 13 and Group 1 is -.042 and is also 
highly significant.  This confirms that at least part of the HFT positioning performance 
shown previously is driven by trading in the correct direction during the extreme price 





is relatively continuous as well.  In Groups 1-5 (the five 5-minute intervals of the day 
with the lowest prices), HFT net buying is significant, and in Groups 7-13 (the seven 5-
minute intervals of the day with the highest prices), HFT net selling is significant.  
Similarly, in Groups 1-6, HFT Order Imbalance is significantly positive, and in Groups 
11-13, HFT Order Imbalance is significantly negative.  Across groups as prices move 
from low to high, HFT Net Dollar Volume Ratios are monotonically decreasing, and 
HFT Order Imbalances are near-monotonically decreasing.  This continuous pattern 
reveals insights about the nature of intraday return predictability, but there is another 
arguably more important implication.  If HFTs were systematically profiting from 
pushing prices to their extremes and then reversing their positions, we would expect to 
see very different patterns, such as selling pressure in the intervals in Group 2 or buying 
pressure in Group 12.  While I cannot rule out that this behavior occurs sporadically or at 
horizons I do not study, I find no signs of it in this analysis. 
I interpret these results in this section as suggesting that HFTs possess intraday 
market timing skills, buying when prices are temporarily low and selling when prices are 
temporarily high.  This suggests that there is economically significant predictability in 
intraday prices.  These timing skills are not driven by very short-term signals, and are not 
limited to trades made during the periods with the extreme prices of the day.  Finally, 
HFT liquidity-providing trades outperform their liquidity-demanding trades.  This raises 
the question why they engage in so many liquidity-demanding trades.  As discussed in 
Section 2.4, half or more of HFT dollar trading volume is liquidity-demanding.  It is 
possible that some of these trades are motivated by inventory rebalancing or other risk 





are motivated by more time-sensitive information than their liquidity-supplying trades, or 
that they are in the position of having employed as much capital as possible in liquidity 
provision and have excess capital they are willing to employ in less attractive (but still 
profitable) liquidity-demanding strategies. 
2.7.2 Predictive Positioning 
Do the positions HFTs take predict short-term cross-sectional stock returns?  This 
is of interest for some of the same reasons that motivated the study of timing in the 
previous section. If the stocks that HFTs are holding or actively buying in one period 
outperform the stocks they are short or actively selling, that would suggest there is short-
term predictability in the cross section of returns.  It would also give us insights into how 
they allocate their capital.  If HFTs trade in and out of stocks based on short-term signals, 
then it is unlikely that we can expect them to consistently dedicate market-making capital 
to specific stocks.  There are several reasons to suspect HFTs may trade based on relative 
expected returns.  First, the results from the price delay tests in Section 2.6 are consistent 
with relative value trading.  Second, studying longer horizons, the empirical asset pricing 
literature has found stronger evidence of cross-sectional predictability than time-series 
predictability.  If this is true at shorter horizons as well, it is likely that HFTs would take 
advantage of this.  Third, by actively balancing their long and short positions, HFTs can 
reduce market risk, and to the extent they are able to predict relative returns, it would be 
natural for them to incorporate this information into their hedging choices.  Finally, in 
various informal descriptions, HFTs are thought to engage in relative value trading, pairs 





In this test, I form decile portfolios based on HFTs’ stock-specific trading activity 
and compare the 1-minute and 5-minute midpoint returns on the portfolios they have 
bought to those on the portfolios they have sold.  I use two measures of their buying and 
selling activity.  First, as a proxy for their overall positions at the start of each interval, I 
measure their cumulative net trading volume in each stock from the start of the day until 
the end of the prior interval.  Second, as a proxy for their recent trading, I calculate the 
lagged position change as the cumulative net volume in each stock over the prior interval.  
This measure may be more informative if HFTs are not agile enough to move their entire 
portfolios in the direction of predicted future returns over a short period of time but do 
start trading in the correct direction, or if the first measure contains too much 
accumulated error from trades on other venues over the course of the day, as discussed in 
Section 2.7.1.  Position changes are also measured with error but, because the errors 
accumulate over the measurement horizon, the position change errors should be smaller 
than the position errors.  At the beginning of each interval, stocks are ranked into deciles 
based on the HFT positions and position changes, and returns are calculated for each 
decile and a 10-1 spread portfolio.  Variations of this procedure are common in the 
empirical asset pricing literature to test whether a category of investor’s holdings or 
change in holdings are related to future returns.  See Yan and Zhang (2009) for an 
example that tests whether short-term institutional investor’s equity trades are informed. 
The results are shown in Table 2.12.  The stocks HFTs hold or bought actively in 
the prior period tend to underperform the stocks they are short or sold actively.  The 
spread portfolio returns are all negative, and are statistically significant with the 





bps for the 1-minute position decile spread portfolio to -0.70 bps for the 5-minute 
position change decile spread portfolio.  As a robustness test, I ran Fama-Macbeth 
regressions of returns on the positions and position changes (unreported).  These show 
qualitatively similar results: the coefficients on the positions and position changes are 
either significantly negative or insignificant.   
Table 2.12 also reports information on the mean positions and position changes in 
each portfolio.  This helps understand the typical magnitudes of HFT positions in each 
stock, how fast they change, and whether there are tendencies towards net long or short 
position or if positions tend to offset across stocks.  The mean estimated HFT short 
position for a stock in the 5-minute decile 1 portfolio is -$4,576,538 and the long position 
in the decile 10 portfolio is $4,426,550.  One-minute portfolios are similar.  For the 5-
minute position change portfolios, there is $347,750 of selling for the average stock in 
decile 1 and of $352,802 of buying for the average stock in decile 10.  For the 1-minute 
position change portfolios, there is $129,778 of selling in decile 1 and of $130,409 of 
buying in decile 10. However, it is not correct to interpret this as evidence that HFTs 
almost completely offset their long positions with short positions, and their buying with 
selling, because this sample does not include the whole universe of their trades and these 
are unconditional mean values.  A more informative approach is to divide the absolute 
value of their net positions (position changes) by their gross positions (position changes).  
Performing this analysis on 5-minute positions, the mean of this ratio is 29%, and the 90th 
percentile ratio is 58%.  Similarly, for 5-minute position changes, the mean of this ratio is 
30%, and the 90th percentile ratio is 60%.  There are occasionally periods when HFT 





500 1-minute intervals in the sample where the net position changes are 95% or more of 
the gross.  To the extent this sample is representative, it appears HFTs tend to offset some 
but not all of their long and short positions (position changes), and occasionally trade 
very directionally.  
The magnitudes of the negative spread portfolio returns are small, and are within 
the mean quoted bid-ask spreads.  The strongest conclusion I can draw is that I do not 
find evidence that their positions or trades positively predict relative returns at these 
horizons.  This should not be interpreted as meaning they are losing money.  We do not 
expect them to trade at the midpoints or exactly at these frequencies.  It is also important 
to note these 120 stocks are presumably a small sample of the assets they trade.  The most 
likely explanation for the small negative returns seems to be liquidity effects.  We may be 
observing the effect of small reversals after the positions HFTs actively take create price 
pressure.  The use of midpoint returns is intended to mitigate this effect, but does not 
necessarily do so perfectly.   
2.8 Conclusion 
In this paper, I analyze market quality and HFT trading behavior using a large 
sample of NASDAQ trades and quotes with HFT participation explicitly identified.  I 
find that trading costs are unconditionally low in this market, but spreads are slightly 
wider for trades where HFTs provide liquidity and slightly tighter when HFTs take 
liquidity.  This suggests that HFTs provide liquidity when it is scarce and consume 
liquidity when plentiful.  Prices incorporate information from order flow and market-





driven by HFT demand-side participation, implying that HFTs improve price efficiency 
when demanding liquidity.  I also find that HFTs seem to possess intraday market timing 
ability, but I find no evidence that they trade to exploit predictability in cross-sectional 
expected returns at the horizons I study. 
The new evidence in this paper is relevant to the ongoing HFT-related policy 
debates and can potentially provide guidance to theoretical researchers seeking to model 
HFT behavior and market quality impacts.  Of particular interest, the trading cost and 
market timing analysis have implications for the proposals to impose affirmative 
obligations to provide liquidity on HFTs.  The trading costs I document indicate that 
there is little compensation in the spread for naïve liquidity provision in this market.  The 
evidence on HFT intraday market timing suggests that HFT profits are not driven by 
spreads alone, and it is not clear that their strategies would be economically viable if 
affirmative obligations prevented them from exercising discretion in when to trade.   
The results in this study suggest that HFTs play a beneficial or neutral role in the 
market.  However, it is important to note that my data are limited to NASDAQ 
continuous trading and my focus is on unconditional systematic effects.  These issues and 
other limitations of this study are discussed in more detail in previous sections.  
Conclusions drawn in this setting may not generalize to other environments, and 
continued study of these issues is clearly warranted.  In particular, the impact of HFT on 
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Table 2.1 Sample Stocks 
Sample was selected for NASDAQ by Terrence Hendershott and Ryan Riordan.  Sample period is January 2008 – 
December 2009 and February 22, 2010 – February 26, 2010.  Listing venue, price, and market capitalization are 
from CRSP as of February 26, 2010.  Dollar trading volumes are from TAQ for trades between 9:30 am and 4:00 pm 
and are averaged over all days in sample for each name.  Stocks are sorted in descending order by market 
capitalization. 


















 NYSE  183.803  63.28  186.570 889.604 20.7% 
GE  GENERAL ELECTRIC   NYSE  171.357  16.06  350.167 1,710.448 19.4% 
PFE  PFIZER INC  NYSE  141.635  17.55  190.253 908.159 20.4% 
CSCO  CISCO SYSTEMS INC  NASDAQ  139.305  24.33  544.225 1,216.373 43.7% 
GOOG  GOOGLE INC  NASDAQ  128.612  526.80  976.411 2,197.014 43.5% 
HPQ  HEWLETT PACKARD   NYSE  119.564  50.79  168.456 762.414 21.6% 
INTC  INTEL CORP  NASDAQ  113.408  20.53  557.855 1,285.776 42.6% 
DIS  DISNEY WALT CO  NYSE  60.590  31.24  81.993 377.655 20.9% 
MMM  3M CO  NYSE  57.045  80.15  65.307 329.624 19.3% 
AMGN  AMGEN INC  NASDAQ  55.438  56.61  243.441 532.812 45.6% 




 NYSE  45.703  38.19  111.628 493.304 22.1% 
GILD  GILEAD SCIENCES   NASDAQ  42.952  47.61  200.488 435.583 45.7% 
CMCSA  COMCAST CORP   NASDAQ  33.884  16.44  192.761 417.744 45.8% 




 NYSE  30.704  40.16  54.990 242.639 22.2% 
EBAY  EBAY INC  NASDAQ  29.903  23.02  159.904 363.127 43.7% 
PNC  
P N C FINANCIAL 
SERVICES GRP INC 
 NYSE  27.792  53.76  51.977 303.458 17.3% 
GLW  CORNING INC  NYSE  27.483  17.63  63.275 276.531 22.1% 
CELG  CELGENE CORP  NASDAQ  27.363  59.52  130.188 281.530 45.9% 
COST  
COSTCO 
WHOLESALE CORP  
 NASDAQ  26.850  60.97  144.949 330.337 43.5% 
ESRX  EXPRESS SCRIPTS   NASDAQ  26.445  96.01  89.624 193.355 46.2% 
MOS  MOSAIC COMPANY  NYSE  25.993  58.39  110.995 519.619 19.5% 
DELL  DELL INC  NASDAQ  25.911  13.24  200.338 464.816 41.8% 
KMB  KIMBERLY CLARK   NYSE  25.286  60.74  27.274 163.386 16.4% 
ADBE  ADOBE SYSTEMS   NASDAQ  18.211  34.65  115.867 245.726 46.5% 
AGN  ALLERGAN INC  NYSE  17.763  58.43  23.249 124.567 18.2% 




 NASDAQ  16.442  12.24  150.360 339.454 43.4% 
GENZ  GENZYME CORP  NASDAQ  15.221  57.20  102.936 220.846 46.9% 
BIIB  BIOGEN IDEC INC  NASDAQ  15.120  55.01  86.319 193.493 44.7% 
BHI  BAKER HUGHES INC  NYSE  14.946  47.92  64.653 275.455 22.8% 




 NYSE  14.726  42.55  44.165 214.302 20.7% 
KR  KROGER COMPANY  NYSE  14.363  22.10  39.537 191.461 20.4% 
CTSH  
COGNIZANT 
TECHNOLOGY SOLS  
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BRCM  BROADCOM CORP  NASDAQ  13.737  31.32  128.856 295.870 43.3% 
















 NASDAQ  2.034  47.70  9.476 17.911 52.4% 
SFG  
STANCORP 
FINANCIAL GROUP  
 NYSE  2.030  42.98  2.975 17.587 16.9% 
FL  FOOT LOCKER INC  NYSE  2.030  12.97  5.874 30.986 19.2% 
ERIE  ERIE INDEMNITY CO  NASDAQ  2.029  39.62  2.739 4.706 57.2% 








 NASDAQ  1.927  17.52  8.506 19.787 42.2% 
JKHY  
HENRY JACK & 
ASSOC INC 
 NASDAQ  1.908  22.58  8.708 17.120 49.8% 
FCN  F T I CONSULTING   NYSE  1.904  36.74  9.878 50.463 20.3% 
CBT  CABOT CORP  NYSE  1.899  29.06  2.247 12.376 17.6% 
PNY  
PIEDMONT 
NATURAL GAS INC 
 NYSE  1.895  25.83  2.057 12.067 16.2% 
GAS  NICOR INC  NYSE  1.884  41.65  4.612 23.929 18.6% 
BRE  B R E PROPERTIES   NYSE  1.860  33.71  5.196 36.006 14.5% 
CR  CRANE CO  NYSE  1.855  31.67  2.130 11.512 17.7% 




 NYSE  1.832  40.06  3.291 19.065 16.6% 
ISIL  INTERSIL CORP  NASDAQ  1.826  14.84  23.484 53.516 43.5% 




 NYSE  1.782  23.99  2.556 13.784 18.5% 
CSE  CAPITALSOURCE   NYSE  1.777  5.50  5.377 30.523 15.2% 
CHTT  CHATTEM INC  NASDAQ  1.774  93.48  12.617 27.768 46.3% 
ARCC  ARES CAPITAL   NASDAQ  1.737  13.07  4.232 9.884 42.6% 
CKH  SEACOR HOLDINGS   NYSE  1.727  76.38  3.585 18.195 19.1% 





 NYSE  1.710  37.39  2.958 20.932 14.2% 




 NASDAQ  1.697  9.62  7.652 15.745 47.2% 
AYI  ACUITY BRANDS   NYSE  1.692  38.98  4.146 22.083 18.6% 
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 NYSE  1.676  26.72  1.120 6.844 14.9% 




 NASDAQ  1.673  30.50  11.012 25.294 44.2% 
CRI  CARTERS INC  NYSE  1.664  28.66  3.179 18.992 16.9% 
AMED  AMEDISYS INC  NASDAQ  1.630  57.65  16.055 37.936 44.7% 














 NASDAQ  1.106  49.38  7.760 15.189 50.8% 
NXTM  NXSTAGE MEDICAL   NASDAQ  0.498  10.65  0.449 1.013 43.6% 
CTRN  CITI TRENDS INC  NASDAQ  0.438  29.74  2.481 5.538 45.9% 
RVI  RETAIL VENTURES   NYSE  0.438  8.94  0.210 1.410 13.4% 




 NYSE  0.435  9.40  0.554 2.924 16.3% 
ROG  ROGERS CORP  NYSE  0.433  27.45  0.898 4.084 18.8% 
KTII  K TRON INTL INC  NASDAQ  0.424  149.46  0.684 1.369 49.8% 
KNOL  KNOLOGY INC  NASDAQ  0.421  11.45  0.798 1.723 47.3% 
PPD  
PRE PAID LEGAL 
SERVICES INC 









 NYSE  0.416  20.54  1.160 5.631 19.4% 












 NASDAQ  0.410  13.58  0.751 1.540 48.9% 




 NASDAQ  0.407  7.70  4.613 10.934 42.7% 
MIG  
MEADOWBROOK 
INSURANCE GROUP  
 NYSE  0.405  7.08  0.212 1.697 12.7% 




 NYSE  0.402  8.03  0.334 2.309 14.2% 
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 NYSE  0.399  17.22  0.276 1.982 14.0% 













 NASDAQ  0.392  7.55  4.175 9.221 43.0% 
ABD  A C C O BRANDS   NYSE  0.391  7.17  0.406 2.973 13.3% 
DK  
DELEK U S 
HOLDINGS INC 
 NYSE  0.390  7.27  0.426 2.433 16.8% 
CRVL  CORVEL CORP  NASDAQ  0.389  32.20  0.826 1.527 52.7% 
CBZ  CBIZ INC  NYSE  0.389  6.23  0.284 2.235 13.4% 
AZZ  A Z Z INC  NYSE  0.388  31.41  1.118 6.523 16.9% 
CCO  
CLEAR CHANNEL 
OUTDOOR HLDGS  




 NYSE  0.385  9.45  1.075 5.781 17.4% 




 NASDAQ  0.366  13.86  1.130 2.476 45.4% 




 NASDAQ  0.353  11.68  2.079 4.423 46.2% 







Table 2.2 Trade Summary Statistics 
Trade and Inside Quote (BBO) data provided by NASDAQ.   Trade sample period is January 2008 – December 
2009 and February 22, 2010 – February 26, 2010.  Trades are missing on October 10, 2008.  Quote sample period is 
the first full week of each quarter during 2008 and 2009, September 15, 2008 – September 19, 2008 (the week of 







Matched w/ quotes 
Days in Sample  509  49 
Number of Trades                550,118,372                   61,272,712  
Total Share Volume (millions)                       105,772                          11,642  
Total Dollar Volume (millions)                    3,919,037                        443,996  
Trade size     
   Mean  192.3  190.0 
   Std Dev  449.2  447.3 
   10th %ile  50  58 
   Median  100  100 
   90th %ile  400  398 
Num of Trades/Day     
   Mean                    1,080,783                     1,250,464  
   Std Dev                       393,491                        570,385  
   10th %ile                       691,279                        634,906  
   Median                    1,009,167                     1,091,299  
   90th %ile                    1,575,009                     2,263,314  
Daily Share Volume (millions)     
   Mean                              208                               238  
   Std Dev                                73                                 97  
   10th %ile                              130                               132  
   Median                              197                               209  
   90th %ile                              298                               396  
Daily Dollar Volume  (millions)     
   Mean                           7,699                            9,061  
   Std Dev                           3,147                            4,158  
   10th %ile                           4,439                            4,537  
   Median                           6,892                            7,740  
   90th %ile                         11,912                          15,076  







Table 2.3 HFT Participation Dollar Volume Shares 
  HFT participation shares are measured as dollar volume of sample trades with HFT participation divided by total 
dollar volume of sample trades.  Three versions of participation shares are calculated, differing in whether HFT 
participation is defined as trades where an HFT participates in any side (All), the liquidity-demanding side 
(Demand), or the liquidity-supplying side (Supply).  Trades where an HFT participates in both sides are used in all 
three measures.  Trade data provided by NASDAQ.   Trade sample period is January 2008 – December 2009 and 
February 22, 2010 – February 26, 2010.  Trades are missing on October 10, 2008.  Only trades between 9:30 am and 
4:00 pm are used.  
HFT Participation Definition  All  Demand  Supply 
Full Sample Pooled  68.3%  42.2%  41.2% 
Daily Pooling       
   N                 509                    509                  509  
   Mean  68.5%  42.7%  41.1% 
   Std Dev  2.8%  3.6%  2.4% 
   10th %ile  65.2%  37.9%  38.2% 
   Median  68.3%  42.7%  41.1% 
   90th %ile  72.3%  47.8%  44.1% 
Stock-Day Pooling       
   N           61,014              61,014            61,014  
   Mean  48.3%  32.5%  23.2% 
   Std Dev  20.5%  15.4%  16.8% 
   10th %ile  19.9%  10.9%  5.5% 
   Median  49.2%  33.2%  17.9% 
   90th %ile  75.0%  52.6%  50.5% 
Stock Pooling       
   N                 120                    120                  120  
   Mean  48.3%  32.5%  23.2% 
   Std Dev  17.7%  11.9%  15.0% 
   10th %ile  25.1%  15.4%  10.2% 
   Median  46.4%  34.2%  15.7% 
   90th %ile  72.6%  47.1%  49.4% 
Within-Stock Variation       
(differences between means on high participation and normal participation days for each stock) 
   N                 120                    120                  120  
   Mean  16.6%  16.1%  12.5% 
   Std Dev  5.4%  4.1%  3.6% 
   10th %ile  9.4%  10.9%  8.2% 
   Median  16.7%  16.1%  12.0% 
   90th %ile  23.4%  21.7%  16.9% 






Table 2.4 Mean and Median Spread and Price Impact Summary   
All spreads and price impacts are measured as a percent of the pretrade midpoint.  Trades signs are provided by 
NASDAQ based on payments to liquidity providers.  Uses trade subsample where both a pretrade and posttrade 
midpoint are available.  The first letter in each trade category label refers to the liquidity taker and the second refers 
to the liquidity provider.  H signifies that the counterparty is an HFT, N signifies a non-HFT. 
 













All  61,272,712  0.036  0.027  0.036  -0.009 
HH  11,631,186  0.032  0.023  0.035  -0.012 
HN  14,837,559  0.036  0.021  0.034  -0.013 
NH  19,581,587  0.033  0.028  0.032  -0.004 
NN  15,222,380  0.043  0.035  0.042  -0.007 
           
All  61,272,712  0.026  0.022  0.025  -0.002 
HH  11,631,186  0.026  0.023  0.029  -0.016 
HN  14,837,559  0.026  0.018  0.024  -0.010 
NH  19,581,587  0.026  0.024  0.023  0.000 
NN  15,222,380  0.026  0.023  0.024  0.000 






Table 2.5 Regression Estimates of Effective Spread and Price  
Impacts on HFTs Participation Variables and Controls   
 
The regression model is: 
 
SPREADitn = αit + β1 HFT + β2j SIZEj + β3 BUY + β4 SELL + ε 
 
where i indexes stocks, t indexes day-half hours, n indexes trades, and j indexes trade size groups. The regression is 
estimated with stock and day-half hour fixed-effects.  HFT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an HFT 
participated in the trade and 0 otherwise.  Different models define HFT based on the liquidity-demanding or 
liquidity-providing side of the trade. Trade size groups are defined as SMALL (< 500 shares), MEDIUM (>=500 
shares, <=1,000 shares), and LARGE (> 1,000 shares). BUY and SELL are dummies indicating the aggressive side 
of the trade.  
 
Panel A: Effective Spreads 
  Model       
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
HFT Participation         
   HFT_demand  -0.007  -0.007     
  (<.0001)  (<.0001)     
   HFT_supply      0.003  0.003 
      (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Trade Size         
   Medium    0.000    0.001 
    (<.0001)    (<.0001) 
   Large    0.001    0.003 
    (<.0001)    (<.0001) 
Trade Sign    0.000    0.000 
   Buy    (<.0001)    (<.0001) 
         
R2  27.60%  27.60%  27.41%  27.41% 
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Panel B: 1-minute Price Impacts 
  Model       
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 







   HFT_demand  0.001  0.001     
  (<.0001)  (<.0001)     
   HFT_supply      -0.001  -0.001 
      (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Trade Size         
   Medium    0.005    0.004 
    (<.0001)    (<.0001) 
   Large    0.008    0.008 
    (<.0001)    (<.0001) 
Trade Sign         
   Buy    0.003    0.003 
    (<.0001)    (<.0001) 
R2  2.44%  2.44%  2.44%  2.44% 






Table 2.6 Regression Estimates of Effective Spread and Price Impacts 
on HFT Participation Variables, Controls, and Interactions 
The regression model is: 
 
SPREADitn = αit + β1j (HFT x SIZEj) + β2 (HFT x BUY) + β3 (HFT x SELL) + ε 
 
where i indexes stocks, t indexes day-half hours, n indexes trades, and j indexes trade size groups. The regression is 
estimated with stock and day-half hour fixed-effects.  HFT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an HFT 
participated in the trade and 0 otherwise.  Different models define HFT based on the liquidity-demanding or 
liquidity-providing side of the trade. Trade size groups are defined as SMALL (< 500 shares), MEDIUM (>=500 
shares, <=1,000 shares), and LARGE (> 1,000 shares). BUY and SELL are dummies indicating the aggressive side 
of the trade.  
Panel A: Effective Spreads         
  Model       
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
HFT Participation         
   HFT_demand  -0.007  -0.007     
  (<.0001)  (<.0001)     
   HFT_demand x Medium  0.001       
  (<.0001)       
   HFT_demand x Large  0.001       
  (<.0001)       
   HFT_demand x Buy    0.000     
    (<.0001)     
   HFT_ supply      0.004  0.003 
      (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
   HFT_supply x Medium      -0.002   
      (<.0001)   
   HFT_supply x Large      -0.004   
      (<.0001)   
   HFT_ supply x Buy        0.000 
        (<.0001) 
Trade Size         
  Medium  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.001 
  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
   Large  0.001  0.001  0.004  0.003 
  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Trade Sign         
   Buy    -0.001    -0.001 
    (<.0001)    (<.0001) 
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Panel B: 1-minute Price Impacts 
  Model       
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
HFT Participation         
   HFT_demand  0.001  0.001     
  (<.0001)  (<.0001)     
   HFT_demand x Medium  0.000       
  (0.119)       
   HFT_demand x Large  0.000       
  (0.4015)       
   HFT_demand x Buy    -0.001     
    (<.0001)     
   HFT_ supply      0.000  -0.002 
      (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
   HFT_supply x Medium      -0.004   
      (<.0001)   
   HFT_supply x Large      -0.008   
      (<.0001)   
   HFT_ supply x Buy        0.002 
        (<.0001) 
Trade Size         
   Medium  0.005  0.005  0.006  0.004 
  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
   Large  0.008  0.008  0.011  0.008 
  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Trade Sign         
   Buy    0.003    0.002 
    (<.0001)    (<.0001) 





Table 2.7 Regressions of 5-minute and 1-minute Returns on Contemporaneous Market 
Returns, Lagged Order Imbalances, and Lagged Order Imbalance Interacted with a 
Dummy Variable for HFT Participation Regimes   
Returns are from TAQ and are calculated using the last midpoint in each interval.  SPY ETF returns are used as the 
market proxy.  OIB$t-1 is the dollar value of buyer-initiated trades less the dollar value of seller-initiated trades 
divided by the total dollar volume during interval t-1. A stock is defined as having a high-HFT participation day 
when its participation share is in its highest tercile for that stock over the entire sample.  Participation share is 
defined as HFT dollar volume divided by the stock’s total dollar volume.  Three versions of participation shares are 
calculated, differing in whether HFT participation is defined as trades where an HFT participates in any side (All), 
the liquidity-demanding side (Demand), or the liquidity-supplying side (Supply).  Trades where an HFT participates 
in both sides are used in all three measures.   The regressions are estimated separated for each stock, and cross-
sectional means of coefficients across all stocks are reported.  T-statistics test the null that the mean is 0.  Adjusted t-
statistics are corrected for cross-correlation in the residuals.  The numbers of positive significant and negative 
significant coefficients in the individual stock regressions are reported, with significance defined as a t-statistic 
greater than 2 in absolute value.  The sample contains 120 stocks.  All coefficients are multiplied by 1000.     
 
Panel A: 5-minute returns 
   t-statistic   
HFT Participation 
Definition Variable Coefficient Raw Adjusted Num pos sig Num neg sig 
All Intercept 0.0066 3.34 1.38 9 2 
 MKT 825.0872 36.52 15.07 120 0 
 OIB$t-1 0.0960 6.62 2.73 59 12 
 OIB$t-1 x HFT -0.0704 -6.51 -2.69 2 37 
       
Demand Intercept 0.0066 3.33 1.37 9 2 
 MKT 825.0813 36.52 15.06 120 0 
 OIB$t-1 0.1098 7.42 3.06 59 10 
 OIB$t-1 x HFT -0.1175 -9.73 -4.01 4 57 
       
Supply Intercept 0.0066 3.36 1.39 9 2 
 MKT 825.1111 36.52 15.07 120 0 
 OIB$t-1 0.0651 4.38 1.81 47 24 
 OIB$t-1 x HFT 0.0249 2.52 1.04 17 6 
       
Panel B: 1-minute returns 
       
All Intercept 0.0004 0.91 0.39 6 2 
 MKT 691.5641 31.78 13.60 120 0 
 OIB$t-1 0.1047 14.48 6.20 112 1 
 OIB$t-1 x HFT -0.0193 -5.55 -2.37 7 53 
       
Demand Intercept 0.0004 0.92 0.39 7 2 
 MKT 691.5636 31.78 13.60 120 0 
 OIB$t-1 0.1066 14.71 6.29 114 1 
 OIB$t-1 x HFT -0.0244 -6.75 -2.89 8 64 
       
Supply Intercept 0.0004 0.95 0.41 6 2 
 MKT 691.5649 31.78 13.60 120 0 
 OIB$t-1 0.0992 13.58 5.81 111 3 
 OIB$t-1 x HFT -0.0024 -0.79 -0.34 19 23 







Table 2.8 Comparisons of Price Delay Measures across  
High and Normal HFT Participation Regimes 
Price Delay measures use regressions of a stock’s return on contemporaneous and lagged market returns 
(unrestricted regression) compared to regressions on contemporaneous returns only (restricted regression) to 
measure the speed with which market information is incorporated into the stock’s price.  D1 is derived from R2 from 
the restricted and unrestricted regressions.  D2 uses ratios of lagged coefficients to all coefficients and gives more 
weight to longer lags.  D3 is similar to D2 but uses t-statistics instead of coefficients, down weighting less precise 
estimates.  Higher values indicate greater delays.   Six lags of market returns are used.  Returns are from TAQ and 
are calculated using the last midpoint in each interval.  SPY ETF returns are used as the market proxy.  Price Delays 
are calculated from 5-minute returns in Panel A and 1-minute returns in Panel B.  A stock is defined as having a 
high-HFT participation day when its participation share is in its highest tercile for that stock over the entire sample.  
Participation share is defined as HFT dollar volume divided by the stock’s total dollar volume.  Three versions of 
participation shares are calculated, differing in whether participation is calculated for trades where an HFT 
participates in any side, the liquidity-demanding side, or the liquidity supplying side.  Trades where an HFT 
participates in both sides are used in all three measures.   Price Delay differences are calculated separately for each 
stock, and cross-sectional means across all stocks are reported.  T-statistics test the null that the mean is 0.  Adjusted 
t-statistics are corrected for cross-correlation in the residuals.   The sample contains 120 stocks. 
 
Panel A: 5-minute returns 




measure High Normal Diff Raw Adjusted 
All D1 0.030 0.038 -0.008 -3.04 -1.22 
 D2 0.262 0.375 -0.113 -4.57 -1.83 
 D3 0.264 0.381 -0.117 -4.46 -1.79 
       
Demand D1 0.030 0.040 -0.010 -3.89 -1.56 
 D2 0.250 0.382 -0.131 -4.69 -1.88 
 D3 0.251 0.386 -0.135 -4.54 -1.82 
       
Supply D1 0.037 0.033 0.003 1.49 0.60 
 D2 0.301 0.349 -0.047 -2.12 -0.85 
 D3 0.302 0.354 -0.051 -2.14 -0.86 
       
Panel B: 1-minute returns 
All D1 0.068 0.084 -0.016 -4.31 -1.83 
 D2 0.312 0.445 -0.133 -5.14 -2.18 
 D3 0.311 0.448 -0.136 -4.71 -2.00 
       
Demand D1 0.070 0.086 -0.016 -2.70 -1.15 
 D2 0.283 0.468 -0.186 -6.29 -2.67 
 D3 0.278 0.473 -0.195 -6.01 -2.55 
       
Supply D1 0.077 0.077 0.000 -0.10 -0.04 
 D2 0.403 0.389 0.014 0.65 0.28 
 D3 0.407 0.389 0.018 0.72 0.31 








Table 2.9 HFT VWAP Difference Summary Statistics 
Differences between VWAP on HFT trades of various categories and same-stock, same-day market VWAP, and differences between VWAP on HFT 
sells and buys.  VWAP differences are scaled by market VWAP and reported as percentages.  VWAP differences are signed so that positive numbers 
indicate that HFTs are outperforming the market benchmark.  VWAP differences are first calculated separately for each stock-day and then the stock-
day values are summarized with different weightings.  Panel A reports summary statistics weighted equally over all stock-days, Panel B reports 
summary statistics equally weighted by day, and Panel C reports summary statistics equally weighted by stock.  Trade data provided by NASDAQ.   
Trade sample period is January 2008 – December 2009 and February 22, 2010 – February 26, 2010.  Trades are missing on October 10, 2008.  Only 
trades between 9:30 am and 4:00 pm are used. 
 
Panel A: Stock-day weighting 
HFT Trade Type All  Demand  Supply 
VWAP Difference mkt - buy sell - mkt sell - buy  mkt - buy sell - mkt sell – buy  mkt - buy sell - mkt sell - buy 
   N      60,692       60,716       60,585        60,260       60,360       59,966        60,084       60,108       59,524  
   Mean 0.033 0.032 0.065  0.011 0.010 0.023  0.064 0.065 0.128 
   Std Dev 0.484 0.431 0.560  0.539 0.516 0.659  0.639 0.611 0.813 
   T        16.70         18.17        28.48            5.12           4.71           8.57          24.50         25.96         38.30  
   10th %ile -0.177 -0.179 -0.244  -0.267 -0.268 -0.356  -0.298 -0.292 -0.317 
   Median 0.011 0.011 0.023  0.002 0.001 0.004  0.023 0.025 0.050 
   90th %ile 0.269 0.264 0.424  0.305 0.301 0.434  0.469 0.467 0.668 
            
Panel B: Day weighting 
   N           509            509            509             509            509            509             509            509            509  
   Mean 0.033 0.032 0.065  0.011 0.010 0.023  0.064 0.065 0.128 
   Std Dev 0.056 0.050 0.066  0.071 0.063 0.075  0.100 0.115 0.111 
   T        13.24         14.38         22.27            3.56           3.55           6.93          14.45         12.71         25.94  
   10th %ile -0.017 -0.019 -0.004  -0.053 -0.056 -0.059  -0.018 -0.024 0.027 
   Median 0.028 0.027 0.058  0.008 0.005 0.020  0.049 0.055 0.108 
   90th %ile 0.087 0.090 0.147  0.077 0.078 0.109  0.159 0.157 0.257 
            
Panel C: Stock  weighting 
   N           120            120            120             120            120            120             120            120            120  
   Mean 0.034 0.032 0.066  0.011 0.009 0.021  0.066 0.067 0.135 
   Std Dev 0.046 0.033 0.069  0.041 0.047 0.070  0.077 0.062 0.137 
   T          8.06         10.47         10.50            3.02           1.98           3.35            9.45         11.76         10.80  
   10th %ile 0.000 0.001 0.003  -0.024 -0.024 -0.031  0.007 0.010 0.019 
   Median 0.023 0.020 0.052  0.006 0.006 0.013  0.051 0.056 0.111 
   90th %ile 0.077 0.078 0.139  0.055 0.058 0.095  0.138 0.131 0.258 





Table 2.10 HFT VWAP Difference Decomposition   
Decomposition of the differences between VWAP on HFT same-stock, same-day sell and buy trades of various 
categories into a positioning performance component and a short-term timing component. VWAP differences and 
components are scaled by market VWAP and reported as percentages.  VWAP differences and components are 
signed so that positive numbers indicate positive HFT performance.  The positioning performance is calculated by 
first replacing the price on each HFT trade with the market VWAP for the same 5-minute interval, computing 
VWAPS for HFT sells and buys using the modified prices (positioning VWAPs) for every stock-day, and then 
taking the difference between the sell and buy positioning VWAPs.  Timing performance is the HFT sell-buy 
VWAP difference calculated using actual trade prices less the positioning performance.  Each observation is a stock-
day.  Trade data is provided by NASDAQ.   Trade sample period is January 2008 – December 2009 and February 
22, 2010 – February 26, 2010.  Trades are missing on October 10, 2008.  Only trades between 9:30 am and 4:00 pm 
are used. 
 
Panel A: HFT Sell-Buy VWAP Difference 
HFT Trade Type All  Demand  Supply 
   N 60,585  59,966  59,524 
   Mean 0.065  0.023  0.128 
   Std Dev 0.560  0.659  0.813 
   T 28.48  8.57  38.30 
   10th %ile -0.244  -0.356  -0.317 
   Median 0.023  0.004  0.050 
   90th %ile 0.424  0.434  0.668 
      
Panel B: HFT Positioning Performance 
   Mean 0.050  0.028  0.081 
   Std Dev 0.558  0.638  0.783 
   T 21.91  10.77  25.39 
   10th %ile -0.251  -0.338  -0.358 
   Median 0.016  0.006  0.026 
   90th %ile 0.396  0.431  0.587 
      
Panel C: HFT Short-term Timing Performance 
   Mean 0.015  -0.005  0.046 
   Std Dev 0.207  0.146  0.235 
   T 17.96  -8.4  47.98 
   10th %ile -0.031  -0.059  -0.027 
   Median 0.007  -0.002  0.020 
   90th %ile 0.062  0.047  0.136 







Table 2.11 HFT Activity in 5-minute Intervals Ranked by VWAP 
Mean levels of HFT activity measures in groups of 5-minute intervals ranked by VWAP, and comparisons across 
high and low VWAP groups.  For each stock-day, the market VWAP is calculated for every 5-minute interval, and 
then each interval is ranked into thirteen groups by VWAP.  Each group contains six 5-minute intervals.  Group 1 
contains the intervals with the lowest prices of the day, and Group 13 contains the intervals with the highest prices 
of the day.  HFT activity measures are HFT Net Dollar Volume Ratio and HFT Order Imbalance.  HFT Net Dollar 
Volume Ratio is the net HFT dollar volume traded (buy dollar volume less sell dollar volume) divided by the gross 
HFT dollar volume (buy dollar volume plus sell dollar volume), and indicates how much of the HFT trading in that 
interval was buying vs. selling.  HFT Order Imbalance is calculated with the same formula using only trades where 
HFTs demanded liquidity.  HFT activity measures are calculated within each interval and then averaged across 
intervals within a group for each stock-day, and summarized over stock-days.  Differences in activity measures 
between Group 13 and Group 1 are reported.  Bold values indicate significance at the 5% level based on a t-test.  
Trade data are provided by NASDAQ.   Trade sample period is January 2008 – December 2009 and February 22, 





























































































Table 2.12 Decile Portfolios and Decile Spread Portfolios Formed on HFT Positions and Position Changes 
  Portfolio returns are calculated from TAQ midpoints. t-statistics test the null that the spread portfolio return is equal to 0.  Holding periods are 5-
minutes in Panels A and C and 1-minute in Panel B and D.  In Panels A and C, positions are based on cumulative observed trades ending just prior to 
start of the holding period.  In Panels B and D, portfolios are formed on lagged position changes based on prior intervals of the same length as the 
holding period.  Mean positions and position changes across stocks in each portfolio are reported.  Trade data used to calculate HFT positions are 
provided by NASDAQ.   Sample period is January 2008 – December 2009 and February 22, 2010 – February 26, 2010.  Trades are missing on October 
10, 2008.  Only intervals between 9:30 am and 4:00 pm are used.  The first interval is dropped when positions are used and the first two intervals are 
dropped when position changes are used.   
 
Panel A. HFT position portfolios, 5-minute Intervals. 
           spread 
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 t(spread) 
Mean Pt-1 
($000) 
-4,577 -624 -135 -38 -9 6 35 134 632 4,427   
return (bps) 0.07 0.29 0.39 0.52 0.25 -0.11 -0.32 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 -1.14 
             
Panel B. HFT position portfolios, 1-minute Intervals. 
Mean Pt-1 
($000) 
-4,570 -621 -134 -38 -8 7 35 134 632 4,421   
return (bps) 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.06 -0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -4.21 
             
Panel C. HFT position change portfolios, 5-minute Intervals. 
Mean ∆Pt-1 
($000) 
-348 -44 -10 -3 0 0 3 10 44 353   
return (bps) 0.42 0.71 1.04 0.96 0.30 -0.31 -0.71 -0.80 -0.49 -0.28 -0.70 -13.96 
             
Panel D. HFT position change portfolios, 1-minute Intervals. 
Mean ∆Pt-1 
($000) 
-130 -15 -3 -1 0 0 1 3 15 130   
return (bps) 0.29 0.36 0.31 0.01 0.17 -0.16 -0.02 -0.25 -0.31 -0.26 -0.55 -48.88 
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Figure 2.1 Time Variation in Count of High HFT Participation Stocks   
The graph shows how many stocks per day have high HFT participation.  A stock is defined as having a 
high-HFT participation day when its participation share is in its highest tercile for that stock over the entire 
sample.  Participation share is defined as HFT dollar volume divided by the total dollar volume stock.  
Three versions of participation shares are calculated, differing in whether participation is calculated for 
trades where an HFT participates in any side, the liquidity-demanding side, or the liquidity supplying side.  
Trades where an HFT participates in both sides are used in all three measures. 
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Figure 2.2 Time and Cross-sectional Variation in Impact  
of HFT Participation on Effective Spreads   
The graphs show coefficients from effective spreads regressed on HFT participation indicator variables and 
controls estimated one day at a time or one stock at a time.  The regression model is: 
 
Effective Spreaditn = αit + β*HFT + controls 
 
where i indexes stocks, t indexes day-half hours, n indexes trades, and HFT is alternately set to 
HFT_Demand or HFT_Supply.  When regression is estimated one stock at a time, stocks are sorted in order 
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Figure 2.3 Time and Cross-sectional Variation in Impact  
of HFT Participation on 1-minute Price Impacts   
The graphs show coefficients from 1-minute price impacts regressed on HFT participation indicator 
variables and controls estimated one day at a time or one stock at a time.  The regression model is: 
 
Price Impactitn = αit + β*HFT + controls 
 
where i indexes stocks, t indexes day-half hours, n indexes trades, and HFT is alternately set to 
HFT_Demand or HFT_Supply.  When regression is estimated one stock at a time, stocks are sorted in order 
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Figure 2.4 Time and Cross-sectional Variation in HFT VWAP Performance 
Measures 
The graphs show averages of HFT sell VWAP – buy VWAP differences measured as a percent of market-
wide VWAP for each stock.  Differences are calculated for each sample stock–day, and summarized by 
time or stock.  Three measures are computed, the first using all HFT trades (All), the second using 
liquidity-demanding HFT trades only (Demand), and the third using liquidity-supplying HFT trades only 
(Supply).   Panel A shows time series variation in the daily equal-weighted averages across stocks.  Panel B 
shows cross-sectional variation in the time series averages for each stock over the full sample.  Stocks in 








3. HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING IN EXTREME  
MARKET CONDITIONS 
3.1 Abstract 
Does High-frequency Trading (HFT) stabilize or destabilize markets under stress?  
I address this question by studying HFT activity around extreme returns and order flow 
imbalances in a proprietary sample of NASDAQ trades that identifies HFT participation.  
First, I study HFT trading around extreme negative returns over short horizons, which are 
commonly referred to as “mini-flash crashes.”  I define mini-flash crashes as returns of -
5% or less in 5 minutes or less.  My findings indicate that, on average, HFTs buy during 
mini-flash crashes and sell in the minutes afterwards, and they provide more liquidity 
than they consume during the crashes.  However, their trading volumes are small relative 
to the market.  Results are qualitatively similar for price spikes, characterized by returns 
of 5% or greater in 5 minutes or less.  Second, motivated by theory in Jarrow and Protter 
(2011) and the SEC’s stated concerns regarding “momentum ignition,” I examine returns 
around large HFT order imbalances.  I find only economically small momentum after 
imbalances, which is eventually followed by reversals for sell imbalances.  Finally, I 
examine two aspects of HFT interaction with the order flow of others.  I study how 
resiliency, the speed at which the order book replenishes after an order imbalance, varies 
with HFT participation.  I also test HFT activity around sustained market order flow 





Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2011a) (ELO (2011a) hereafter), I find that HFT 
participation levels decrease as toxic order flow increases, but I find no evidence 
supporting concerns that HFTs increase their liquidity demand at very high levels.  
Overall, my results suggest that HFTs play a neutral or stabilizing role around extreme 
events. 
3.2 Introduction 
The possibility that high-frequency trading (HFT) can destabilize markets has 
been raised by academics, practitioners, regulators, and the press.  The hypothesized 
mechanisms vary, but can be classified into three categories.  HFTs could directly cause a 
destabilizing shock through their active trading, HFTs could alter their trading behavior 
after an exogenous shock in a way that amplifies or prolongs the shock, or a decrease in 
HFT participation by could cause liquidity to disappear to the point where normal order 
imbalances would result in extreme price moves.  All of these mechanisms could result in 
crashes or spikes in prices.  Many observers have blamed HFT for recent examples of 
these events.  A few examples of these assertions follow.  An article from CBS’s Money 
Watch claims:  
A dip in the market can trigger millions of automatic sales, which like 
dominoes, trigger millions more in just seconds.  Before humans even 
realize what's happening, a panic has begun.23  
Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2011) (KKST (2011) hereafter) study trading in the 
S&P 500 futures market around the May 6th, 2010 Flash Crash, and conclude that HFTs 
                                                 





did not cause the crash but did exacerbate it.24  Sornette and von der Becke (2011) state: 
“Can high frequency trading lead to crashes? We believe it has in the past, and it can be 
expected to do so more and more in the future” (p. 3).  These assertions seem plausible 
considering the large volumes traded by HFT, their speed, and the lack of human 
intervention in their trading process.  It is not hard to imagine that HFT herding, technical 
malfunctions, or even manipulative strategies could destabilize markets.  Given the 
economic importance of market stability and the consequences of a potential loss of 
investor confidence in the markets, these claims should be taken seriously and warrant 
further investigation. 
While many of the assertions regarding the destabilizing effects of HFT seem 
plausible, it is an empirical question whether HFTs behave as hypothesized and, if so, 
whether the impacts are significant.  Much of the blame placed on HFT for these events 
is based on conjecture, theory, or in the case of the Flash Crash, a single event.  There are 
also reasons to believe that HFTs may be play a neutral or even a stabilizing role.  As 
some observers have noted, extreme price moves occurred long before the existence of 
HFT.  A Wall Street Journal article notes: “On May 28, there was a ‘flash crash.’ If you 
didn't notice it, that is because it occurred not in 2010, but in 1962.”25  This is also 
acknowledged by Sornette and von der Becke (2011).  Gregg Berman of the SEC 
attributes many of these events to expected news or “fat finger” trading errors.26  
                                                 
24 The Flash Crash is the popular name for an event that occurred on May 6, 2010, where within a half 
hour, the major U.S. equity indexes dropped more than 5% and quickly reversed most of the losses.  
Volatility in some ETFs and individual stocks was even greater.  See KKST (2011). 
25 “Back to the Future: Lessons from the Forgotten 'Flash Crash' of 1962,” by Jason Zweig, The Wall Street 
Journal, May 29, 2010, p. B7. 
26 These comments are from a speech titled “Market Structure: What We Know, and What We Need to 






Deutsche Börse AG found that a mini-flash crash in index futures was actually caused by 
“a barrage of institutional selling” and not HFT, as initially suspected.27 There are also 
potential HFT trading strategies that would prevent extreme price moves or hasten the 
recovery after they occur.  For example, Brogaard (2012b) and KKST (2011) find 
evidence of contrarian trading by HFTs in some circumstances. 
The trading behavior of HFT in extreme market conditions has received little 
attention in the empirical literature.  In addition to KKST (2011), Brogaard (2012a) and 
Hirschey (2011) are the only studies I am aware of that touch on these issues using data 
that identify HFT participation.  Brogaard (2012a) finds that HFTs increase their trading 
when short-term volatility is at extreme levels, but reduce their trading when longer term 
intraday volatility is high, and the effects are stronger for liquidity-demanding trades.  
Hirschey (2011) finds that large 1-second periods of aggressive HFT trading precede 
market-wide order imbalances and returns in the same direction, and concludes that this 
is consistent with anticipatory trading strategies.  However, the definition of aggressive 
order imbalance used in that paper is the extreme deciles from a cross-sectional sort, 
which means roughly 20% of the sample is classified as aggressive.  In contrast, I am 
interested in much more extreme events, which are of greater importance in the context 
of the market stability issues that are my focus.  Other relevant studies that do not employ 
HFT data include Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2011c) (ELO (2011c) hereafter), 
ELO (2011a), and Golub and Keane (2011).  ELO (2011c) suggest that HFTs decreased 
liquidity provision during the Flash Crash as a result of perceived asymmetric 
                                                                                                                                                 
spch092111geb.pdf.  The specific comments are based on a review of events that tripped circuit breakers or 
led to consideration of trade cancellations 






information signaled by extreme order flow imbalances, which they refer to as toxic order 
flow.  They contend that when toxic order flow reached extreme levels, HFTs became 
liquidity consumers as they liquidated inventory.  ELO (2011a) develops the VPIN 
(Volume-synchronized Probability of Informed Trading) measure of order flow toxicity, 
which aims to measure the risk of liquidity-induced volatility large price movements.28  
Golub and Keane (2011) documents stylized facts regarding mini-flash crashes, and 
conjectures that HFT may play a role.  Several other studies examine the behavior of 
other types of market participants in extreme market conditions.  Gennotte and Leland 
(1990) model the interactions of various types of market participants around a crash and 
show their model explains some characteristics of the Crash of October 1987.  Dennis 
and Strickland (2002) employ institutional ownership data to study the trading of 
institutional investors in the equity market on extreme return days, and find evidence 
suggesting that institutions herd, trade with the market momentum, and contribute to 
volatility on these days.  Lipson and Puckett (2010) address the same questions using 
trade level data, and find that institutional investors actually trade in the opposite 
direction of large market moves and provide a stabilizing influence.   
I study these issues by examining HFT activity and returns around extreme return 
and order flow events in a proprietary sample of NASDAQ trades that identifies HFT 
participation.  First, I identify a set of mini-flash crashes and price spikes.  My 
crash/spike selection criteria is a move of +/- 5% or more with a 5-minute period.  This is 
motivated by the SEC’s proposed “Limit Up-Limit-Down” rule, which would prevent 
trades from occurring outside price bands of a similar magnitude.  This rule was not in 
                                                 





place during my sample period, and therefore does not influence price formation or the 
behavior of market participants in this analysis.  I find that, on average, HFTs buy during 
mini-flash crashes, and they provide more liquidity than they consume during the crashes.  
This trading behavior should provide a stabilizing effect and reduce the severity of the 
crashes.  However, their trading volumes are small relative to the market.  Results are 
qualitatively similar for price spikes.  Second, motivated by theory in Jarrow and Protter 
(2011) and the SEC’s stated concerns regarding “momentum ignition,” I examine returns 
around large HFT order imbalances.  While the prior analysis examines HFT trading 
around extreme return events, here the focus is on returns around extreme levels of HFT 
trading.  It is possible that these events result in price distortions that are economically 
important but do not enter the extreme return sample discussed above.  I find only 
economically weak momentum after imbalances, which is eventually followed by 
reversals for sell imbalances.  The sell imbalance price patterns are weakly consistent 
with Jarrow and Protter (2011) and the SEC’s theory of momentum ignition, but are also 
consistent with the price pattern that would result from a large liquidity demand, as in 
Kraus and Stoll (1972).  Finally, I examine two dimensions of the relationship between 
HFT and the order flow imbalances of others.  I test whether resiliency, the speed at 
which the order book replenishes after an order imbalance, varies with HFT participation.  
Resiliency is relevant to price stability because when resiliency is low, a stock will 
potentially experience large price swings after sustained order flow imbalances.  I find 
the measure of resiliency I use (based on Degryse et al. 2005) does not perform well in 
this sample and I can draw no conclusions from this analysis.  Finally, I examine HFT 





(2011a).  Using VPIN, a measure based on ELO (2011a), I find HFT participation levels 
decrease as toxic order flow increases, confirming one of the predictions in ELO (2011c).  
However, I find no evidence supporting their other prediction that HFTs increase their 
liquidity demand at very high levels of flow toxicity as they urgently reduce inventory to 
mitigate risk.  Overall, my results suggest HFTs play a neutral or stabilizing role around 
extreme events. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 3.3 describes the data.  
Section 3.4 examines HFT trading behavior around mini-flash crashes and up crashes.  
Section 3.5 studies whether large HFT order imbalances destabilize prices.  Section 3.6 
examines resiliency and whether it varies with HFT participation.  Section 3.7 examines 
how HFT participation varies with order flow toxicity.  Section 3.8 concludes. 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Overview 
The primary data source employed is a proprietary dataset provided by NASDAQ 
consisting of trades, quotes, and limit order book snapshots for a sample of 120 stocks.  
The stock sample was chosen by Terrence Hendershott and Ryan Riordan.  See Table 2.1 
for a list of sample stocks.  It is stratified by market capitalization and is evenly split by 
NASDAQ and NYSE listing.  The sample period covers all of 2008 and 2009 and one 
week in 2010.29  The trade sample consists of all trades executed on the exchange in 
continuous trading, excluding crosses and NASDAQ TRF-reported trades.  Trades are 
time stamped to the millisecond and signed to indicate whether they were initiated by a 
                                                 





buyer or seller.  The trade signs are high quality, and are based on records of rebate 
payments.30  NASDAQ Inside Quotes (BBOs) and 1-minute limit order snapshots are 
provided for subsamples of the data.  These subsamples cover the first full trading week 
in each quarter, the week of Oct 6-10, 2008 (the week of the Lehman collapse), and the 
week of Feb 22-26, 2010.  The BBO data are time stamped to the millisecond and do not 
have the problems with timestamp discrepancies that are present in alternate sources.  
The limit order snapshots have 10 levels of bids and 10 levels of asks, and show hidden 
orders.  The only filter applied to the full trade sample was the removal of trades before 
9:30 am and after 4:00 pm.  A subsample used for trading cost analysis also required a 
usable quote before and after each trade.  The limit order book was filtered for snapshots 
with locked or crossed markets, negative sizes, or no size at the top of the book when 
depth was present below.  For some analyses, additional filters were applied, and 
specifics are provided in the relevant sections. 
A unique feature of this dataset is that high-frequency trader participation is 
identified in the data.  NASDAQ has manually identified 26 high-frequency trading firms 
and flagged their activity.  Specifically, trades contain a field with the following codes: 
HH, HN, NH, or NN.  H identifies a high-frequency trader and N identifies a non-HFT.  
The first term in a pair classifies the liquidity taker, and the second term classifies the 
liquidity provider.  For example, a trade marked HN would mean a high-frequency trader 
took liquidity from a non-HFT on that trade.  Similarly, HFT quotes are flagged in the 
LOB snapshots and a subsample of quotes. 
                                                 
30 Rebate payments are payments made to the liquidity supplier in a maker-taker market.  These are partial 





The identities of the HFT firms are not provided.  The selection process was 
manual and apparently somewhat subjective.  The principles are described in Brogaard 
(2012a) as follows: 
The characteristics of firms identified as being HFTs are the following: 
They engage in proprietary trading… They use sponsored access providers 
whereby they have access to the co-location services and can obtain large-
volume discounts and reduce latency. They tend to switch between long 
and short net positions several times throughout the day…. Orders by HFT 
firms are of a shorter time duration than those placed by non-HFT firms. 
Also, HFT firms normally have a lower ratio of trades per orders placed 
than non-HFT firms. (p. 7) 
Brogaard (2012a) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) note that the selection process excludes 
certain types of firms that engage in HFT, such as firms whose primary business is not 
HFT but sometimes engage in HFT or HFT firms that route trades through a non-HFT 
firm.  This concern is valid but is somewhat mitigated by the large percentage of trading 
volume that the sample firms participate in, which is described in further detail in Section 
2.4. 
I also obtain supplemental data from CRSP and TAQ.  I use CRSP data for the 
sample stock descriptive statistics only.  I use TAQ CT trade data to assess NASDAQ’s 
volume shares in sample stocks. 
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2 presents trade summary statistics. The second column reports values for 
the full sample.  The full sample covers 509 days and contains 550,118,372 trades for 
approximately 106 billion shares and a total dollar volume of $3.9 trillion.  The daily 
average share volume in the sample is 208 million shares and the dollar volume is $7.7 





day, there is $4.4 billion traded while on the 90th percentile day, $11.9 billion is traded.  
The trade size is of particular interest because there is a common perception that trade 
sizes are much smaller than in the past.  They are in fact small in this sample: the average 
size is 192.3 shares, the median is 100 shares, and the 90th percentile is 400 shares.  The 
third column reports values for the subsample where matching NASDAQ pretrade and 
posttrade quotes are available.  This subsample contains 61,272,712 trades for 11.6 
billion shares and $444 billion dollars.  By comparing the two columns, we can 
informally assess whether the quote subsample is reasonably representative.  The days 
with quotes have somewhat more trading activity, but in general appear similar.  The 
subsample covers roughly 10% of the trading days in the full sample, and the aggregate 
trades, share volume, and dollar volume are around 11% of the full sample values.  The 
daily mean share volume and dollar volume in the subsample are 14% and 18% higher 
than the full sample means. The trade size distributions are very close.   
 Table 3.1 reports order book summary statistics.  The sample includes 2,311,201 
limit order book snapshots after applying the screens described above.  These cover the 
best ten bids and asks and are provided at 1-minute intervals.  The mean quoted half 
spread is $.031 (12 bps).  As expected, these are positively skewed, with a median of 
$0.01 (6 bps).  The mean best bid depth is 2,162.9 shares and the mean best ask depth is 
2,205.6 shares.  The mean total bid depth is 22,436.9 shares and the mean total ask depth 
is 22,245.1 shares.  Depths are also highly skewed.  The medians are 300 shares, 300 






3.4 Mini-flash Crashes and Price Spikes 
As discussed above, HFTs are often suspected of playing a role in extreme return 
events.  Since the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash, the press has frequently called large negative 
return events mini-flash crashes.  I adopt this term and also refer to large positive return 
events as price spikes.31  The assertions about the role of HFTs in these events are largely 
speculative.  To my knowledge, the only studies addressing these concerns using data 
that identify HFT participation are the CFTC-SEC May 6 Report and KKST (2011), and 
they only study a single event (the Flash Crash).  In this section, I create a sample of 
mini-flash crashes and price spikes and study the behavior of HFTs in periods before, 
during, and after these events.   
3.4.1 Methodology 
There is no formal definition of a mini-flash crash in the literature and there does 
not seem to be a consensus in the press.  I elect to use a return of +/- 5% or greater within 
5 minutes or less as my definition.  This choice is motivated by the “Limit Up-Limit 
Down” rule proposed by the SEC on April 5, 2011.32  This rule was not implemented 
during my sample period, so it does not affect the trading behavior of the HFTs in this 
analysis.  I argue that the use of thresholds of a magnitude similar to those proposed by 
the SEC ensures that the events selected are extreme enough to be of interest. 
                                                 
31 This term implies that a reversal follows the price increase.  While this is true on average in my sample, I 
do not screen for it. 
32 See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-84.htm for details on the SEC’s Limit Up-Limit Down 






More specifically, for all stocks and every 5-minute interval in the sample, I 
employ the high and low trade prices to calculate the most extreme return within the 
interval.  If the low came first, the most extreme return is positive and vice-versa.  
Intervals with returns of -5% or less enter the crash sample and returns of 5% or greater 
enter the price spike sample.  I record the times of the price extremes and use the time of 
first price extreme (the high for crashes and the low for price spikes) as the start of the 
event and the time of the second extreme as the end of the event.  I define the 5 minutes 
prior to the start of the event as the before period, and the 5 minutes after the event as the 
after period, but only use the portion of the before and after periods that falls within 
regular trading hours (RTH).  I exclude events that start before 9:37 or end after 3:58, to 
avoid possible effects from the open or close and to assure that periods before and after 
the crash are available for analysis.  I also keep only the first event in a stock on each 
day. 
For each event, I collect all RTH trades from 5 minutes before the start of the 
event through 5 minutes after the end of the event.  Trade records contain the price, size, 
a sign indicating whether the trade was buyer-initiated or seller-initiated, a field 
indicating whether an HFT is on the liquidity-demanding side of the trade, the liquidity 
supplying side, or both, and a millisecond timestamp.  For each event, the various 
categories of trades are aggregated over the periods before, during, and after the event to 
produce metrics that capture the dimensions of HFT behavior that are of interest.  
Descriptions of the measures that may not be immediately obvious follow. Market Order 
Imbalance is the ratio of net trading dollar volume (Buyer Initiated Dollar Volume – 





Seller Initiated Dollar Volume.  This variable is essentially the same as OIB introduced in 
Section 2.6 but measured in event time, and can be interpreted as the market-wide buying 
pressure from liquidity-demanding trades.  It is renamed to distinguish it from other 
similar variables used in this section.  HFT Order Imbalance is the same ratio calculated 
using only the trades where HFTs demanded liquidity, and can be interpreted as the 
buying pressure from HFT liquidity-demanding trades.  HFT Net Dollar Volume is the 
dollar volume of HFT buys less the dollar volume of HFT sells.  HFT Net Dollar Volume 
Ratio scales the HFT Net Dollar Volume by the market dollar volume.  This measure 
ranges from 1.0, which would indicate that HFTs were the buyers in every trade, to -1.0, 
which would indicate that HFTs were the sellers in every trade.  HFT Demand Ratio is 
the fraction of total HFT dollar volume where HFTs demanded liquidity. 
3.4.2 Results 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.2.  Crash results are shown in 
Panel A, and price spike results are shown in Panel B.  Using the criteria described in the 
previous section, I identify 315 crash events in 64 stocks, with a mean return of -6.65%, 
and 402 price spike events in 74 stocks with a mean return of 7.19%.  Given that the 
universe consists of 120 stocks and the sample period covers 509 days, it appears these 
events are not uncommon.  Also, considering the attention received by crashes, it is 
somewhat surprising that price spikes are more common and more extreme.  Both types 
of events are preceded by small and statistically insignificant returns in the opposite 
direction, which indicates that the start times are reasonable.  More importantly, both 





5 minutes.  The reversal pattern suggests that these extreme events are not simply an 
efficient reaction to information about fundamentals in a liquid market. The fact that the 
reversals are incomplete suggests that these events are related to information, but at this 
point I cannot rule out the possibility of further reversal after the postevent window.  
Also, perhaps not surprisingly, mean contemporaneous market order imbalances are large 
and strongly significant in the direction of the event (-0.565 for crashes and 0.493 for 
price spikes), and are not significantly different from zero in the before and after periods. 
The main goal of this analysis is to examine HFT behavior and participation in the 
periods before, during, and after these events.  The before period measurements are 
shown in column 2.  First, we see that HFTs often do not trade in the period prior to the 
crashes.  Only 204 (250) of the 315 crashes (402 spikes) have any HFT trading in the 
prior period.  The absence of HFT activity during some of these periods does not seem 
unusual, although it may occur more frequently than usual.  On nonevent stock days, 
there is no HFT trading in a mean of 14.2 5-minute intervals, out of the 78 intervals in the 
trading day.  Also, an untabulated regression with stock fixed effects finds that there are 
2.5 less nontrading intervals on event days than on nonevent days.  Of the events with 
HFT pre-event trading, HFT net trading accounts for an average of only 1% (2%) of the 
market’s trading dollar volume for crashes (spikes), neither of which is significantly 
different from zero.  This is a reflection of balanced trading rather than a lack of 
participation, however.  HFTs participate in 31.0% (27.8%) of the dollar trading volume 
in the before period for crash (spike) events.  This is somewhat lower than normal, as 
shown by the negative and often significant HFT abnormal participation shares, but not 





periods, as HFT order imbalances are close to zero for both event types.  The HFT 
Demand Ratio shows that HFTs demand liquidity in 56% of their trades.  Overall, these 
results suggest that HFTs did not cause these events, but they may have identified 
unusual market conditions in advance of the crashes/spikes and reduced their trading 
activity slightly in response 
The during period HFT activity measurements are shown in column 3.  HFTs 
trade in more during periods than before periods (273 of 315 crashes and 336 of 402 price 
spikes), but still are absent in a nontrivial number of events.  Of those events with HFT 
trading, HFT net trading accounts for an average of 5% (4%) of the market’s trading 
dollar volume during crashes (price spikes), both of which are significantly different from 
zero.  HFTs are net buyers during crashes and net sellers during price spikes, indicating 
that their trading on balance mitigates the severity of these events.  Similar to the before 
intervals, the relatively small HFT net trading as a share of market volume is explained 
by balanced mix of buys and sells rather than a low overall participation, as evidenced by 
the raw participation shares of 31.6% (29.0%) for crashes (price spikes).   The abnormal 
participation shares show that overall HFT participation shares are close to normal levels 
during these events, but their liquidity-demanding participation drops and liquidity-
supplying participation increases.  The abnormal participation shares are mostly 
significantly or marginally significantly different from zero for both crashes and price 
spikes and all three definitions of participation, but again are not dramatic in magnitude.  
All point estimates are within +/- 5%.  HFT order imbalances are significantly different 
from zero in the direction of the return for both event types.  However, this only measures 





because it is more than offset by their tendency to buy during crashes and sell during 
price spikes on their liquidity-supplying trades.  This can be seen from their net trading as 
discussed above, and from the HFT Demand Ratio which shows that HFTs demand 
liquidity in less than half of their trading volume during these events.  The results in the 
crash/spike periods suggest that HFTs trading direction and increased liquidity provision 
are stabilizing, but their net trading volumes relative to the market imply that the effects 
are probably small.   
Finally, the after period HFT activity measurements are shown in column 4.  
HFTs are again absent in many after-event periods, but less frequently than in pre-event 
periods.  Of those events with HFT trading, HFT net trading accounts for an average of 
3% (3%) of the market’s trading dollar volume after crashes (price spikes), both of which 
are significantly different from zero.  After crashes, mean HFT Net Dollar Volume is 
positive while the mean HFT Net Dollar Volume Ratio is negative and significant.  This 
is not a contradiction.  HFTs trade in larger volumes during the crashes in which they are 
buying than in the crashes in which they are selling.  However, HFT Net Dollar Volume 
is positively correlated with market dollar volume in this subsample, meaning HFTs tend 
to buy when market volume is high and sell when market volume is low, and this 
correlation is high enough to generate the negative ratios.  After price spikes, HFTs are 
unambiguously net buyers.  In both cases, the magnitude of HFT net dollar volume is 
small relative to the market.  Again, the relatively small HFT net trading as a share of 
market volume is explained by balanced trading rather than a low overall participation.  
The abnormal participation shares show that HFT participation is slightly elevated after 





often significantly positive.  HFT order imbalances return to near-zero levels, and HFTs 
resume demanding liquidity in a normal fraction of their trades.  In the periods after 
crashes and price spikes, HFTs do not seem to follow very consistent or dramatic 
patterns.  
Overall, the results in this section suggest that HFTs’ trading activity does not 
cause the crashes and price spikes studied, and tends to reduce their magnitude.  
However, based on their low net trading volumes relative to the market, HFTs are 
probably not the major drivers of price formation in these events.  The HFT abnormal 
participation shares indicate that they decrease overall participation slightly prior to the 
extreme return events, and decrease liquidity-demanding participation while increasing 
liquidity-providing participation during the events.  However, while the deviations from 
normal participation levels are often statistically significant, they are relatively small. 
It is of interest to compare my results with the HFT behavior documented during 
the Flash Crash by the CFTC-SEC May 6 Report and KKST (2011).  One of the most 
striking findings from the CFTC-SEC Report is that HFTs were net sellers in individual 
stocks before, during, and after the crash.  They also find that HFTs increased their 
individual-stock participation before and during the crash and decreased their 
participation after the crash.33  In contrast, I find buying during crashes and little evidence 
of net buying or selling before and after.  My abnormal participation results are also 
much less extreme, and often have different signs.  In the S&P 500 futures market, KKST 
(2011) finds that HFTs initially bought during the crash, then reversed and sold their 
inventory.  While I do find evidence consistent with initial buying during crashes, the 
                                                 
33 It is arguably hard to determine the end of the Flash Crash for individual stocks.  This assumes a market-





evidence of position reversals afterwards is mixed.  In total, my results show that many of 
the HFT dynamics documented by the CFTC-SEC Report and KKST during the Flash 
Crash are not consistently seen in extreme return events.  It is also of interest to compare 
these results with the finding in Brogaard (2012a) that HFTs increase their trading when 
volatility is high.  My results show that this pattern seems to reverse in the extreme tail 
event volatility in this sample. 
3.5 Price-destabilizing HFT Order Imbalances 
Jarrow and Protter (2011) as well as the SEC have suggested that HFT order 
imbalances can lead to the destabilization of prices.  I assess this issue.  In particular, 
Jarrow and Protter (2011) develop a model where HFTs trade in unison on commonly 
observed signals and create momentum.  The key assumptions of their model are that 
demand curves for stocks are downward sloping, HFTs do not anticipate their price 
impacts, and they can react faster to common signals than ordinary traders.  While the 
authors do not specifically label this behavior as herding, it appears to be an appropriate 
description.  The model does not explicitly predict reversals afterwards, but because the 
HFT trading pushes the price past its fundamental value and creates volatility, this seems 
to be implied.  The SEC’s Concept Release on Equity Market Structure describes the 
separate but similar phenomenon of momentum ignition strategies.  In momentum 
ignition, an HFT seeks to cause momentum through issuing trades or quotes that either 
“spoof” other market participants into believing they are informed or trigger stop orders.  
No model is referenced, but the mechanisms described in De Long et al. (1990) and Allen 





not provide evidence of the prevalence of momentum ignition or background on how it 
has become a concern, but the SEC asks for feedback on whether momentum ignition is 
currently a problem in the market.  There is no herding necessarily implied by 
momentum ignition, as it could be caused by a single HFT.  While the mechanisms differ, 
in either the Jarrow and Protter (2011) model or the trade-based version of momentum 
ignition, we would expect to see an HFT order flow imbalance followed by momentum 
and an eventual reversal. 
3.5.1 Methodology 
I cannot identify the trades of individual HFTs, so I cannot assess if multiple 
HFTs trade in unison as described in Jarrow and Protter (2011).  However, if this 
behavior is present and extreme enough to affect prices, it should result in large aggregate 
HFT order imbalances.  Similarly, the trade-based version of momentum ignition would 
likely require a large order imbalance.  Therefore, an event study around large order 
imbalances is a natural test for the hypothesized patterns.  To define the events, I measure 
HFT signed volumes over 5-second intervals in the full sample and then rank them into 
groups of 1000 for each stock.  The events with signed volumes in the 1000th group are 
HFT buy events and those in the 1st group are HFT sell events.  This corresponds to 
approximately 4.7 events of each type per stock per day assuming independence.  I 
perform the ranking in the full sample but keep only events on days where NASDAQ 
inside quotes are available.  This procedure results in a sample of 27,632 buy events and 
28,108 sell events.  The mean signed volumes are 3,813 shares for buy events and 3,896 





before the end of each event through 1800 seconds after the event ends at 1-second 
intervals.  I form event windows for the 25-second period before each event, the 5-second 
event window, and postevent windows of the first and second 5-second intervals,  the 
next 10-second interval, followed by a 20-second interval, a 30-second interval, a 10-
minute window, and finally, a 20-minute window.  Within each window, I calculate the 
mean return across all buy events and sell events, and perform a t-test to determine 
whether it is significantly different from zero.  To examine whether the aggregation into 
event windows misses any obvious patterns, I also plot the 1-second mean midpoint 
prices with the midpoint 30 seconds before the end of the event normalized to 100.  If the 
Jarrow and Protter (2011) model describes these events or they cause momentum 
ignition, we would expect to see initial momentum and an eventual reversal. 
3.5.2 Results 
The results are presented in Table 3.3.  Panel A presents results for Buy events.  
There is a small insignificant negative return in the pre-event window, then a positive and 
significant return of 9.0 bps during the event.  After the event, there are small but 
significant positive returns (momentum) up to 60 seconds after the event.  This 
accumulates to 1.9 bps at 60 seconds.  Subsequent returns are negative but insignificant, 
and do not offset the initial momentum.  Panel B shows the results for sell events.  The 
pre-event return is small and insignificant, and the event return is a significant -9.1 bps.  
For the 30 seconds after the event, returns are negative and significant (indicating 
momentum).  This accumulates to a loss of 1.5 bps at 30 seconds.  After 30 seconds, a 





minute to 10 minutes.  The reversal is 3.2 bps and offsets the previous momentum as well 
as some of the initial event return.  Figure 3.1 shows the 1-second midpoints, normalized 
to start at 100 at 30 seconds before the end of the event, plotted for the whole event 
window to verify that the event windows capture the relevant price dynamics.  Overall, it 
appears there is moderate postevent momentum that does not reverse appreciably for 
buys and reverses fully for sells.  However, these magnitudes are arguably not 
economically significant.  Note that the returns reported for each event window do not 
compound to the cumulative returns because I use events that are missing observations in 
some intervals.  This mostly affects events near the end of the trading day.   
To the extent that there is momentum followed by reversal for sells, this is 
consistent with the Jarrow and Protter (2011) model and with trade-based momentum 
ignition.  There are, however, other potential explanations.  CRS (2005, 2008) find that 
overall order imbalances positively predict future returns.  They attribute this to market 
maker inventory effects, and find this in data that predates HFT.  And since Kraus and 
Stoll (1972), numerous studies have observed reversals after large trades, which are 
typically attributed to the price of immediacy paid to liquidity providers.  These 
explanations have very different implications.  Kraus and Stoll (1972) and CRS (2005, 
2008) describe the effects of benign market frictions, De Long et al. (1990) and Jarrow 
and Protter (2011) present mechanisms that cause prices to overreact to real information, 
while Allen and Gale (1992) is entirely manipulative.  My current tests are not able to 
distinguish between these mechanisms, but are only able to find (or fail to find) evidence 
consistent with their existence.  For buys, given that no significant reversal is observed, I 





that there is a reversal that is not visible in the test horizon.  Possible future directions are 
to attempt to disentangle these explanations and to examine other timeframes and event 
severity. 
3.6 Resiliency 
Resiliency refers to how liquidity returns to a market after a shock.  Kyle (1985) 
defines resiliency as “the speed with which prices recover from a random, uninformative 
shock.”  Other authors have extended the definition to include all shocks, as discussed in 
Large (2007).  Resiliency is important to study in this setting for several reasons.  First, it 
is considered particularly important in a limit order book market, where liquidity depends 
on public limit orders and there is no specialist to smooth volatility (see Large 2007).  
Second, market stability has received increased attention since the Flash Crash, and 
intuitively resiliency after routine shocks could be related to the ability to recover from 
larger shocks which cannot be studied as easily due to their infrequent occurrence.  
Finally, a more resilient market may be less susceptible to predatory trading (see 
Bessembinder, Carrion, Tuttle, and Venkataraman 2012).  It is plausible that HFT affects 
resiliency and the direction is not clear.  When a shock ends, HFT could rush to fill the 
book to gain time priority at the new prices.  Alternately, HFT could avoid trading after 
shocks if they have no comparative advantage in determining when they have ended, and 
their presence in the market could cause adverse selection risk that dissuades other 
traders from replenishing the book rapidly.  In this section, I compare the resiliency on 






Resiliency has not been studied extensively, and the literature has not reached a 
consensus on how best to measure it.  I follow a procedure loosely based on Degryse et 
al. (2005).  I define resiliency events as large signed order imbalances, and focus on how 
long it takes for the prices for hypothetical orders of various sizes imputed from the limit 
order book to stabilize.  This differs from Degryse et al. (2005), who define events as 
aggressive orders under the Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) classifications, because I 
wish to study more extreme events. 
I define the resiliency events as the top and bottom percentile signed volume over 
1-minute intervals during regular trading hours within each stock.  I calculate the 
percentiles in the full sample, but study only the events that occur on days where order 
book data is available.  Next, I match events with limit order book snapshots from 300 
seconds before the end of the event to 300 seconds after.  The snapshots are at 60-second 
intervals.  From each snapshot, I calculate the midpoint and the prices for hypothetical 
buy and sell trades of 100, 500, 1,000, and 5,000 shares.  This gives nine prices at 11 
points in time for each event.  I trim snapshots at the 99th percentile buy prices and 1st 
percentile sell prices to avoid problems with stub quotes.34  For presentation purposes I 
normalize the midpoint at 5 minutes prior to the event end to a value of 100, and adjust 
the hypothetical trade prices to give the same percent effective spreads as in the original 
snapshot.  In the following snapshots, I apply the log price changes observed in the 
original sample to the normalized starting prices.  I plot and tabulate the evolution of the 
average prices over the event window for buy events and sell events individually.  To 
                                                 
34 Stub quotes are very low bids or high asks posted by market makers to meet quoting obligations but 





determine the permanent price impact, I take the mean change in normalized prices over 
the full event window.  To determine the total price impact, I calculate the mean price 
change from the start of the event window to the maximum (minimum) prices for buy 
(sell) events.  To assess “time to resiliency” for each price, I calculate the return from 
each point in time to the last price in the event window, and measure the point when the 
mean return across events becomes statistically insignificant at the 5% level.  This 
assumes prices will be resilient within the 5-minute window. 
I split the sample into days of high and normal HFT participation, as defined in 
Section 2.4, and perform this analysis separately in each subsample.  Using the three 
definitions of HFT participation (All, Demand, and Supply), this results in six iterations 
of the procedure.  I then compare the permanent price impact, total price impact, and time 
to resiliency for each price type across high and normal HFT participation days. 
3.6.2 Results 
This procedure results in a reasonable event sample, both in terms of severity and 
number of observations.  The mean signed volumes are 14,677 shares for buys and 
14,520 shares for sells.  After matching with the limit order book, the sample contains 
24,167 buy events and 24,801 sell events.   
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2 show the evolution of mean prices over the event 
window for events decomposed by HFT liquidity supply participation.  I do not report 
results for the other participation categories in this level of detail to conserve space.  The 
most notable feature is that, regardless of HFT participation, the market seems to be able 





visible reversal in the graphs, and upon inspection of the numerical values, the reversals 
are sometimes absent and other times small (1-3 bps).  Another observation is that to the 
extent small lags in resiliency are present, they seem to be stronger in the opposite side of 
the book from the event imbalance (i.e., the sell side of the book for buy events).  So we 
are observing small lags in new orders that chase the price move, rather than same-side 
resting orders fleeing the book after the shock.  The table identifies prices that are not yet 
statistically resilient with asterisks, and there are differences in time to resiliency across 
prices within an event and across HFT participation.  For example, after buy events on 
normal all HFT participation days, resiliency is immediate in the whole book, while on 
high participation days, it takes from 4 minutes on the sell side of the book to immediate 
at the 1000 share buy price.  However, it appears the differences between resilient and 
nonresilient observations using the current methodology are often more related to test 
power than real differences.  This is especially true when comparing high-HFT to normal 
HFT participation categories, because there are large differences in the number of 
observations between the two groups.  One surprising result is that some of the prices 
experience momentum after the event has ended.  For example, in Panel D, the mean 
midpoint drops a further 3 bps after the sell events end.  This merits further analysis.  It is 
possible that this is due to not precisely capturing the end of the order flow imbalance.  
Otherwise, we would expect the price to peak/trough at the end of the event and reverse 
afterwards as the temporary price impact dissipates.  However, the magnitude is 
relatively small. 
Table 3.5 summarizes the permanent and total price impacts and times to 





also point to possible problems with the current tests.  The permanent price impacts for 
different levels of the order book are different.  For example, in sell events on normal 
HFT participation days, the permanent price impact for 1,000 share sells is 16 bps, while 
it is 20 bps for 1,000 share buys.  This suggests that even if prices near the top of the 
book are stable, full book resiliency is still not achieved over this event window length, 
and I need a longer window to estimate the true permanent price changes.  Alternately, it 
could be the case that the order book is very nonstationary.  I consider it premature to 
draw any strong conclusions from this analysis. 
3.7 Toxic Order Flow 
In the debate about whether HFTs should have affirmative obligations (see 
discussion in Section 2.2), the concern is that HFTs will choose to exit the market when 
conditions are inhospitable and their withdrawal will harm the market.  There is anecdotal 
evidence that some HFTs did exit during the flash crash.  ELO (2011c) argue that this 
was a result of perceived asymmetric information, which they also refer to as toxic order 
flow.  The academic literature provides both theoretical and empirical support for this 
concern. The model in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) predicts that liquidity will decline 
with increased information asymmetry, and the market shuts down when it reaches a 
threshold level where there are no prices that can facilitate trade.  Also, Chaboud et al. 
(2009) find that ATs reduce liquidity provision just before economic data announcements 
and increase it afterwards.  Furthermore, ELO (2011c) argue that when order flow is 
extremely toxic, in addition to ceasing to provide liquidity, “market makers [may] turn 





market they were making” (p. 14) as they dump their inventory.  KKST suggests that this 
occurred in the Flash Crash.  In this section, I will test whether, in this sample, HFTs 
endogenously exit the market and/or demand liquidity on the way out when a proxy for 
information asymmetry is high. 
As I proxy for information asymmetry, I use VPIN (Volume-synchronized 
Probability of Informed Trading).  VPIN is a measure introduced in ELO (2011a) that 
uses order imbalances to detect informed trading.  It is a descendent of PIN, (Probability 
of Informed Trading) from Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) and is 
theoretically motivated with a sequential trade model where informed trading results in 
trading imbalances.  The main innovations of VPIN are ease of estimation and the use of 
a fixed-volume look-back window instead of a calendar time look-back window.  The 
logic behind the fixed-volume window is that volume and information arrival are 
correlated, so with fixed volume windows, each observation contains roughly the same 
amount of information.  See ELO (2011a) for a detailed VPIN calculation algorithm, but 
I reproduce the key elements here and note the implementation choices I have made. 
The calculation is performed one stock at a time.  The first step is to assign all 
trading volume into equal-sized buckets.  Each bucket should contain 1/50th the average 
day’s trading volume.  I calculate average daily NASDAQ trading volumes over each 
quarter from TAQ data, and use these values to select bucket sizes for the next quarter.  I 
impose a minimum bucket size of 1,000 shares.  A starting point for the bucketing 
process needs to be selected, and ELO (2011a) does not provide specific guidance on 
this.  I restart the bucketing process at 9:30 am every trading day, so the first trade after 





time, so for each day’s calculation, the prior bucket is always full.  Second, the absolute 
value of order imbalance for each bucket is calculated as: 






S is the sell volume in bucket i, and Vi
B is the buy volume in bucket i.  Third, 
after each bucket is filled, a VPIN observation is calculated.  The VPIN calculation uses 
the last 50 buckets, so on average it is based on the last 24 hours of trading volume and is 
updated 50 times per day but the calendar time look-back window and update frequency 
vary with trading intensity.  The first calculation of the day starts with the last bucket 
formed before the open and looks up to 3 days back to form 50 buckets.  The first update 
of the day uses the first full bucket of the day plus 49 prior buckets, and so on.  The VPIN 
formula is: 
 (3.2) VPINi = (1/50) x∑ OIi
i-49
j=i  
I create a time series of VPINs for each stock-day by assigning each VPIN to the second 
after the last trade used in its calculation, and keeping it in effect until it is replaced in the 
next VPIN update.  
Note that there is an unresolved controversy in the literature on whether the 
volume bucketing should be performed on transaction data or 1-minute bars.  ELO 





transaction data give counterintuitive results, so 1-minute bars are preferred.  Andersen 
and Bondarenko (2011) argue that 1-minute bars introduce extra apparent imbalance in 
fast markets by classifying all the volume in one minute either a buy or sell, when in 
reality it is mixed.  In this analysis, I use transaction level data instead of 1-minute bars.  I 
do not take a stand on the proper technique for general applications, but in the NASDAQ 
data, high-quality trade signs are provided so the ELO (2011a) concerns do not apply. 
Next, to observe the relationship between VPIN and HFT participation, I perform 
a sorting procedure to assign trades to VPIN groups and compare the HFT participation 
levels across VPIN groups.  For each stock, I sort all trades into twenty equal-size stock-
specific VPIN groups.  Group 1 contains the lowest 5% of all trades by VPIN rank, and 
group 20 contains the highest 5%.  Within each group, I calculate HFT participation 
shares for all HFT participation, HFT demand participation, and HFT supply 
participation by stock.  Then I subtract the stock’s mean HFT participation levels for the 
whole sample to obtain abnormal participation levels.  The result is a dataset with an HFT 
abnormal participation level for each stock in each group. 
The results are shown in Table 3.6.  For all three definitions of HFT participation, 
abnormal participation shares decline near-monotonically as VPIN increases from group 
1 to group 20.  The mean differences in abnormal participation between group 20 and 1 
are -8.51%, -7.63%, and -3.70% for all HFT participation, HFT demand participation, 
and HFT supply participation, respectively.  To assess the difference between high and 
normal levels of VPIN, I also report mean differences between abnormal participation in 
group 20 and the stock-specific mean of groups 5-15.  These are -3.20%, -2.46%, and -





an effect as it moves from normal to low levels as well as normal to high.  All are 
significantly different from 0 at the 5% level.  While the spreads on supply participation 
are lower, abnormal supply participation becomes negative at more moderate levels of 
VPIN than the other categories.  Also, there are two low volume stocks in my sample that 
produce very infrequent and noisy VPIN updates.  My results are robust to their 
exclusion.  
I interpret these results as supportive of the hypothesis that HFTs reduce both 
their liquidity provision and liquidity-demanding participation when information 
asymmetry is high.  It is worth noting that this seems to be a relatively smooth process, 
where participation declines continuously over the entire range of VPIN levels instead of 
remaining normal until very high VPIN levels and disappearing suddenly.  I find no 
evidence of HFTs aggressively demanding liquidity and “destroying the market they 
were making” at high levels of VPIN.  These results are consistent with the idea that 
VPIN is a reasonable proxy for information asymmetry, and strongly support the idea that 
VPIN is a useful measure that predicts HFT trading behavior.  To the best of my 
knowledge, VPIN has not been validated in individual equity data previously in the 
literature.  Future directions may be to create a market-wide VPIN using TAQ data, to 
test the variations of VPIN suggested by Anderson and Bondarenko (2011), to test the 
relationship between VPIN and prices and liquidity, and to test whether either rapid 
changes in VPIN or very extreme levels trigger the liquidity-demanding behavior 






In this paper, I study HFT activity and returns around extreme return and order 
flow events in a proprietary sample of NASDAQ trades that identifies HFT participation.  
First, I examine HFT trading around extreme returns, or mini-flash crashes and price 
spikes.  I find that, on average, there is no HFT selling pressure in the period before 
crashes and no HFT buying pressure in the periods before price spikes, so it is unlikely 
that HFTs trigger these events.  Furthermore, HFTs tend to buy during crashes and sell 
during price spikes, and provide more liquidity than they consume during these events.  
These trading patterns are likely to have stabilizing effects, but because HFT net trading 
is small relative to the market, these effects are probably small.  Next, I study returns 
around large HFT order imbalances to test whether these lead to price momentum, as 
suggested by Jarrow and Protter (2011) and the SEC’s concept of momentum ignition.  I 
find weak evidence of momentum after HFT order imbalances, but this effect is arguably 
economically insignificant.  I also fail to find evidence of reversals after buy imbalances, 
which casts doubt on distortion-based explanations.  In my third set of tests, I examine 
whether stock price resiliency is higher on days when HFT participation is high.  The 
methodology I employ does not perform well in this sample, and I consider the results 
inconclusive.  Finally, I examine how HFT participation levels vary with levels of 
sustained market-wide order flow imbalances, also called toxic order flow.  Using the 
VPIN measure of order flow toxicity based on ELO (2011a), I find that HFT participation 
levels decrease as toxic order flow increases, but I find no evidence supporting concerns 
that HFTs increase their liquidity demand at very high levels.  Overall, my results suggest 
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Table 3.1 Limit Order Book Summary Statistics 
Book data provided by NASDAQ for a 120 stock sample.   Sample period is the first full week of each 
quarter during 2008 and 2009, September 15, 2008 – September 19, 2008 (the week of Lehman’s failure), 
and February 22, 2010 – February 26, 2010.  Only limit order book snapshots between 9:30 am and 4:00 
pm are used, exclusive of 9:30 am because this is before the opening cross.  Screens include removing 
observations with locked or crossed markets or negative sizes, and with zero size at the top of the book but 




   
Days in Sample  50  
Number of LOB Snapshots, 
total 
 
         2,342,090  
 
Number of LOB Snapshots, 
screened 
 
         2,311,201  
 
Quoted Half Spread ($)    
   Mean  0.031  
   Std Dev  0.139  
   10th %ile  0.005  
   Median  0.010  
   90th %ile  0.055  
Quoted Half Spread (%)    
   Mean  0.12  
   Std Dev  0.31  
   10th %ile  0.01  
   Median  0.06  
   90th %ile  0.26  
Best Bid Size    
   Mean                2,162.9   
   Std Dev                8,582.6   
   10th %ile                       100   
   Median                       300   
   90th %ile                   3,977   
Best Ask Size    
   Mean                2,205.6   
   Std Dev                9,116.8   
   10th %ile                       100   
   Median                       300   
   90th %ile                   4,128   
Total Bid Depth    
   Mean             22,437.9   
   Std Dev             57,449.0   
   10th %ile                   2,101   
   Median                   6,020   
   90th %ile                 44,750   
Total Ask Depth    
   Mean             22,245.1   
   Std Dev             56,954.3   
   10th %ile                   2,132   
   Median                   6,180   
   90th %ile                 45,207   






Table 3.2 Mini-Flash Crashes and Price Spikes 
Mini-Flash Crashes (Price spikes) are defined as a return of less (greater) than -5% (5%) in 5 minutes or 
less.  Returns are from NASDAQ trades and are the minimum (maximum) return experienced during the 
event interval.  Order imbalances are liquidity-demanding buy dollar volume less liquidity-demanding sell 
dollar volume divided by total dollar volume.  Two versions of order imbalance are calculated, differing in 
whether all trades or only HFT trades are used.  HFT Demand Ratio is the fraction of HFT dollar volume 
that demanded liquidity.  HFT participation shares are measured as dollar volume of trades with HFT 
participation divided by total dollar volume of trades.  Three versions of participation shares are calculated, 
differing in whether HFT participation is defined as trades where an HFT participates in any side (All), the 
liquidity-demanding side (Demand), or the liquidity supplying side (Supply).  HFT abnormal participation 
shares are defined as HFT participation share less the mean daily stock-specific HFT participation share. 
The sample period is January 2008 - December 2009 and February 22, 2010 - February 26, 2010.  The 
sample contains 120 stocks. 
 
Panel A: Crashes 
       
Crash Description   Before  During  After 
Number of events  275  315  299 
Number of stocks  63  64  64 
Return       
   Mean  0.15%  -6.65%  1.24% 
   t-statistic  0.86  -42.8  7.11 
Mean Market Dollar Volume  1,264,774  1,757,086  2,186,958 
Market Order Imbalance       
   Mean  -0.046  -0.565  0.025 
   t-statistic  -1.11  -23.07  0.78 
HFT Activity        
Periods with HFT activity  204  273  249 
Mean HFT Net Dollar Volume  35,315  134,954  82,087 
HFT Net Dollar Volume Ratio       
   Mean  -0.01  0.05  -0.03 
   t-statistic  -0.82  3.75  -2.13 
HFT Order Imbalance       
   Mean  -0.033  -0.146  0.015 
   t-statistic  -1.04  -4.62  0.44 
Mean HFT Demand Ratio  56.0%  42.1%  56.5% 
HFT Participation        
Demand  18.6%  15.4%  21.9% 
Supply  15.2%  20.3%  20.5% 
All  31.0%  31.6%  37.3% 
HFT Abnormal Participation        
Demand       
   Mean  -2.4%  -4.6%  1.3% 
   t-statistic  -1.81  -4.62  1.23 
Supply       
   Mean  -1.4%  4.4%  4.3% 
   t-statistic  -1.22  4.24  3.78 
All       
   Mean  -2.6%  -0.6%  4.3% 





Table 3.2 Continued 
 
Panel B: Price spikes 
       
Crash Description   Before  During  After 
Number of events  347  402  378 
Number of stocks  72  74  74 
Return       
   Mean  -0.05%  7.19%  -1.30% 
   t-statistic  -0.38  28.66  -7.72 
Mean Market Dollar Volume  363,321 
 
 743,494  933,924 
Market Order Imbalance       
   Mean  0.054  0.493  -0.020 
   t-statistic  1.53  21.49  -0.67 
HFT Activity        
Periods with HFT activity  250  336  309 
Mean HFT Net Dollar Volume  -10,895  -3,038  23,304 
HFT Net Dollar Volume Ratio       
   Mean  -0.02  -0.04  0.03 
   t-statistic  -1.3  -3.34  2.35 
HFT Order Imbalance       
   Mean  0.012  0.121  0.035 
   t-statistic  0.41  4.25  1.30 
Mean HFT Demand Ratio  56.8%  48.2%  55.5% 
HFT Participation        
Demand  16.4%  15.4%  19.2% 
Supply  13.8%  16.6%  17.9% 
All  27.8%  29.0%  32.9% 
HFT Abnormal Participation        
Demand       
   Mean  -4.6%  -4.4%  -1.5% 
   t-statistic  -4.7  -5.22  -1.51 
Supply       
   Mean  -1.9%  1.6%  2.6% 
   t-statistic  -1.95  1.88  2.50 
All       
   Mean  -5.2%  -2.4%  0.5% 
   t-statistic  -4.3  -2.19  0.38 






Table 3.3 Event Study of Large 5-second HFT Order Imbalances 
Returns are from NASDAQ quotes and are calculated using the last midpoint in each interval and are 
expressed in basis points.  Order imbalances are HFT liquidity-demanding buy dollar volumes less HFT 
liquidity-demanding sell dollar volumes.  Large HFT order imbalances are defined as imbalances in the top 
or bottom 1000th quantile for each stock.  Quantile cutoffs are defined using full trade sample, but events 
only enter the sample on days when quotes are available.  Event times are in seconds.  T-statistics test the 
null that the mean return in each window is 0.  The sample contains 120 stocks. 
Panel A: HFT Buy Imbalances 
Event Window  Return  
Cum. Return 
from t= -30  
Cum. Return 
from t= 0 
(-29, -5)  -0.3  -0.3   
  (-1.53)  (-1.53)   
       
(-4, 0)  9.0  8.7   
  (33.38)  (33.79)   
       
(1, 5)  1.1  9.7  1.1 
  (7.30)  (44.3)  (7.30) 
       
(6, 10)  0.3  10.0  1.4 
  (3.36)  (44.76)  (8.20) 
       
(11, 30)  0.3  10.4  1.7 
  (2.48)  (41.46)  (8.30) 
       
(31, 60)  0.2  10.7  1.9 
  (1.86)  (38.81)  (8.43) 
       
(61, 600)  -0.4  10.6  1.6 
  (-0.85)  (19.41)  (3.10) 
       
(601, 1800)  -0.8  10.8  1.6 
  (-1.20)  (11.78)  (1.79) 
       
Panel B: HFT Sell Imbalances 
       
(-29, -5)  0.0  0.0   
  (0.02)  (0.02)   
       
(-4, 0)  -9.1  -9.1   
  (-67.28)  (-40.19)   
       
(1, 5)  -0.8  -9.9  -0.8 
  (-9.40)  (-42.60)  (-9.40) 
       
(6, 10)  -0.2  -10.2  -1.0 
  (-2.78)  (-42.51)  (-9.56) 
       
(11, 30)  -0.5  -10.6  -1.5 
  (-3.77)  (-40.02)  (-10.06) 
       
(31, 60)  0.2  -10.4  -1.3 
  (1.68)  (-36.95)  (-6.73) 
       
(61, 600)  2.0  -8.6  0.8 
  (4.27)  (-15.73)  (1.67) 
       
(601, 1800)  1.0  -6.9  2.9 
  (1.47)  (-7.73)  (3.38) 









Table 3.4 Resiliency Event Study of Large 1-minute Order Imbalances  
 Resiliency events are defined as the 1st and 100th percentiles of 1-minute signed volumes for each stock.    The prices are averages of normalized 
midpoints and prices for hypothetical buys and sells of various sizes calculated from NASDAQ limit order book snapshots from 300 seconds before the 
event to 300 seconds after.  Percentiles are defined using full trade sample, but events only enter the sample on days when limit order book snapshots 
are available.  ** signifies that the mean return from a price (midpoint) to the price for the same size trade (midpoint) at t=300 across stocks is 
significantly different from 0 at the 5% level based on a t-test.  Event times are in seconds.  The sample contains 120 stocks. 
 
Panel A: Buy Events, Normal HFT Supply Participation Days 
    
 Hypothetical sell prices  Hypothetical buy prices 
Event Time 5,000 1,000 500 100 mid 100 500 1000 5000 
-300 99.22** 99.71** 99.81** 99.90** 100.00** 100.10** 100.16** 100.24** 100.59** 
-240 99.26** 99.72** 99.81** 99.90** 100.00** 100.10** 100.15** 100.23** 100.55** 
-180 99.27** 99.73** 99.82** 99.90** 100.00** 100.09** 100.14** 100.21** 100.53** 
-120 99.29** 99.74** 99.83** 99.91** 100.00** 100.09** 100.14** 100.20** 100.51** 
-60 99.31** 99.76** 99.85** 99.92** 100.01** 100.09** 100.13** 100.18** 100.48** 
0 99.47 99.90 99.99 100.07 100.17 100.26 100.32 100.40 100.68** 
60 99.46 99.91 100.00 100.09** 100.18** 100.27 100.33 100.41 100.71 
120 99.46 99.91** 100.01** 100.08** 100.18** 100.27 100.33 100.41 100.72 
180 99.46 99.91** 100.01 100.09** 100.18** 100.27 100.33 100.41 100.73 
240 99.45 99.91 100.01 100.09** 100.18** 100.28 100.33 100.41 100.73 
300 99.45 99.90 100.00 100.08 100.18 100.27 100.33 100.41 100.72 
          
Panel B: Buy Events, High HFT Supply Participation Days 
          
-300 99.54** 99.84** 99.89** 99.93** 100.00** 100.07** 100.10** 100.15** 100.33** 
-240 99.58** 99.85** 99.90** 99.94** 100.00** 100.07** 100.10** 100.14** 100.30** 
-180 99.59** 99.86** 99.90** 99.94** 100.00** 100.07** 100.10** 100.14** 100.29** 
-120 99.61** 99.87** 99.91** 99.95** 100.01** 100.08** 100.10** 100.14** 100.28** 
-60 99.64** 99.89** 99.93** 99.97** 100.03** 100.09** 100.11** 100.14** 100.28** 
0 99.79 100.04 100.09** 100.12 100.18 100.25 100.28 100.32 100.45 
60 99.79 100.05** 100.10** 100.13** 100.20** 100.27** 100.30** 100.34 100.48 
120 99.78 100.04 100.08 100.12** 100.19** 100.26 100.29 100.34 100.48 
180 99.77 100.03 100.08 100.12 100.18 100.25 100.29 100.34 100.47 
240 99.76 100.02 100.07 100.11 100.18 100.25 100.29 100.33 100.47 
300 99.76 100.03 100.07 100.11 100.18 100.25 100.28 100.33 100.47 











Table 3.4 Continued 
 
Panel C: Sell Events, Normal HFT Supply Participation Days 
    
 Hypothetical sell prices  Hypothetical buy prices 
Event Time 5,000 1,000 500 100 mid 100 500 1000 5000 
-300 99.42** 99.79** 99.85** 99.90** 100.00** 100.10** 100.18** 100.28** 100.69** 
-240 99.45** 99.80** 99.86** 99.90** 100.00** 100.09** 100.16** 100.26** 100.65** 
-180 99.47** 99.81** 99.86** 99.90** 99.99** 100.08** 100.16** 100.25** 100.62** 
-120 99.49** 99.81** 99.86** 99.90** 99.98** 100.07** 100.14** 100.24** 100.60** 
-60 99.51** 99.82** 99.86** 99.89** 99.97** 100.05** 100.12** 100.21** 100.57** 
0 99.30 99.64 99.69 99.74 99.83 99.91 99.98 100.07** 100.42** 
60 99.28 99.62 99.68** 99.73** 99.82** 99.91** 99.98** 100.08** 100.42** 
120 99.28 99.63 99.69 99.74** 99.82 99.91** 99.98 100.08** 100.43** 
180 99.29 99.64 99.69 99.74** 99.83 99.92 99.99 100.08 100.44 
240 99.28 99.63 99.69 99.74** 99.83** 99.92 99.99 100.09 100.44 
300 99.28 99.64 99.70 99.75 99.84 99.93 100.00 100.10 100.45 
          
Panel D: Sell Events, High HFT Supply Participation Days 
          
-300 99.61** 99.86** 99.90** 99.93** 100.00** 100.07** 100.12** 100.18** 100.40** 
-240 99.65** 99.87** 99.90** 99.93** 100.00** 100.07** 100.11** 100.17** 100.35** 
-180 99.66** 99.88** 99.91** 99.93** 100.00** 100.06** 100.11** 100.16** 100.34** 
-120 99.67** 99.88** 99.91** 99.93** 99.99** 100.06** 100.10** 100.16** 100.33** 
-60 99.67** 99.87** 99.90** 99.91** 99.97** 100.04** 100.08** 100.13** 100.31** 
0 99.47** 99.68** 99.71** 99.74** 99.81** 99.88** 99.92** 99.98 100.14 
60 99.44 99.67 99.70 99.73 99.80 99.87 99.91 99.97 100.14 
120 99.44 99.66 99.70 99.73 99.80 99.87 99.91 99.97 100.14 
180 99.43 99.66 99.69 99.73** 99.79 99.86 99.91 99.97 100.14 
240 99.42 99.65 99.69 99.72** 99.79 99.86 99.90 99.96 100.13 
300 99.41 99.65 99.68 99.72 99.78 99.85 99.90 99.96 100.13 





Table 3.5 Resiliency Event Study Summary 
Permanent Price Impacts, Total Price Impacts, and Times to Resiliency for midpoints and hypothetical 
trades of various sizes calculated from NASDAQ limit order book snapshots estimated across buy and sell 
resiliency events categorized by HFT participation on the event day.  Events are defined as the 1st and 100th 
percentiles of 1-minute signed volumes for each stock.  Total price impact is the mean return from the 
highest (lowest) observed price for buy (sell) events in the event window through 300 seconds after the 
event.  Permanent price impact is the mean return from 300 seconds before the end of the event through 
300 seconds after. Returns are in basis points.  Time to resiliency is the time after which further mean 
returns through 300 seconds postevent are insignificantly different from 0 at the 5% level based on a t-test. 
 
Panel A.  Buy Events 




Measure 5,000 1,000 500 100 mid 100 500 1000 5,000 
           
All, Normal 
Total PI 
25 20 20 19 18 18 18 18 13 
Perm. PI 
23 20 19 19 18 17 17 17 13 
 Res. Time 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
           
All, High 
Total PI 
27 22 21 21 20 19 19 19 17 
Perm. PI 
23 18 18 18 17 17 17 17 14 
 
Res. Time 
240 240 240 240 240 120 120 0 0 




25 21 20 20 19 19 18 18 14 
Perm. PI 
23 20 19 19 18 18 18 18 14 
 Res. Time 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




28 21 20 18 17 17 17 17 15 
Perm. PI 
24 18 18 17 16 15 16 16 12 
 
Res. Time 
0 240 240 240 300 180 0 0 0 




25 20 20 19 18 17 17 17 14 
Perm. PI 
23 19 19 19 18 17 17 17 13 
 Res. Time 
0 240 180 300 300 0 0 0 60 




25 21 21 21 20 20 20 19 14 
Perm. PI 
22 19 18 18 18 18 18 18 14 
 Res. Time 
0 120 120 180 180 120 120 0 0 





Table 3.5 Continued 
 
Panel B.  Sell Events 




Measure 5,000 1,000 500 100 mid 100 500 1000 5,000 
           
All, Normal 
Total PI 
-14 -17 -17 -18 -18 -19 -20 -21 -27 
Perm. PI 
-14 -16 -16 -16 -17 -18 -19 -20 -25 
 Res. Time 
0 0 0 120 120 120 0 0 120 
           
All, High 
Total PI 
-14 -17 -17 -17 -18 -19 -20 -21 -27 
Perm. PI 
-13 -15 -15 -15 -16 -17 -18 -18 -24 
 
Res. Time 
60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




-15 -18 -18 -18 -19 -19 -20 -21 -27 
Perm. PI 
-15 -17 -17 -17 -18 -18 -19 -20 -26 
 Res. Time 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




-17 -18 -18 -18 -19 -20 -22 -23 -28 
Perm. PI 
-17 -17 -17 -17 -17 -18 -18 -18 -22 
 
Res. Time 
0 0 0 0 180 180 180 180 0 




-14 -17 -17 -17 -18 -19 -20 -21 -27 
Perm. PI 
-13 -15 -15 -15 -16 -17 -18 -18 -24 
 Res. Time 
0 0 120 300 300 180 120 180 180 




-20 -21 -21 -21 -22 -22 -22 -22 -27 
Perm. PI 
-20 -21 -21 -21 -22 -22 -22 -22 -27 
 Res. Time 
60 60 60 300 60 60 60 0 0 






Table 3.6 HFT Abnormal Participation Shares by VPIN Groups 
Abnormal participation shares are calculated as the HFT participation share for a stock measured in a 
specific group minus the overall participation share for that stock, and are averaged across stocks.  Three 
versions of abnormal participation shares are calculated, differing in whether HFT participation is defined 
as trades where an HFT participates in any side (ALL), the liquidity-demanding side (DEMAND), or the 
liquidity supplying side (SUPPLY).  VPIN is an order-flow imbalance based proxy for information 
asymmetry from Easley, Lopez DePrado, and O’Hara (2011).  VPIN is calculated using NASDAQ trades 
only.  VPIN groups are formed by ranking all trades within specific stock into 20 groups by VPIN.  T-
statistics test the null that the mean abnormal participation share in a group is 0.  The sample contains 120 
stocks.   
 
       
VPIN Group  ALL_abnormal  DEMAND_abnormal  SUPPLY_abnormal 
1  4.92%  4.99%  1.03% 
2  2.93%  2.94%  0.63% 
3  2.43%  2.34%  0.59% 
4  2.12%  2.03%  0.65% 
5  1.51%  1.60%  0.03% 
6  0.83%  0.85%  -0.13% 
7  0.42%  0.50%  -0.27% 
8  0.03%  0.29%  -0.52% 
9  -0.10%  0.08%  -0.60% 
10  -0.38%  -0.09%  -0.83% 
11  -0.65%  -0.50%  -0.79% 
12  -0.81%  -0.52%  -0.89% 
13  -0.97%  -0.82%  -0.89% 
14  -0.88%  -0.61%  -1.01% 
15  -1.35%  -0.98%  -1.23% 
16  -1.10%  -0.72%  -1.20% 
17  -1.67%  -1.21%  -1.53% 
18  -1.87%  -1.40%  -1.64% 
19  -2.45%  -1.70%  -2.08% 
20  -3.59%  -2.64%  -2.67% 
       
20-1       
Mean  -8.51%  -7.63%  -3.70% 
T  -8.65  -7.66  -6.18 
Min  -49.51%  -49.98%  -27.67% 
Max  37.48%  43.82%  16.65% 
       
20 – 
mean(5-15) 
      
Mean  -3.20%  -2.46%  -1.96% 
T  -4.35  -3.22  -5.07 
Min  -16.81%  -17.65%  -11.92% 
Max  32.58%  39.09%  15.98% 
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Figure 3.1 HFT Signed Volume Event Normalized Midpoint Plots    
HFT signed order flow events are defined as the 1st and 1000th quantiles of  5-second signed HFT order 
volumes for each stock.  The graphs show averages of normalized midpoints from 25 seconds before the 
event to 1800 seconds after.   Midpoints are normalized to 100.00 30 seconds before each event.  Event 
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Figure 3.2 Resiliency Tests by HFT Liquidity Supply Participation Levels 
Resiliency events are defined as the 1st and 100th percentiles of 1-minute signed order volumes for each 
stock.  The graphs show averages of normalized midpoints and prices for hypothetical buys and sells of 
various sizes from 300 seconds before the event to 300 seconds after.   Midpoints are normalized to 100.00 
at 300 seconds before each event, and hypothetical trades are normalized to have the same percent effective 
spreads as actual trades.  Event time is indexed such that the event ends at time 0. 
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4. PRETRADE TRANSPARENCY AND CORPORATE  
BOND TRADING COSTS: EVIDENCE FROM  
THE NYSE AND OTC MARKETS 
4.1 Abstract 
I document dramatically lower trading costs for corporate bond transactions 
executed on the NYSE when compared to a matched sample from the OTC market.  The 
difference in effective spreads is on the order of 100 bps, which is highly economically 
and statistically significant and has not been previously documented.  This result survives 
controls for bond- and day-fixed effects and various trade characteristics, and holds 
whether cost differences are constrained to be constant across trades or are allowed to 
vary with trade characteristics.  I attempt to identify the factors responsible for the cost 
difference, and find that the greater pretrade transparency on the NYSE is the most likely 
explanation.  This contributes to our knowledge about market design and may help 
explain the negative relationship between spreads and trade sizes for OTC bond trades.  I 
also develop and employ a methodology to estimate the impact of trade signing errors in 
data with stale quotes, and show my results are not likely to be driven by stale quote-
related errors.  This methodology may be useful in other applications where stale quotes 






Trading costs in the corporate bond market have recently received increased 
attention in the academic literature.  One factor driving the interest has been the 
introduction of the TRACE reporting system, which was implemented in stages 
beginning in 2002.  The TRACE reporting system provides a rich and near-
comprehensive data set of actual trade prices and sizes.  More importantly, because 
TRACE data are available to market participants in near real-time, the introduction of 
TRACE allowed researchers to test conflicting theoretical predictions of the effects of 
increased transparency on the market.  Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman 
(2006), Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2006), and Edwards, Harris, and Piowar (2007) 
all address various aspects of the impact of TRACE.  Bessembinder, Maxwell, and 
Venkataraman (2006) examine a sample of large insurance company trades around the 
time TRACE reporting was initiated, and find that improved transparency decreases 
trading costs.  Their sample allows them to estimate trading costs before TRACE 
initiation for comparison.  They also document a liquidity externality effect, where 
improved transparency in a group of bonds increases liquidity in related but less 
transparent bonds.  Edwards, Harris, and Piowar (2007) examine a broader proprietary 
sample of OTC transactions from January 2003 through January 2005, and find that 
trading costs are lower for transparent bonds than for opaque bonds, and trading costs are 
reduced when a bond becomes more transparent.  Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2006) 
study a group of BBB bonds that initiated TRACE reporting in 2003 and a matched 
sample that remained opaque during that period.  They find that TRACE reporting 





and that trading volume effects were not significant.  Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) 
provide a review of these studies. 
The majority of corporate bond trading is conducted over-the-counter (OTC), 
where transactions are typically negotiated bilaterally with dealers.  Compared to the 
equity markets, the corporate bond market is relatively opaque, even post-TRACE.  
TRACE provides only posttrade transparency, and pretrade transparency is limited.  
There is no centralized and widely-disseminated source of real-time quote data.  Prior to 
trading, market participants often must contact dealers directly to obtain firm quotes and 
it is surely not practical to survey all dealers prior to a trade.  There are proprietary 
market information systems (i.e., Bloomberg), and private electronic trading networks 
(i.e., MarketAxess) that provide quote data, but these are fragmented and have other 
limitations.  Participation is not universal; in some cases quotes are indicative rather than 
firm, depth of market information is lacking, and infrequently traded issues may not be 
covered.  Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) provide a description of the OTC corporate 
bond market. 
Some corporate bond trading occurs on the NYSE, in a very different 
environment.  The NYSE’s Automated Bond System (ABS) is structured as an electronic 
limit order book system with extensive pretrade transparency. 35 Biais and Green (2005) 
describe the NYSE’s bond trading environment and compare it to the OTC market.  
Some corporate bond issues trade on both markets, so the ABS provides an opportunity 
to examine the impact of pretrade transparency on trading costs.  Pretrade transparency 
                                                 
35 Since the sample was collected, the ABS system has been replaced by the NYSE Bonds system.  It 
appears trading rules on NYSE Bonds are largely the same, and the main differences are relaxed listing 





has been the subject of several papers, but there is not a strong consensus on how it 
should impact trading costs.  Baruch (2005) develops a model predicting that pretrade 
transparency increases liquidity.  Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2005) present a model 
that predicts wider spreads in more transparent markets, and they document decreased 
liquidity and increased trading costs when the Toronto Stock Exchange began to disclose 
more detailed order book data.  Their findings are opposite those of Boehmer, Saar, and 
Yu (2005), who find that an increase in pretrade transparency in the NYSE’s equity 
market led to decreased trading costs. 
Two prior studies address the impacts of NYSE listing or trading on corporate 
bond transaction costs.  Edwards, Harris, and Piowar (2007) include an indicator variable 
for NYSE ABS listing in their cross-sectional analysis of transaction costs, and find that 
ABS listing results in a small but statistically significant reduction for smaller trades.  
This result is not a major focus of their paper and is not discussed in detail.  Further, they 
do not clarify whether their sample includes trades that were actually executed on the 
NYSE, and in any case, their regression specification does not directly measure the 
impact of the trading venue on execution costs.  Hong and Warga (2000) do compare 
corporate bond transaction costs on the NYSE with those in the OTC market, and report 
that transaction costs are similar across markets. 
In this paper, I use NYSE trade and quote data from February 6, 2002 to April 20, 
2007 and TRACE transaction data from the same period to compare effective spreads 
across markets. 36   I use fixed-effects regressions to directly compare same-bond same-
day trades, and add additional controls for trade size and direction.  I find that effective 
                                                 
36 The TRACE system was not in operation until July 2002, and was introduced in stages, so some analyses 





spreads are on the order of 100 bps lower for trades on the NYSE using several different 
estimation methodologies.  The mean spread for the OTC trades in my sample is 219 bps, 
so this is a significant difference across markets. 37  I discuss differences in market design 
and conclude that pretrade transparency is the most likely reason for the difference in 
trading costs. 
This paper differs from Hong and Warga (2000) in several important ways.  First, 
their sample is prior to the implementation of the TRACE system, so their results are 
affected by the lack of both pre- and posttrade transparency on the dealer market.  
Second, they are not able to obtain reliable small trade transaction costs from their 
sample of OTC trades, so they are forced to compare large OTC trades (500 bonds and 
over) with small NYSE trades in their analysis and therefore cannot effectively control 
for trade size.  I use small OTC trades (less than 100 bonds), which are similar in size to 
typical NYSE trades, and show that it is important to control for trade size.  Third, there 
are other methodological differences.  They calculate trading costs based on round trips, 
while my sample allows me to use quotes.  They identify and control for several bond-
specific characteristics and market state variables explicitly, while I control for all 
possible bond-specific characteristics and daily variations in the market state using fixed 
effects regressions.  Finally, my results are dramatically different from theirs. 
An additional contribution this paper makes is the introduction of a new technique 
to assess the accuracy of trade buy vs. sell classifications in data characterized by 
potentially stale quotes.  I rely on the quote rule (see Hasbrouck 1988 and Lee and Ready 
1991), to sign trades, and my estimates of transaction costs are sensitive to 
                                                 
37 This is not representative of all OTC trades, as my sample is restricted to trades of 100 bonds or less for 





misclassifications.  A shortcoming of TAQ data for bonds is that quotes are only 
available at the close, and therefore are likely to be stale by the time a trade occurs, which 
introduces error into the quote-rule assignments.  This new technique estimates the 
probability of error in the quote-rule assignments for each trade.  I show that my key 
results are unlikely to be materially affected by this problem.  This technique potentially 
has applications in other empirical microstructure work where the quotation data may be 
stale. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 4.3 discusses 
characteristics of the NYSE and OTC corporate bond markets that are relevant to trading 
costs.  Section 4.4 describes the data sample and Section 4.5 describes my research 
methodology.  Section 4.6 presents the results for the full sample of transactions, and 
Section 4.7 presents results for the subset of the transactions where dealers trade on the 
NYSE platform.  Section 4.8 analyzes the robustness of these results to stale quote data.  
Section 4.9 concludes. 
4.3 Corporate Bond Trading in the NYSE and OTC Markets 
Hong and Warga (2000) and Biais and Green (2005) provide comparisons of the 
NYSE and OTC markets for bond trading, and Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) 
provide additional detail on the OTC market.  The following differences in market 
design, level of trading activity, and composition of the trader population are most 
relevant to this study: 
1) Pretrade transparency.  The NYSE has more pretrade transparency than the 





displayed. 38  There is not a uniform theoretical prediction of the impact of this pretrade 
transparency on transaction costs.  I reason that this should decrease trading costs on the 
NYSE, based on the evidence from the TRACE-related literature that increased 
transparency increases liquidity for corporate bonds, and because of the recent empirical 
equity market evidence from the same exchange in Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005).  In 
contrast, the Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2005) finding of higher trading costs after 
an increase in pretrade transparency is based on older evidence from the TSE. 
2) Trading volume.  Trading volume is greater in the OTC market.  This is true 
both overall and on a per-issue basis.  According to Edwards, Harris, and Piowar (2007), 
fewer than 5% of all bonds are listed on the NYSE and NYSE trading in these issues 
accounts for 0 to 40% of all transactions.  Biais and Green (2005) document that 
corporate bonds traded actively on the NYSE until volume migrated to the OTC market 
in the mid 1940s.  The academic literature is consistent in predicting that increased 
trading volume lowers trading costs, so this effect should increase trading costs on the 
NYSE relative to the OTC market. 
3) Price discrimination opportunities. We know from the literature on the OTC 
bond markets that liquidity providers charge lower spreads for larger orders.  It can be 
argued that this is either a result of rent-seeking behavior or of dealers’ fixed costs, but in 
either case, larger orders are empirically cheaper (from the customer’s perspective) to 
execute.  In the OTC market, a dealer is free to price discriminate by quoting different 
prices for different trade sizes.  In the exchange environment, this is not possible.  In a 
limit order book market with price priority rules, trading costs must be increasing in trade 
                                                 
38 NYSE Bonds, the successor system to ABS, supports Reserve Orders where a portion of the order is 





size.  A liquidity provider posts a limit order with a specified price and size, and then a 
liquidity taker can choose to trade any lower size at that price.  Larger trades will “walk 
the book” and execute at wider spreads. 
This does not appear to have been addressed in the literature to date.  It is 
reasonable to expect that this would cause dealers to quote wide spreads in anticipation of 
small trades.  This effect should raise transaction costs for large trades on the NYSE 
relative to the OTC.  The impact on small trades is unclear.  These trades transact at the 
tip of the book bid-ask spread, which could be tighter if the dealer prices in some 
probability of a large trade or in the event a patient investor becomes the marginal 
liquidity provider.   The spread for small trades would be unchanged, however, if a small 
trade is priced in with 100% probability and the dealer remains the marginal liquidity 
provider.   
I empirically address these issues by estimating the difference in trading costs 
between the two markets separately for different transaction sizes.  Although my sample 
does not contain truly large trades by OTC standards, the larger trades are large enough to 
trade at tighter effective spreads on the OTC market, and therefore should be large 
enough to capture this effect.  I interpret a pattern where the NYSE trading costs increase 
relative to OTC costs as trade size increases as evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  
I interpret lower observed NYSE relative to OTC costs for the largest trades as evidence 
that this is not the only factor influencing the cost differences across the markets. 
4) Investor participation. Observed trading costs on the NYSE could be lower due 
to higher investor participation.  Dealers participate in every trade on the OTC market by 





with each other.  Trades between two liquidity seekers may be executed more cheaply 
due to the lack of the requirement to compensate the liquidity provider.  Note that this is 
not the same as claiming lower dealer participation increases overall liquidity, as we 
would expect depth to suffer and fewer trades to occur.  I control for the possibility that 
my results are driven by differing levels of investor participation between the two 
markets by analyzing a subset of the NYSE trades that are likely to have dealers on at 
least one side. 
5) Trade size. Trade sizes are smaller on the NYSE than the OTC market.  As 
mentioned above, smaller corporate bond trades are known to have wider effective 
spreads.  I address this by using a small trade subset of the TRACE data in my sample, 
and by controlling for trade size in most regression specifications. 
6) Proportion of buys vs. sells.  It is possible that trading costs are different 
depending on whether the buyer or the seller is seeking liquidity.  Green, Hollifield, and 
Schurhoff (2007) conjecture that sellers in small municipal bond trades are generally 
more motivated than buyers, due to the availability of close substitutes.  It is reasonable 
to assume this could apply to corporate bonds as well.  If this is true, sales would be more 
expensive than buys.  If the mix of buyers and sellers on each market are different, this 
could cause a difference in overall trading costs.  I control for this possibility with 
regression specifications that control for trade direction. 
My research design reflects these considerations.  I use regression analyses that 
control for trade size, differences in costs for buys and sells, and dealer participation.  
The estimated residual difference in trading costs between the two markets can reflect the 





opportunities.39  Assuming omitted factors are of secondary importance, the finding of 
lower NYSE costs can be interpreted as evidence that pretrade transparency is the driving 
factor.  The other two effects are believed to increase costs for trades on the exchange, 
and the net difference is lower, so it appears that pretrade transparency lowers trading 
costs and is of sufficient magnitude to overcome the other factors. 40  If NYSE trading 
costs had been found to be higher, I would not have been able to separate out the impact 
of pretrade transparency with this analysis.   
In the current version of this paper, I hope to have analyzed the most important 
differences between the two markets but there are details I have not yet considered.  
Specifically, I have omitted examination of possible impacts of minimum tick sizes, 
commissions, and accrued interest conventions.  I am relying on documentation of 
trading rules from 2007, and still need to determine if there were any major changes 
during the sample period.  I have not determined if there are any rules or registration 
records available for market makers operating on the NYSE.  Finally, if the motivated 
seller hypothesis is true, this could result in midpoints that are lower than fair value.  This 
may raise econometric issues that warrant attention, but should not affect my conclusions 
regarding the differences across markets. 
4.4 Data Description 
I obtain data for this paper from the NYSE and from TRACE.  Sample descriptive 
statistics are presented in Tables 4.1-4.3.  The NYSE initial sample contains trade and 
                                                 
39 Technically the component of this factor that is unexplained by the size-market interaction terms in the 
regressions. 
40 With the possible exception of the price discrimination effect lowering NYSE costs for the smallest 





quote data for all ABS listed bonds from Feb 6, 2002 through April 20, 2007.  Trade data 
consist of bond identifying information, trade date and time, price, number of bonds 
traded, and several trade condition flags.  Quote data consist of bond identifying 
information, date, bid and ask prices and sizes (tip of the book only), several bond 
characteristic fields and flags, and information on the last trade and interest payment.  
Quotes are only available at the close.  The initial TRACE sample contains all small 
trades (less than 100 bonds) for bonds in the NYSE sample that traded on the same day 
an NYSE trade occurred.  The size restriction is used to select only OTC trades that are of 
similar size to typical NYSE trades.  TRACE data consist of bond identifying 
information, trade date and time, price, number of bonds traded, and several trade 
condition flags. 
4.4.1 Main Sample Selection 
My study uses effective spreads as the primary measure of transaction costs, so I 
require that quote data be available for each trade.  I impose additional trade-level screens 
described below.  I am interested in comparing NYSE and OTC transaction costs, so I 
also require that a TRACE-reported OTC trade in the same bond be available on the same 
day. 
The quote screens begin with the requirement that the bond must be a domestic 
corporate issue not in default and there must be both a valid bid and ask.  I remove 
observations with extreme midpoint prices, defined as prices less than or equal to 90 or 
greater than or equal to 115, and several malformed records.  These screens reduce the 





I eliminate NYSE trades that do not match screened two-sided quotes from the 
prior close.  Then I remove records with errors, unusual status codes, and extreme trade 
prices.  Extreme prices are defined as prices less than or equal to 80 or greater than or 
equal to 125, which is equal to the extreme quote midpoint definition +/- 10 points.  For 
the remaining trades, I select all TRACE trades of less than 100 bonds in the same bond 
issue that trade on the same day.  I eliminate TRACE trades that have unusual or error 
status codes.  I flag TRACE trades that appear to have been executed on the NYSE, based 
on trade price, size, and time, and do not use these for matching candidates.  Finally, I 
form a matched sample, keeping only NYSE trades where a TRACE-reported OTC trade 
is available.  These screens reduce the NYSE sample from 346,471 to 54,405 NYSE 
trades.  The final sample includes 114,860 matched TRACE trades.  I refer to this final 
sample as the full sample in the rest of this paper. 
4.4.2 Dealer Trade Sample Selection 
I construct a subsample of my data consisting of dealer trades executed on the 
NYSE and matched with same-bond same-day TRACE-reported OTC trades that is used 
for the analysis in Section 6.  To construct this subsample, I define a trade in the NYSE 
data as a dealer trade if it appears to be reported on TRACE.  I implicitly assume that 
dealers participate in all trades reported to TRACE.  This assumption may warrant further 
research; I have not verified that there is not some way a trade without dealer 
participation (such as two liquidity traders trading through a broker) could be reported.    
Specifically, for each trade in the NYSE data, I search for a TRACE trade in the same 





NYSE trade time.  If there is a match, I designate it as a dealer trade.  I acknowledge that 
it is possible there are a few cases where the trade did not involve a dealer and was 
similar by coincidence, but this seems to be a reasonable approach.  Then, following the 
same procedure used in the primary dataset, I match these with small same-bond same-
day OTC-executed TRACE trades.   
This approach may undercount the dealer trades on the NYSE for two reasons.  
First, if a trade is executed on the NYSE it is not required to be reported to TRACE.  I 
conjecture that the reason some are is that some dealers find it expedient to report all 
trades on TRACE rather than sorting them.  Second, I have not attempted to match trades 
allowing for the possibility of aggregation.  If there are situations where two trades in the 
same issue on the NYSE are reported as one trade in TRACE or vice-versa, my algorithm 
would not identify them as dealer trades.   
4.4.3 Main Sample Characteristics 
Descriptive statistics for the initial and final samples are presented in Tables 4.1 
and 4.2.  The most striking features of the data are that the quoted spreads are wide, the 
trades are small, and most issues trade infrequently.   
In the final sample, quoted spreads average $2.2 per $100 of face value, which is 
a significant portion of the expected annual return for a corporate bond.    Most bonds 
trade near par, so this is close to a relative spread.  For comparison, Bessembinder (2003) 






The average trade size in the NYSE sample was 28.5 bonds, the median was 15 
bonds, and the 90th percentile was 55 bonds, where each bond has $1000 face value.  
These are clearly small retail-sized trades, which is consistent with Hong and Warga 
(2000) and Biais and Green (2005).  This compares with average institutional trade sizes 
of 2,500-3,000 bonds in the insurance company sample described in Bessembinder, 
Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006).  The small trade sizes in this sample are significant 
because bond trading costs are known to be larger for small trades, and because retail 
traders are thought to be less informed about fair value and therefore more vulnerable to 
rent-seeking behavior by dealers.  Also, the average trade size is lower than the average 
quoted size in the final sample, so most of these trades were unlikely to have walked the 
book. 
The bonds in this sample did not typically trade daily.  In the initial sample, which 
is more descriptive of actual market conditions, the average issue traded on the NYSE 
about once every 3 trading days, and the median issue traded only once every 22 trading 
days. 
The characteristics of the final sample differ somewhat from the initial sample 
due to the screens imposed.  This is a consequence of assembling a dataset with the goal 
of estimating transaction costs for a “normal” trade and meeting the data availability 
requirements.  As shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the final sample has higher prices, tighter 





4.4.4 Dealer Trade Sample Characteristics 
Descriptive statistics for the dealer trade samples are presented in Table 4.3.  
After the selection process described in Section 4.4.2 is applied, the sample contains 
3,704 NYSE trades and 41,785 OTC trades.  NYSE dealer trades were identified in 154 
out of the 227 issues from the full sample.  The large number of OTC matches found for 
these trades suggests that dealers trade primarily in the more actively traded bonds. Trade 
sizes were marginally higher than the matched OTC trades, and lower than those in the 
full sample. 
Comparing the number of trades, dealer participation is identified for 3,704 out of 
a total of 53,811 full sample trades, or about 7%.  By multiplying the daily trading 
volume by the number of sample days in the dealer sample and comparing these totals to 
the full sample values in Table 4.2, we can see that dealer participation is identified for 
less than 5% of the full sample trading volume.  However, the caveat from Section 4.4.2 
that my algorithm may undercount dealer trades warns against weighting this observation 
too heavily. 
4.5 Methodology 
4.5.1 Effective Spreads 
This study uses effective spreads as the primary measure of transaction costs and 
the dependent variable for all regression analyses.  Effective spreads are the absolute 
value of the difference between the execution price and the midpoint of the quotes: 





In my sample, the quotes in at the time of the trade are not available, so I use the 
prior day’s closing quotes as a proxy.  In Section 4.5.4, I address the error introduced by 
this approach and provide a mitigation strategy.  Table 4.4 summarizes the effective 
spreads in this sample.  
4.5.2 Fixed-Effects Regressions 
I use a regression framework to analyze the determinants of observed effective 
spreads, with the goals of identifying components of the spread that can be attributed to 
the market on which the trade is executed, and if possible, drawing a conclusion about the 
impact of pretrade transparency.  I use a fixed-effects model that estimates individual 
intercepts for each bond-day combination.   
This approach controls for the possibility that unobserved factors that are 
correlated with the trading venue influence the effective spreads, and to a degree allows 
me to separate these factors from the market design issues of interest.  For example, if 
trading costs are higher on lower credit quality issues, and these issues are traded more 
heavily OTC, this will decrease observed transaction costs on the NYSE relative to the 
OTC market.  If trading costs are higher on more volatile days, and on these days there is 
more OTC trading volume, this will also decrease observed transaction costs on the 
NYSE relative to the OTC market.  These effects will be absorbed by the bond-day 
intercepts, and will not influence the estimated coefficient on the NYSE dummy 
variable.41 
                                                 





I use variations of two main regression specifications.  The first specification 
estimates a difference in spreads between the NYSE and OTC markets that is constrained 
to be constant across all trades: 
 (4.2) Spreaditn = αi + αit + β1 NYSE + β2j SIZEj + β3 BUY + β4 SELL + ε   
where i indexes issues, t indexes days, n indexes trades, and j indexes trade size groups.  
NYSE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a trade was executed on the NYSE and 0 
otherwise.  The coefficient on NYSE is of primary interest; this is an estimate of the 
transaction cost difference between the two markets not explained by the other 
explanatory variables.  The fixed effects intercepts do not accommodate trade specific 
factors, so I add trade size and sign as additional controls.  SIZEj is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a trade belongs to size group j and 0 otherwise.  The six trade size groups are 
1-10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-49, 41-50, and >50 bonds.  BUY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
a trade is a buy and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, SELL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
trade is a sell and 0 otherwise.  When estimating versions of the regression model where 
trade side is controlled for, I remove unclassified trades from the data and rebalance the 
panel.  Including an unclassified group would be equivalent to a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the dependent variable of the regression is 0.  In some specifications, SELL must be 
omitted to identify the regression. 
The second regression specification allows the difference in spreads between the 
NYSE and OTC markets to vary with trade size and direction using interactions between 





(4.3) Spreaditn = αi + αit + β1j (NYSE * SIZEj) + β2 (NYSE * BUY) + β3 (NYSE * SELL) 
+ β4j SIZEj + β5 BUY + β6 SELL + ε      
where indexes and variable definitions are identical to the first specification.  When 
estimating versions of Equation (4.3) that include trade sign interactions or controls, I 
remove unclassified trades from the data and rebalance the panel.  Unclassified trades 
have a measured effective spread of zero, so it is meaningless to compare transaction 
costs of unclassified trades between the two markets. 
4.5.3 Trade Signing 
Trade sign classifications are required to estimate regression Equations (4.2) and 
(4.3) and are not available in the data.  I use the quote rule to determine whether a trade 
was buyer or seller initiated.  The quote rule classifies all trades above the midpoint as 
buys and below the midpoint as sells.  I leave trades at the midpoint unclassified.  I 
choose not to apply the tick rule to these trades because I believe it will be unreliable due 
to the infrequency of trading and the price discovery that occurs in other markets between 
trades. 
4.5.4 Stale Quote Error Analysis 
As noted, NYSE quotes are only available at the close, so trades are matched with 
quotes that may be stale.  It is clear that this can introduce error into actual effective 
spread measurements, but the primary issue in this study is the error that is introduced 





Consider two trades that occur at the same time, given that the quote has moved since the 
prior close, and let δ equal the movement in the midpoint since the prior close.  Equation 
(4.4) shows the measured difference in spreads, Equation (4.5) shows the true difference 
in spreads, and Equation (4.6) shows the error. 
(4.4) DiffMeasured =Spread1Stale - Spread2Stale = 2( | price1 - midStale | - | price2 - midStale | )  
(4.5) DiffTrue = Spread1True - Spread2True = 2( | price1 - midTrue | - | price2 - midTrue | )  
              = 2( | price1 - (midStale+ δ) | - | price2 - (midStale+ δ) | ) 
(4.6) Error = DiffMeasured - DiffTrue= 2( | price1 - midStale | - | price2 - midStale|    
           - | price1 - (midStale+ δ) | + | price2 - (midStale+ δ) | )  
Note that when comparing trades of the same sign, Equation (4.6) reduces to: 
Error  = 2(price1 - midStale - price2 + midStale - price1 + midStale+ δ + price2 - midStale- δ ) 
  = 0 
However, when trade 1 is a buy and trade 2 is a sell, Equation (4.6) reduces to:  
Error = 2( price1 - midStale - midStale + price2  - price1 + midStale+ δ + midStale+ δ - price2 ) 
          = 4δ  





From this analysis, it may appear that the use of stale quotes would not induce an 
error if the difference in effective spreads is estimated separately for buys and sales, 
which I do in some specifications of regression Equation (4.3).  This is not the case, 
however.  First, the trades do not execute at the same time except by chance.  Second, 
buy and sell designations are not part of the data and are estimated with error.  I leave the 
first issue for future work, but I develop a technique to partially address the second 
concern.  I argue that, if it is possible to estimate this regression in such a way that there 
is higher confidence in the trade signs than in the baseline regression, the effective spread 
coefficients in this estimation should be less affected by stale quote errors than the 
baseline regression. 
For every trade, I use a Brownian bridge to estimate the probability of a trade 
signing error as described below, and define sign confidence as 1- probability of signing 
error.  I then estimate a variation of regression Equation (4.3) using only observations 
with a sign confidence of >= 85%.  I also repeat the analysis using weighted least squares 
with each observation weighted by its sign confidence.  If the results from either of these 
regressions differs materially from the baseline results, it is likely that the baseline results 
are significantly affected by stale quote-induced errors.  
A Brownian bridge is a Brownian motion over an interval conditioned on the two 
fixed endpoints.  A closed form formula exists which can be used to find a probability 
distribution for points along the interval.  For a description of Brownian bridges, see 
Monte Carlo Methods in Financial Engineering by Glasserman (2003).  To the best of my 
knowledge, I am the first to use Brownian bridges to model price movements between 





uses in the finance literature.  Ball and Torus (1983) and Stock (1990) model the pull-to-
par price dynamics of bonds with Brownian bridges.  Brennan and Schwartz (1990), Liu 
and Longstaff (2004) and Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2007) use Brownian 
bridges to model arbitrage convergence processes.42  
I use the midpoints from the prior close (mid0) and the trade day close (mid1), the 
daily volatility of changes in midpoint closes for the issue over the entire sample (σ), and 
the time of the trade (t) to estimate the probability distribution of the midpoint at the time 
of the trade.  I make the simplifying assumption that no price discovery occurs overnight, 
so the midpoint at 8:00 am (the TRACE open) is the same as at the prior day’s at the 4:00 
pm NYSE close.  I also assume normality of midpoint price changes.  The expected value 
of the midpoint at trade time using the Brownian bridge formula is just a linear 
interpolation: 
(4.7) E[midt] =  [(close - t) mid0 + (t-open) mid1]/(close-open)    
and the variance is given by: 
 (4.8) var[midt] =  [(t-open)(close - t)/(close-open)]σ
2     
                                                 
42 Other articles using Brownian bridges include Duffie (1990), Cheng (1991), Back (1992), Manaster and 





where time intervals are measured in fractions of a day for consistency with the volatility 
units. 
For a trade classified as a buy to be signed in error, the midpoint must be higher 
than the trade price at the time of the trade.  The test statistic for this is: 
(4.9) Zcrit = (trade price - E[midt])/ var[midt]
1/2       
And similarly for a trade classified as a sell to be signed in error, the midpoint must be 
lower than the trade price at the time of the trade.  The test statistic for this is: 
(4.10) Zcrit = (E[midt] - trade price)/ var[midt]
1/2       
So for each trade, the probability of a misclassification is: 
(4.11) P(sign error) = P(Z > Zcrit)         
This analysis may be extended in several obvious ways.  First, it may be possible 
to incorporate time elapsed between trades into the weighting scheme.  Second, this 
scheme determines weights on individual trades, while the regression effectively operates 
on same-day, same-issue clusters of trades.  A weighting scheme that applied the same 
weight to all trades in an issue on the same day based on some composite error 





scheme to be applied to other regressions where the estimated difference in effective 
spreads is held constant across buys and sales.  In this application, stale quote-induced 
errors should also be a function of the distribution of the midpoint at trade time but would 
be more complicated.  Finally, I use a constant daily volatility of midpoint price moves 
estimated for the full sample.  A GARCH-estimated volatility may be more realistic.  I 
leave these extensions for future research.  Despite these limitations, I argue that my 
strategy as implemented should work in the direction of reducing stale quote error in a 
large sample and provides a reasonable starting point for further work. 
4.6 Full Sample Empirical Results 
Table 4.5 presents the results from regression Equation (2) estimated in the full 
sample of trades.  In interpreting the results in this and the tables that follow, it is 
important to understand that there are unreported intercepts for each bond-day 
combination, so the coefficients do not reveal the actual level of the effective spread for a 
particular type of trade. 
The coefficient on the NYSE dummy variable is of primary interest, and can be 
interpreted as the effective spread premium for a corporate bond trade that is executed on 
the NYSE compared with a trade in the OTC market.  In all regression specifications, this 
coefficient is negative, strongly economically and statistically significant, and changes 
little in magnitude with the inclusion of other explanatory variables.  Negative values 






Trade size is controlled for with dummy variables indicating whether a trade falls 
into a particular size group.  In unreported regressions replacing the trade size dummies 
with continuous trade size and log of trade size, the results were qualitatively unchanged.  
The dummy variable approach was selected for ease of interpretation.  The trade size 
dummy variables can be interpreted as the additional cost of executing a trade in that size 
group compared to a trade in the largest (>50 bonds) group.  These show a pattern of 
effective spreads decreasing with trade size, which is consistent with the prior literature 
on the bond markets.  Except for the 41-50 bond group, these coefficients are statistically 
significant, which indicates a difference in effective spread from the large trade group.  
Note that this specification constrains the relationship between effective spread and trade 
size to be constant across both markets.  Table 4.4 suggests that the relationship is much 
stronger in the OTC market, and unreported regressions confirm this.  This relates to the 
discussion in Section 4.3 regarding the ability to set different prices for different trade 
sizes in the OTC market but not on the exchange. 
Table 4.5 also shows that effective spreads are wider for buys than sells.  This 
provides evidence against the hypothesis that the availability of substitutes causes sells to 
be more expensive that buys.   
Table 4.6 presents the results from regression Equation (4.3) estimated in the full 
sample of trades.  Where Equation (4.2) constrained the coefficient on the NYSE to be 
constant across all trades, Equation (4.3) allows it to vary across trade size and direction 
by using interaction terms.   
In every model in Table 4.6 that includes NYSE-size group interaction terms, 





shows that the effective spreads on NYSE trades of every size category are lower than 
effective spreads in the OTC market.  The difference is greater for smaller trades, 
beginning at 128 bps for the trades of 1-10 bonds and decreasing near-monotonically to 
75 bps for trades of more than 50 bonds.  Model 4 shows that when a NYSE-buy 
interaction term is included, the magnitude of the differences for each size category 
decline but remain economically and statistically significant and retain their near-
monotonic trend. 
The observation that trading costs are lower on the NYSE for even the largest 
trade size groups suggests that the differences in trading costs are not entirely driven by 
the lack of price discrimination opportunities on the NYSE.  As discussed in Section 4.3, 
this effect is expected to increase NYSE costs relative to the OTC market for the large 
trades. 
Models 2-4 include NYSE-trade direction interaction terms.  Again, these terms 
are all negative and economically and statistically significant.  Model 2 shows that 
without controlling for size, effective spreads for buys on the NYSE are 140 bps lower 
than for buys on the OTC market and effective spreads for sales are 96 bps lower.  Buys 
are 41 bps more expensive than sells on the OTC market, so these results suggest the 
difference between the interaction terms is primarily driven by the difference between the 
costs of buys and sells on the OTC market.  Model 3 adds controls for trade size, and the 
estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are substantially identical.  Model 4 adds 
trade size interaction terms and omits the NYSE-SELL interaction term to identify the 
regression.  In this specification, the coefficient on the NYSE-BUY term drops by 96 bps 





results indicate that, for a given trade size, the differential transaction cost differences 
between the two markets related to trade direction are explained by differences within the 
OTC market. 
The stylized facts we can draw from this analysis are that (1) corporate bond 
trades are less expensive to execute on the NYSE than in the OTC market, (2) the cost 
difference is greater for small trades than large trades, (3) the cost difference is greater for 
buys than for sells, (4) the variations in cost differences related to trade size and direction 
are largely driven by variation within the OTC market, and (5) the difference in trading 
costs between the two markets is not entirely due to the lack price discrimination 
opportunities on the NYSE. 
Based on the results in this section, we can conclude that the differences in 
trading costs between the two markets persist when we control for bond- and day-fixed 
effects, trade sizes, and relative differences in buys and sales, and must include some 
factor other than the lack of price discrimination opportunities on the NYSE.  From the 
factors discussed in Section 4.3, this leaves pretrade transparency, trading volume, and 
level of dealer participation to explain the remainder.  Since we observe lower trading 
costs on the NYSE, and the lower volume on the NYSE would predict higher costs, this 
implies that the combined effects of greater pretrade transparency and level of dealer 
participation effects decrease trading costs.  
4.7 Dealer Trade Sample Empirical Results 
Section 4.3 raises the possibility that lower trading costs on the NYSE are due to 





small fraction of the NYSE trades, implying higher investor participation, but this does 
not show causality. 43  Under the hypothesis that high investor participation causes lower 
trading costs, dealers charge higher spreads than liquidity traders to extract rents and/or 
cover costs regardless of the trading venue, and observed transaction costs are lower on 
the NYSE because low dealer participation causes a large percentage of the trades to 
occur with liquidity-seeking investors on both sides.  In this section, I repeat the 
estimation of Equations (4.2) and (4.3) in a subsample of the NYSE trades that appear to 
be dealer-intermediated.  If this hypothesis is correct, transaction costs will be roughly 
the same in both markets in this subset of trades.  Note that this assumes that dealers are 
primarily liquidity providers when trading on the NYSE, which cannot be confirmed by 
the available data.  This analysis is also interesting because it sheds light on the question 
of whether dealers behave differently when subject to the NYSE trading rules.   
Table 4.7 presents the results from regression Equation (4.2) estimated in the 
dealer trade sample.  As in the full sample, the coefficient on the NYSE dummy variable 
is strongly economically and statistically significant, and changes little with the inclusion 
of other explanatory variables.  Estimates range from -104 to -109 basis points.  This 
result is striking; the effective spread difference for trades executed with dealers on the 
NYSE compared to those on the OTC market are close to those in the full sample results.  
The null of no difference in execution costs for dealer trades between the two markets 
can be strongly rejected.  Dealers appear to behave differently when trading in the NYSE.  
Low dealer participation does not explain the cost differences; if there were high levels of 
                                                 





dealer trading at the spreads we observe in this sample, trading costs on the NYSE would 
still be lower than on the OTC market.    
Table 4.8 presents the results from regression Equation (4.3) estimated in the 
dealer trade sample.  As in Table 4.6, in every model in Table 4.8 that includes NYSE-
size group interaction terms, these terms are all negative and economically and 
statistically significant.  Overall, the results in Table 4.8 are qualitatively similar to those 
in Table 4.6.  The main exception is that the general pattern of the trading cost 
differences decreasing with trade size still exists, but is noticeably weaker and no longer 
near-monotonic. These results also lead to a strong rejection of the null of no difference 
in execution costs for dealer trades between the two markets. 
From the dealer trade analysis, we can add two more stylized facts to those 
presented in Section 4.6: (6) the difference in the level of investor participation does not 
drive the difference in trading costs between the two markets, and (7) dealers trade at 
tighter spreads when transacting on the NYSE than when transacting in the OTC market.   
These results, taken together with those in Section 4.6, combine to support the 
hypothesis that pretrade transparency lowers trading costs in the corporate bond market.  
We observe dramatically lower costs in the trading venue with greater pretrade 
transparency, and all the other factors we can account for would either tend to increase 
NYSE costs relative to OTC costs or have little impact. 
4.8 Robustness to Stale Quote Errors 
Section 4.5.4 discusses the possibility that the use of stale quotes introduces errors 





presents a methodology to reduce this error.  In this section, I apply this methodology to 
Model 3 from Table 4.6, and present the results in Table 4.9. 
The basic concept is that stale quote error is reduced when the trading cost 
differences are estimated for buys and sells separately, conditional on the trades being 
signed correctly.  If my main findings of lower trading costs on the NYSE are driven or 
boosted by stale quote errors, when the baseline regression is repeated with a technique 
that omits low confidence trades or places less weight on them, the trading cost 
differences between the two markets should be reduced.  Using the technique described 
in Section 4.5.4, I estimate a trade sign confidence level for each trade where sufficient 
data exist.  This results in a sample of 144,942 trades, compared to 163,729 for the full 
sample.     
Model 3 estimates the trading cost differences for buys and sells separately 
through the use of interaction terms between the NYSE dummy and BUY and SELL 
dummies, and also controls for trade size and OTC buys.  As benchmarks, Table 4.9 
repeats the Model 3 results for the full sample of trades, and reports the results of the 
same regression estimated in the subsample where confidence estimates can be calculated 
but without using the confidence estimates in any way.  Then I estimate the regression 
using two methods to reduce the influence of low confidence trades: once using a 
confidence level filter and once using confidence weighting.  For the filter regression, I 
use only trades where the sign confidence level is 85% or higher.  For the weighting 
regression, I use Weighted Least Squares estimation on all trades with sufficient data, 





The results show that my findings are not likely to be driven by stale quote-related 
errors.  In both the filter regression and the weighting regression, the estimated 
differences between the two markets increase.  The estimated cost reduction for buys 
executed on the NYSE increases from 144 bps using the standard regression to 154 bps 
(159 bps) in the filter (weighting) regression.   The estimated cost reduction for sales 
executed on the NYSE increases from 99 bps using the standard regression to 105 bps 
(107 bps) in the filter (weighting) regression.  These results are all strongly statistically 
significant, and suggest that stale quote errors might actually bias these estimates 
downwards. 
4.9 Conclusions 
This paper documents dramatically lower trading costs for corporate bond 
transactions executed on the NYSE than on the OTC market.  This result persists when 
controlling for bond- and day-fixed effects, trade size, trade direction, and dealer 
participation.  This also holds whether differences are constrained to be constant across 
trades or are allowed to vary with trade characteristics.  Based on a new methodology I 
use to analyze the impact of stale quote error, the estimated trading cost differences do 
not appear to be driven by stale quotes and may be biased downwards. 
The difference in effective spreads between the two markets is on the order of 100 
bps without conditioning on trade characteristics.  Conditioning on trade characteristics, 
the differences are always economically and statistically significant, and range from a 





in effective spreads across trade characteristics on the NYSE, so most of the variation in 
the differences is driven by variation in spreads on the OTC market. 
I find that dealer-intermediated trades are less costly when executed on the NYSE 
than in the OTC market; this is surprising and important for two reasons.  First, it rules 
out the hypothesis that the cost differences result from differences in investor 
participation.  If every trade on the NYSE were dealer intermediated and nothing else 
changed endogenously, NYSE trading costs would still be lower.  Second, the stylized 
fact that dealers appear to trade at tighter spreads when operating under the exchange 
rules is interesting in its own right.  This parallels observations by Bessembinder, 
Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) regarding dealer behavior when subject to TRACE 
reporting rules, and raises the same question as to whether this can be attributed to lower 
operating expenses or rent extraction.  
The results in this paper do not allow for a precise breakdown of the sources of 
the cost differences between the two markets, but are consistent with the hypothesis that 
pretrade transparency reduces trading costs in the corporate bond market.  This is 
important because pretrade transparency is not well understood, and the academic 
literature contains conflicting theoretical predictions and empirical evidence of its effects.  
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to present evidence relating to the 
effect of pretrade transparency in the corporate bond market since posttrade transparency 
has existed through TRACE.  These results also highlight a previously unknown puzzle: 
why are small corporate bond trades executed OTC when an NYSE execution is available 
as an alternative?  Agency problems that arise when a broker makes or influences the 





Finally, the method I develop to analyze stale quote-induced errors should 
increase confidence in these specific results and may be applicable to other problems in 
empirical market microstructure.  I show that, under certain conditions, errors in the 
trading cost differences are related to trade signing errors.  I introduce a procedure to 
estimate the probability of trade signing errors when applying the quote rule on stale 
quotes, using the time and price of the trade, quotes before and after the trade, and quote 
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Table 4.1 Quote Summary Statistics   
Quotes are NYSE closing quotes for corporate bonds reported from Feb 6, 2002 through April 20, 2007, a 
period of 1,313 trading days.  Screens include: issue type must be domestic corporate; not in default; there 





Initial Sample  Final Sample 
Number of Quotes  1,476,686  198,675 
Market Type, Number obs     
   2-sided  341,908  198,675 
   Ask only  9,986  0 
   Bid only  314,159  0 
   None  810,633  0 
Midpoints      
   Mean  101.29  103.70 
   Std Dev  37.37  4.73 
   Median  102.31  103.31 
   10th %ile  75.19  98.28 
   90th %ile  114.31  110.19 
Quoted Spreads, $ per 100$ par     
   Mean  3.04  2.21 
   Std Dev  2.92  1.90 
   Median  2.00  1.50 
   10th %ile  0.50  0.50 
   90th %ile  6.88  5.13 
Ask Sizes     
   N  351,894  198,675 
   Mean  41.6  44.7 
   Std Dev  56.5  60.8 
   Median  30  35 
   10th %ile  5  8 
   90th %ile  89  94 
Bid Sizes     
   N  656,067  198,675 
   Mean  43.9  46.1 
   Std Dev  52.7  64.9 
   Median  40  40 
   10th %ile  10  10 






Table 4.2 Trade Summary Statistics 
Corporate bonds trades from NYSE ABS system from Feb 6, 2002 through April 20, 2007 and matched 
small OTC trades from TRACE from July 1, 2002 through April 20, 2007.  Screens include: all trades must 
be matched with a quote passing screening criteria; trades with extreme prices, unusual status codes, or 
errors are removed; NYSE trades must be matched with a same-bond, same-day TRACE trade; and 
TRACE trades must be for <100 bonds and not appear to be executed on the NYSE.  Extreme prices are 
defined as <= 80 or >=125.  Statistics for trades on an issue in a particular sample are only based on trades 












Days in Sample  1,313  1,199  1,199 
Number of trades  346,471  53,811  114,860 
Num Issues  757  227  227 
Trade size       
   Mean  23.0  28.6  22.5 
   Std Dev  53.5  44.0  18.2 
   Median  12  15  17 
   10th %ile  3  5  5 
   90th %ile  50  56  50 
Num of trades/day       
   Mean  263.9  44.9  95.8 
   Std Dev  235.1  33.4  77.6 
   Median  180  40  78 
   10th %ile  33  8  22 
   90th %ile  614  86  174 
Daily volume       
   Mean  6,069.9  1,284.0  2,153.0 
   Std Dev  5,864.0  1,284.6  1,739.1 
   Median  3,813  943  1,790 
   10th %ile  559  136  436 
   90th %ile  14,413  2,795  4,082 








   Mean  0.349  0.198  0.422 
   Std Dev  0.986  0.684  1.606 
   Median  0.045  0.026  0.040 
   10th %ile  0.002  0.002  0.002 
   90th %ile  0.699  0.425  0.711 








   Mean  8.0  5.7  9.5 
   Std Dev  26.4  24.9  35.6 
   Median  0.8  0.4  0.9 
   10th %ile  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   90th %ile  14.6  9.0  17.3 






Table 4.3 Dealer Trade Summary Statistics 
Corporate bonds trades from NYSE ABS system meeting full sample screens that appear to be dealer trades 
and matched small OTC trades from TRACE.  An NYSE trade is identified as a dealer trade if a same 
bond, same price, same size trade is reported on TRACE with a trade time +/- 15 minutes of the NYSE 
trade time. Statistics for trades on an issue in a particular sample are only based on trades entering that 







Days in Sample  1,006  1,006 
Number of trades  3,704  41,785 
Num Issues  154  154 
Trade size     
   Mean  18.5  22.0 
   Std Dev  16.9  17.8 
   Median  10  16 
   10th %ile  4  5 
   90th %ile  49  50 
Num of trades/day     
   Mean  3.7  41.5 
   Std Dev  2.9  60.6 
   Median  3  24 
   10th %ile  1  4 
   90th %ile  7  82 
Daily volume     
   Mean  68.2  914.6 
   Std Dev  64.3  1303.2 
   Median  50  511 
   10th %ile  10  65 
   90th %ile  155  1,963 






   Mean  0.024  0.443 
   Std Dev  0.064  1.324 
   Median  0.006  0.081 
   10th %ile  0.001  0.010 
   90th %ile  0.052  0.882 






   Mean  0.270  5.939 
   Std Dev  1.397  30.503 
   Median  0.018  0.309 
   10th %ile  0.002  0.025 
   90th %ile  0.346  6.860 






Table 4.4 Mean Effective Spread Summary for Full Selected Sample 
TRACE trades suspected of being executed on the NYSE are omitted from the OTC sample.  Trades are 
signed using the quote rule. 
     
  NYSE  OTC 
 


























1.15  43,537  2.34 




1.11  26,190  2.30 




1.12  21,163  2.15 




1.09  5,657  1.98 




1.10  11,457  1.86 















   Buy 
 
21,739  1.15  59,162  2.49 
   Sell 
 
29,817  1.17  54,357  1.93 
   Unclassified 
 
2,255  0.00  1,341  0.00 







Table 4.5 Regression Estimates of Effective Spread Difference between Bond Trades 
on the NYSE and in the OTC Market using Various Controls   
 
The regression model is: 
 
Spreaditn = αi + αit + β1 NYSE + β2j SIZEj + β3 BUY + β4 SELL + ε 
 
where i indexes issues, t indexes days, n indexes trades, and j indexes trade size groups. The regression is 
estimated with bond and date fixed effects.  NYSE is a dummy indicating whether trade was executed on 
NYSE.  Trade size is in bonds.  BUY and SELL are dummies indicating whether the trade was a buy or 
sell.  Trades are signed using the quote rule.  When controlling for trade sign, unclassified trades are 
removed from the data and the panel is rebalanced. 
         
  Model 
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Trade Size         
   1-10    0.38 
(24.77) 
   0.38 
(24.87) 
   11-20    0.31 
(19.43) 
   0.31 
(19.10) 
   21-30    0.22 
(13.56) 
   0.22 
(13.05) 
   31-40    0.11 
(5.10) 
   0.10 
(4.60) 
   41-50    0.03 
(1.85) 
   0.03 
(1.66) 
Trade Sign         




N  168,671  168,671  163,729  163,729 
R2  48.3 %  48.8%  48.8%  49.1% 






Table 4.6 Regression Estimates of Effective Spread Difference between Bond Trades 
on the NYSE and in the OTC Market Using Various Controls and Interactions   
The regression model is: 
Spreaditn = αi + αit + β1j (NYSE * SIZEj) + β2 (NYSE * BUY) + β3 (NYSE * SELL) 
+ β4j SIZEj + β5 BUY + β6 SELL 
where i indexes issues, t indexes days, n indexes trades, and j indexes trade size groups. The regression is 
estimated with bond and date fixed effects.  NYSE is a dummy indicating whether trade was executed on 
NYSE.  Trade size is in bonds.  BUY and SELL are dummies indicating whether the trade was a buy or 
sell.  Trades are signed using the quote rule.  When controlling for trade sign, unclassified trades are 
removed from the data and the panel is rebalanced. 
           Model       
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade Size         
   1-10  0.61 
(30.08) 




   11-20  0.54 
(25.99) 




   21-30  0.42 
(19.63) 




   31-40  0.26 
(9.32) 




   41-50  0.15 
(6.55) 




Trade Size Interactions         
   1-10  x NYSE  -1.28 
(-99.02) 
     -1.07 
(-71.32) 
   11-20 x NYSE  -1.31 
(-73.11) 
     -1.08 
(-55.86) 
   21-30 x NYSE  -1.18 
(-59.16) 
     -0.95 
(-44.04) 
   31-40 x NYSE  -1.02 
(-28.65) 
     -0.79 
(-21.25) 
   41-50 x NYSE  -0.92 
(-35.57) 
     -0.68 
(-24.69) 
   >50 x NYSE  -0.75 
(-27.48) 
     -0.52 
(-17.93) 
Trade Sign         






Trade Sign Interactions         











N  168,671  163,729  163,729  163,729 





Table 4.7 Regression Estimates of Effective Spread Difference between Bond Trades 
Executed by Dealers on the NYSE and in the OTC Market Using Various Controls   
A trade executed on the NYSE is considered a dealer trade if it is reported in TRACE.  The regression 
model is: 
 
Spreaditn = αi + αit + β1 NYSE + β2j SIZEj + β3 BUY + β4 SELL + ε 
 
where i indexes issues, t indexes days, n indexes trades, and j indexes trade size groups. The regression is 
estimated with bond and date fixed effects.  NYSE is a dummy indicating whether trade was executed on 
NYSE.  Trade size is in bonds.  BUY and SELL are dummies indicating whether the trade was a buy or 
sell.  Trades are signed using the quote rule.  When controlling for trade sign, unclassified trades are 
removed from the data and the panel is rebalanced. 
 
         
  Model       
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Trade Size         
   1-10    0.43 
(12.39) 
   0.43 
(12.04) 
   11-20    0.36 
(9.90) 
   0.33 
(8.97) 
   21-30    0.31 
(8.31) 
   0.28 
(7.55) 
   31-40    0.18 
(3.74) 
   0.15 
(3.11) 
   41-50    0.09 
(2.29) 
   0.08 
(1.94) 
Trade Sign         




N  45,489  45,489  43,395  43,395 
R2  40.4 %  40.8 %  41.5%  41.9% 






Table 4.8 Regression Estimates of Effective Spread Difference between Dealer Bond 
Trades on the NYSE and the OTC Market Using Various Controls and Interactions   
A trade executed on the NYSE is considered a dealer trade if it is reported in TRACE.  The regression 
model is: 
 
Spreaditn = αi + αit + β1j (NYSE * SIZEj) + β2 (NYSE * BUY) + β3 (NYSE * SELL) 
+ β4j SIZEj + β5 BUY + β6 SELL 
 
where i indexes issues, t indexes days, n indexes trades, and j indexes trade size groups. The regression is 
estimated with bond and date fixed effects.  NYSE is a dummy indicating whether trade was executed on 
NYSE.  Trade size is in bonds.  BUY and SELL are dummies indicating whether the trade was a buy or 
sell.  Trades are signed using the quote rule.  When controlling for trade sign, unclassified trades are 
removed from the data and the panel is rebalanced.  
           Model 
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade Size         
   1-10  .45 
(12.51) 




   11-20  0.38 
(10.20) 




   21-30  0.32 
(8.62) 




   31-40  0.19 
(3.82) 




   41-50  0.10 
(2.47) 




Trade Size Interactions         
   1-10  x NYSE  -1.08 
(-26.83) 
     -0.87 
(-18.55) 
   11-20 x NYSE  -1.16 
(-18.46) 
     -0.92 
(-13.32) 
   21-30 x NYSE  -1.15 
(-16.43) 
     -0.94 
(-12.39) 
   31-40 x NYSE  -0.97 
(-6.59) 
     -0.72 
(-4.76) 
   41-50 x NYSE  -1.00 
(-10.19) 
     -0.70 
(-6.67) 
   >50 x NYSE  -0.78 
(-5.46) 
     -0.60 
(-4.07) 
Trade Sign         






Trade Sign Interactions         











N  45,489  43,395  43,395  43,395 





Table 4.9 Impact of Stale Quotes on Estimates of Effective Spread Difference 
between Bond Trades on the NYSE and OTC Market Controlling for Trade Size 
and Sign 
Sign interaction terms are used to estimate differences separately for buys and sells.  The regression model 
is: 
 
Spreaditn = αi + αit + β1 (NYSE * BUY) + β2 (NYSE * SELL) + β3j SIZEj + β4 BUY  
 
where i indexes issues, t indexes days, n indexes trades, and j indexes trade size groups. The regression is 
estimated with bond and date fixed effects.  NYSE is a dummy indicating whether trade was executed on 
NYSE.  Trade size is in bonds.  BUY and SELL are dummies indicating whether the trade was a buy or 
sell.  Trades are signed using the quote rule.  When controlling for trade sign, unclassified trades are 
removed from the data and the panel is rebalanced.  The baseline model is Model 3 from Table 5 and is 
estimated in the full sample.  Confidence level refers to the confidence that the trade is signed correctly.  
The “Conf. Data” model is the same regression repeated on the subset of data where trade sign confidence 
levels can be estimated.  The “Conf > =85%” model is the same regression estimated on the subset of data 
where the confidence level is >= 85%.  The WLS model is estimated using Weighted Least Squares where 
trades are weighted by sign confidence.  Stale quote errors introduce less error into estimated effective 
spread differences when trade sign confidence is high and differences are estimated separately for buys and 
sells. 
 
         
  Model 




> =85%  WLS 
Trade Size         








































Trade Sign         








Trade Sign Interactions         
   Buy x NYSE  -1.39 
(-105.10) 














N  163,729  144,942  83,282  144,942 
R2  49.4%  48.0 %  51.8 %  51.0 % 
  
 
 
